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A B S T R A C T
This paper explores how mapping historical cycles of innovation and finance 
can inform the future of innovation for industrial clusters. This method is discussed 
in combination with strategic frameworks for increased cluster survival — such as the 
GEMS model for cluster adaptation — and the Three Horizons foresight methodology that 
can complement the historical cycles method. Three stages of cluster development are 
described and charted for five regional clusters , detailing factors contributing to their 
rise and fall which can help firms and clusters understand their place along a life cycle. 
Beneficial agglomeration externalities are also detailed for the case studies. Kondratieff, 
Schumpeter, Elliot waves and the Fourth Turning generational cycles are brought togeth-
er to show how cycles of innovation and decline can be mapped over long periods, adding 
to the insights that other foresight methodologies can bring to cluster planning.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N                                   
I n this paper, I will attempt to show how history can be used to prepare for a better future when combined with theory and emerging foresight practices. I have always been interested in American business history, and was introduced to the historical 
development of key processes in the growth and development of the modern corporation 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries while in university. Personalities asso-
ciated with the rise and fall of famous firms, the decisions they made in the context of 
their time, and surrounding historical and social movements are compelling to me. Of 
particular interest is the history of the automobile, which I felt could be a starting point 
for a major research project if I expanded the area of study to organizational management, 
systems thinking and social influences around a few key firms. In order for the project to 
include a significant foresight and innovation component, however, I resolved to expand 
the study to include multiple regions where innovation took hold and then experienced 
decline — and then reflect on lessons learned that can ensure success for the clusters of 
today and of the future.                                                                                                                                                                                            
My research question developed into: how can we inform the future of regional innovation 
ecosystems by learning from historical case studies and historically-informed innova-
tion systems alongside firm and inter-firm dynamics, which can bring a more substantive 
approach to foresight methods and guide strategies and governance for future innovation 
ecosystems and their component firms? With this question, we can also ask why promi-
nent innovation regions can lose their ability to sustain themselves in a new technology 
regime. Is it because of unchanging competencies, fixed routines that benefited an earlier 
era, the permanent drying-up of financing sources following an economic downturn, or 
ineffective management, or all of the above? Can factors identified in the rise and demise 
of a city like Dayton and its capacity for far-reaching invention, or a similar progression 
for Detroit’s manufacturing dominance help envision the future of innovation centers 
beyond Silicon Valley’s digital computing importance? Can loss of a regional hegemony be 
prevented? By going back into history, foresight techniques can be strengthened through 
insights based on factors that benefited or hurt an industrial cluster.
Cadillacs emerging 
from the factory, 
Detroit, ca. 1917
Author’s collection
2* The Italian garment  
industry is one other  
cluster model that is 
frequently cited as a 
successful
S U R F I N G  T H E  WAV E S  A N D  
WA L K I N G  T H E  S T R E E T S :  
T H E  M E T H O D S                                                 
T o generate insight into how firms and regions might plan for the future, I under-took a primary and secondary study of present and former regions of innovation, combined with the study of historical wave theory and other foresight methods. 
Historical examples of clusters relating to their emergence as centers of innovation and 
reasons for decline are explored in long-term case studies of three American industrial 
regions. I chose American clusters for discussion because of the dramatics of their rise, 
the fascinating figures identified with their histories, and because narratives of American 
firms and clusters are plentiful in cluster and business literature*. My narrative of the 
three regions — Dayton, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan and Hartford, Connecticut — focuses 
on their stature as technological regimes with centers of expertise that were unique in 
the nation before being disrupted. It is my belief that shared factors of their emergence 
and decline can point to lessons for present and future industrial clusters. In order to get 
a sense of what I understood to be a proud history and contrasting present situation up 
close, I conducted field research in Dayton. I interviewed local historians, an institutional 
manager, and a director of a small business hub to get a sense of what went wrong, and 
if there is a new future being built. I engaged in ethnographic research, photographing 
decline in the city center.                                                                                                                                                                                    
  Secondary case study research includes Detroit, with its similar narrative of rise and 
decline, and a comparably minor study of a single firm in Hartford. Modern clusters are 
represented by Silicon Valley — currently positioned in a late stage of the information age, 
heading into a fourth industrial revolution — and New York City, which is emerging with 
other candidate cities as a favoured tech cluster. As with historical clusters that I have 
positioned as useful for foresight study, Silicon Valley is subject to internal and exter-
nal systems that can ensure its dominance or imperil survival. I will point out positive 
growth strategies that a few choice emerging clusters exhibit, but will also feature an ef-
fort underway in downtown Dayton to reverse the region’s long decline with strategies for 
commercial success. Historical lessons derived from factors related to the emergence and 
decline of regions can be combined with knowledge of strategies for cluster growth cur-
rently in use, and then strengthened with foresight methods to construct a better course 
of action for regions. Another device that can be used to mirror the past in the present 
(while also having a foresight function) are reputable historical waves of economics and 
innovation, which are included in the project to function as a companion to the cluster 
narratives. They demonstrate that the emergence, success and failure of innovation and 
its capitalization can be traced along cycles through history, and suggest that the future 
can be planned for by following an expected trajectory of economic events that spur or 
interrupt innovation’s advance.                                                                                                                               
3Along with history, theory and strategic thinking needs to be a part of a discussion that 
aims to advance the success of industrial clusters. For a background of how clusters exist 
as complex systems that have their own structure that influences their behaviour, I have 
included a few key takeaways of cluster theory. Along with a description of clusters as 
complex systems, I will identify the benefits and vulnerabilities of clustering, the stages 
of cluster emergence, maturity and decline, and will discuss how a cluster’s architecture 
may help or hurt its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Three strategic mod-
els that are designed to influence the adaptability of clusters are reviewed, along with a 
discussion of why people in some industries make their home in certain regions instead 
of others — movements of people and talent that have a great influence on the future of a 
region’s wellbeing.                                                                                                                                                                                                            
      
How government policy can help or hinder nationwide economic growth is also discussed, 
and likewise holds lessons for the present and the future. The most straightforward 
tool for stimulating useful foresight proposed in this paper is a framework designed for 
bringing people of past, future and in-the-now mindsets together to work out strategies 
for growth. It is hoped that armed with different varieties of knowledge — of the past, 
theories of what makes up the current system and signals of what is emerging in the pres-
ent — a purposeful foresight tool can direct firms and clusters towards a positive future. 
The signals pertaining to developments and risks for regions comprise a section which 
also includes uncertainties which clusters should plan for, and a look into possible future 
scenarios that give a glimpse into a world of innovation and work which can go in different 
directions. 
The city of Dayton in its 




We start by considering clusters as complex  
systems, and then define the benefits of the com-
ing-together of agents in geographic proximity.  
The stages of a life cycle of clusters are considered, 
and how the architecture of clusters can help or 
hinder their adaptability.
Flint, Michigan, 1910
Wayne State University 
Digital Archives
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A  C O M P L E X I T Y  P E R S P E C T I V E  F O R  C L U S T E R S
I t is important to establish the nature of clusters at a system level, to inform lessons learned when looking at historical examples or in attempting to make changes for the future. If we want to ensure effectiveness when making changes to the differ-
ent cluster agents (firms, educational institutions, suppliers, etc.) or their interactions 
with each other as needed to ensure adaptiveness, we need to have some understanding 
of their complex interactions that may help or conflict with our change efforts. Clusters, 
as described by Kirsten Press in A Lifecycle for Clusters? are complex systems that have 
emergent properties that are derived from the activities of agents and the interdependen-
cies between them. Agents are configured in their own individual forms, having evolved 
to their state depending on the industry and territory. It can be said that clusters,  
therefore, have the first three requirements of systems: agents, interdependence and  
distinctness.                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  These agents that are able to use their proximity to each other to benefit from trust-based 
relationships, whether with partnering firms, government institutions, local buyers, 
local universities and others who can mutually benefit from co-location. Because of this 
partnering, innovations are thought to be able to spread faster, with products that can 
achieve greater specialized value while having the capacity to be upgraded at a quicker 
pace (Press, 2006). In the U.S., examples of clusters are found in the high concentrations 
of mutual-fund companies that can be found in Boston, aerospace and defence builders 
in Seattle, the familiar automotive firms in Detroit, motion picture studios in southern 
California, amusement parks in central Florida, and so on (Dzialo, 2018, McCraw, 2000). 
In order for these firms survive in a complex system, there needs to be a certain degree 
of agency at the system level, with interacting components of non-linear relationships 
that are open to environmental influences. At the higher level, the architecture of the 
cluster will have significant impact on the behaviour of elements at the component level, 
extending to all the components within the cluster. The cluster cannot adapt on its own, 
but can steer individual activity from a systems perspective (Press, 2006). It will be seen 
that automotive firms in Detroit, for example, had individual strategies for combating the 
initial influx of foreign competition, but also attempted to act in unity as a cluster. These 
were agent and cluster decisions that ultimately proved to be of insufficient  
foresight.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Since adaptation cannot be understood by studying the individual firms of a cluster alone, 
clusters meet the second definition of complex adaptive systems (“the overall behavior of 
the system of elements is not predicted by the behavior of the individual elements”). Clus-
ters do not have the central decision-making authority that would suggest a simpler pro-
6cess characterized by integrated organizations. Interdependent agents might be adapting 
to external changes, while at the same time relying on fellow agent’s activities and trying 
to conform to behavioral restraints of the cluster’s understanding of acceptable business 
practice. In Detroit’s example, car makers responded to foreign competition by trying new 
model strategies at the firm level, but adopted a don’t-rock-the-boat behaviour at the larg-
er cluster level). Adaptation can take time, and the efficient system can be endangered if 
the surrounding environment is unstable, as is almost always the case (Press, 2006). The 
complexity of the adaptiveness of agents is one of the more inaccessible features of study-
ing clusters, but a disciplined study of complex systems in the form of inter-firm dynamics 
would be a benefit for those who aspire to lead industrial regions. Texts such as Thinking 
in Systems: A Primer by Donella H. Meadows (2008) or Systems Thinking: Managing Cha-
os and Complexity by Jamshid Gharajedaghi (2011) could provide a valuable grounding in 
trying to figure out sensible systems that address this complexity.
Fig. 1 shows Press’ conception of the nature of ideal clusters, with agents, interdepen-
dence and co-ordination behaving within territorial boundaries. All of these agents con-
tribute to agglomeration externalities. The arrows represent the competing and comple-
mentary exchange of activities by different cluster agents (Press, 2006).                                                            















7W H Y  S T A Y  T O G E T H E R ?  
T H E  B E N E F I T S  O F  C L U S T E R I N G                         
T hough clusters are indeed complex in their difficulty to successfully regulate at the firm or system level, sharing a spatial proximity has a history of benefits. These benefits are seen in the first stage of the emergence of clusters, and are also 
be seen in the initial upward thrust of historical waves of innovation. The founding text 
that extensively analyzed and proposed a theory of why clusters emerge was Alfred Mar-
shall’s Principle of Economics (1890, revised in 1920), which discusses benefits of co-lo-
cation, the spillover of information, scale, specialization and attraction of demand. This 
work builds on economic theories going back to Adam Smith, who recognized the impor-
tance of division of labour and specialization. Marshall, however, investigated the wealth 
of regions and industries rather than nations, and proposed that firms cluster spatially in 
distinct areas because of three benefits that are self-reinforcing: 
First, labour clusters where firms cluster; firms and labour can match each other’s 
special characteristics, making both more productive, possibly reducing unemployment 
(pooling resources). Second, clustered firms benefit from other firms in technological 
learning, which builds up the productivity of all firms, allowing clusters to be more pro-
ductive (information flow/spillover). Third, suppliers that enter a cluster allow for lower 
transactions costs and specialization, benefiting both suppliers and firms (integration 
of specialized inputs) (Klepper, 2011, Agrawal, J., et al., 2012). This mutual knowledge and 
trust saves money for everyone involved, with skill transfer and benefit of qualifications 
that promote innovations and innovation diffusion (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012).                                                                                             
C L U S T E R I N G  O F  A  C O M M U N I T Y
The least centralized system is the traditional competitive system. When relationships 
eventually form among firms, costs such as searching decline (e.g. just-in-time delivery 
of parts embodied by Toyota in the 1980s). Three dimensions of embeddedness that can 
be reinforced in clusters are territorial, social and network. Strong ties among work-
ers, including managers, can increase the amount of information available to firms and 
readiness of people to share what they know. From there, relationships gain a dimension 
of friendship, which counterbalances the competitiveness among firms. Chance meetings 
may promote discussion of common problems and new initiatives (Jacobson, et al., 2008). 
A local culture of informal institutions might govern local business practices, enabling 
and facilitating inter-firm exchanges within the cluster (Press, 2006). An important ex-
ample of informal institutions and chance meetings can be seen throughout the history of  
Dayton, as will be shown in the discussion of the rise of Delco and the strong ties held by 
those connected with or influenced by the National Cash Register Company (see also the 
GEMS model).                                                                                               
8K  N O W L E  D G  E  I  N  T H  E  A I  R
Labour mobility found in industrial clusters can enhance knowledge in a district; work-
ers change jobs, become foremen, and set up business themselves (spin-offs). Some of 
these businesses will fail, but talented people who have gone out on their own can then be 
reabsorbed as employees in other firms. In Silicon Valley, for instance, entrepreneurship 
is rewarded, and failure is not stigmatized (though there is the potential weakness of 
today’s unbounded confidence in the aimless “cool idea” criticized in today’s Silicon Val-
ley). Knowledge generation occurs because of the effective mechanisms for its diffusion, 
and the ability to transform that knowledge for new contexts* (Jacobson, et al., 2008). 
When learning in these communities of practice transcends firm boundaries, a kind of 
character can be imparted to the cluster. As Marshall wrote of 19th century Britain, “to 
use a mode of speaking which workmen themselves use, the skill required for their work 
‘is in the air, and children breathe it as they grow up’”. This too would have been felt in 
Dayton’s 19th century intense atmosphere for invention, or in the companies that were 
putting America on the move in Detroit. Along with information diffusion, the creation of 
new sets of knowledge through shared preoccupations can result in a stronger “gene pool” 
within the sector. Solutions originally regarded as competing may turn out to be comple-
mentary and well-suited to different niches in the district (Jacobson, et al., 2008).
M O D U L A R I T Y  A N D  S P E C I A L I Z AT I O N
With new information gained from the frequent meetings of participants, improvements 
in processes can be integrated by leading firms in the cluster that collect information 
along several segments of the supply chain. In these processes, high levels of differentia-
tion and specialization allow firms to focus on aspects of the supply chain in which they 
are especially competent (Press, 2006). From an industrial perspective, when common 
practices in a cluster lead to high degrees of consistency of products and processes, 
formal and informal modularity can be achieved to the cluster’s benefit (Jacobson, et 
al., 2008). This occurred as far back as the early 1920s in Detroit, when a dominant auto 
design emerged, leading to a significant increase in the modularity of cars, which allowed 
for a thriving after-market of parts (Argyres, Bigelow, 2010). A more generalized vision 
shared by participants of a cluster’s business and how firms are expected to go about it 
can also take place (which would eventually work to Detroit’s disadvantage, and per-
haps in time, Silicon Valley’s as well). Good working knowledge of how products relate 
to existing configurations or components can help firms and their suppliers innovate to 
achieve success in the marketplace (Jacobson, et al., 2008). Richard Florida, an economic 
geographer, cites Jane Jacobs in stating that innovation is drawn from a diverse pool of 
resources, in cities where “so many people are close together, and among them contain so 
many different tastes, skills, needs, supplies and bees in their bonnets” (Florida, 2008). 
The coming-together of agents in a cluster, therefore, brings about a shared community of 
knowledge and habits that sustains success for a certain period of time.                                
* Uncertainty about whether 
spatial proximity is truly 
needed in the dispersal of 
knowledge-intensive work 
appears in the literature, 
and most activities are 
frequently outsourced 
locally in today’s digital 
world. But it will be seen 
that important instances 
of convergence -- of money, 
skill, social benefits and 
opportunity still seem to 
demand a contingency for 
like minds to meet together 
for complex transactions. 
In Silicon Valley, for exam-
ple, there is a recognition 
of a ‘20 minute rule’ of how 
long venture capitalists are 
willing to travel to hear a 
high-risk tech pitch. Some 
commuters, on the other 
hand, are willing to endure 
ever-longer commutes to be 
able to work in an important 
cluster (Florida, 2008). The 
Three Horizons method 
for devising a practical 
future (discussed later) is an 
example of the possibilities 
for convergence of imagina-
tion that would be difficult 
remotely. 
9S P I N N I N G - O F F  S U C C E S S
In the literature, Steven Klepper discusses the spinning-off of firms that are an important 
activity of clusters that through history, have created much innovation and contribution 
to the economy. Leading firms in clusters are predominantly spin-offs of other leading 
firms originating in the cluster (Klepper, 2011). Important spin-offs in history will be  
detailed in the narratives of Dayton, Detroit and Silicon Valley. Learning the heredity  
of familiar companies that are the result of an enterprising individual, chafing under  
a successful but constraining firm, can be surprising. Some of the characteristics of spin-
offs are:
• Clusters begin with a successful diversifier, often former employees who have learned 
much from a successful firm, and go out on their own to start an organization that in 
some way mirrors the incumbent firm.
• Clusters experience a high rate of spin-offs; the percentage of entrants that are spin-offs 
is greater in clusters than elsewhere.
• Clusters are home to the most fertile spawners of spin-offs.
• Spin-offs in clusters are more competent on average than spin-offs elsewhere and other 
kinds of new firms denoted as startups, based on the superior knowledge and practices 
learned from the successful founding firm.
The National Cash Register Company (NCR), based in Dayton, Ohio, influenced talent 
that went on to form Delco and the Dayton Computing Scale Company, which would later 
become IBM. In Detroit, this heredity of organizational reproduction can be seen in the 
founding of automobile firms, started by former ‘pupils’ from successful firms that set 
the pace. The Olds Motor Works, for example, trained several men that would make their 
name in the auto industry: Olds subcontractors helped build both Ford (1903) and Ca-
dillac (1902); and a former Oldsmobile executive started Maxwell, which eventually was 
folded in with another firm to become Chrysler (1925). The better performance of firms 
equates to more valuable lessons for enterprising employees, resulting in spin-offs located 
near the incumbent businesses’ location (Klepper, 2011).                                                                                                        
 
T H E  V E R T I C A L  I M P U L S E
Historically, vertical integration was the most common structure of firms, as small 
markets do not permit specialization. Dynamic transaction costs in the early stages of an 
industry may force organizations to produce their own inputs and exhibit centralized pro-
cesses. Complex, new-to-the world products are built by firms that have their own central 
product architectures, often earning a price premium based on the uniqueness of product 
design (Argyres, Bigelow, 2010). As will be seen, The Pope Manufacturing Company in 
Hartford spent years perfecting the painstaking process of building some of the world’s 
most sophisticated and exclusive bicycles before inviting (and then acquiring) suppliers 
to speed up growth. These external suppliers may only appear after a product has estab-
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lished itself, followed by a more horizontal business landscape of cooperating firms and 
suppliers.                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The reverse can also happen: an industry may develop quickly into an industrial cluster 
but transform into a vertically integrated firm when innovation raises dynamic trans-
action costs. Examples of this are the early Detroit automobile industry* or with watch 
manufacturers in Switzerland in the late 20th century (Jacobson, et al., 2008). In the case 
of Ford, however, the result of extreme centralization of production and control tended to 
suffocate success (Liu, et al., 2015), as it did with NCR. For modern-day tech industries, 
the architecture of their complex products tends to become more modular as they develop, 
while mechanisms for innovation knowledge in open systems vary in degrees of central-
ization. Ultimately, it is helpful to know to what degree a structure should be vertically or 
horizontally integrated for optimal success; the consideration is mentioned here only as 
part of a background on clusters to influence further firm and cluster-level discussion.
* Ford had been in business 
for ten years before it 
stopped buying compo-
nents from the Dodge 
Brothers and geared up for 
its famous vertically-inte-
grated Rouge River plant
4 o’clock shift at the  
Ford Motor Company 




S T A G E S  O F  A  C L U S T E R                                                                      
A s innovation and its investment can be plotted along historical innovation time lines, Kirsten Press has identified stages particular to clusters. Analyzing these stages of development can be useful in the emergence or maturity of a cluster to 
prepare for a possible decline in a later stage. A cluster’s emergence follows the discov-
ery of something in a region that makes it a suitable location for the industry. Pioneering 
startup activity that exhibits success will attracts firms to the emerging cluster, acceler-
ating its advance (Press, 2006, McCraw, 2000). An increasing division of labour follows: 
mergers, acquisitions and exits of firms, and the arrival of resources from outside the 
area. Eventually, a buoyant cluster will find what Press calls its ‘carrying capacity’ — its 
maximum size before becoming unsustainable. Press analyzes the relative success of 
clusters based on changes in firm and employee numbers, describing how the cluster’s 
carrying capacity results from varying external conditions that shift from positive to 
negative (between a positive and negative change event) (Press, 2006).                                                                                                                
F I R S T  S TA G E
Firms may enter an emerging cluster to take advantage of geographic benefits such as the 
availability of raw materials or access to transportation networks that are present. There 
may also be a promise of agglomeration (benefits of locating in a cluster) shared by a num-
ber of firms, reinforcing the movement of products further along innovation life cycles 
(Jacobson, et al., 2008).The firms that enter into an emerging cluster learn by proximity, 
facilitated in part from shared sources of technical knowledge, such as research institu-
tions or other firms (Press, 2006). Stanford Industrial Park in Silicon Valley was a major 
center of development at the beginning of the region’s tech cluster, and the possibilities of 
knowledge sharing would have been considerable. At this stage, there are benefits from 
the low transaction costs enjoyed by emerging clusters, plus the security of being able to 
manage one’s size in order to avoid over-capacities, made possible by division of labour 
through coordination among participating firms. This coordination results in the devel-
opment of a dominant product design that is favoured by users (Argyres, Bigelow, 2010). 
Because of these benefits, energetic clusters will have out-competed isolated firms. Over 
time, the need for frequent knowledge transfer and inter-firm coordination declines as 
a result of the stabilized nature of production and design. It should be noted, however, 
that this sequence of events in the cycle may reflect the more traditional story: not all 
industries move toward standardization, vertical integration, mass-production and cost 
competition. Transaction cost savings, tacit knowledge, division of labour may also not 
be important at the beginning of a cluster (Press, 2006). An accelerated flow of innova-
tions occurs, stemming from suppliers, or from the soundness of the relationship between 
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assemblers and their suppliers. Suppliers in the early stages of a life cycle can offer new 
variations on their components, which benefit assemblers by adopting improvements that 
consumers approve of (Jacobson, et al., 2008).                                                                                                                    
S E C O N D  S TA G E
The second stage of cluster development sees a consolidation of firms and growth of the 
cluster. A result of this growth is the increased competition of suppliers seeking to input 
into the system, a growth of infrastructure and a higher cost of increasingly scarce local 
products. Major consolidation occurred at multiple times in the Detroit auto industry, 
with a major shake up occurring in the mid-1950s, when Ford launched an aggressive 
campaign to be number one in the industry, pricing the remaining important independent 
car makers out of most markets, leaving only Ford, General Motors and Chrysler with a 
market share of over 90 percent (Klier, 2009). What Press describes as “negative agglom-
eration externalities” can take hold in the second stage, limiting the growth of the cluster, 
or even triggering its demise in changing economic conditions. The strength of a firm’s 
response to change events are influenced by the responses by other firms (expressed in 
the Press cluster model as ‘fitness’) (Press, 2006). As the industry matures, technology 
becomes standardized and production more integrated, which reduces the initial benefits 
of co-learning and discovery of important efficiencies made possible by proximity. The 
sustained strength of agglomeration economies that made for positive agglomeration will 
shift in time as more firms enter the cluster, decreasing as the threshold of the cluster size 
is reached. Competition for scarce location-intrinsic resources will eventually make the 
cluster less viable.                                                                                                                                                                                       
T H I R D  S TA G E
The level of standardization increases in the third stage, with the cost of a firm’s product 
now seen as more important than its innovation or performance. The decreased benefits 
of operating in a cluster and negative externalities become overwhelming, and a convul-
sive dispersal of activity may occur following an external event, such as the arrival of a 
lower-cost non-local entrant to the industry, or the emergence of an entirely new industry. 
Completely original ideas and products often come from discoveries that happen outside 
the existing cluster, and new industries tend to take shape in new locations that are rela-
tively low-cost compared to the original cluster. With the new locations established by the 
upstarts, their new technologies, often incompatible with the technologies established 
by the incumbent cluster, will in time become dominant (Press, 2006). New entrants will 
often have a smaller stake in the established technology known to the incumbents, and 
will therefore have less to lose from the cannibalization of the current technology (Rosen-
bloom, 2000). It will be shown, for example,  that Silicon Valley was better positioned 
geographically compared to Detroit in accessing the right suppliers of electronics for 
electric vehicles (though it can be argued that the Tesla example might not yet come close 
to true disruption). Other sources of exhaustion could be internal or regulatory inflexibil-
ities, changes in quality or demand, changes in production, and changes in transportation 
options (Press, 2006). 
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Altogether, there are many factors of emergence, maturity and decline that can be traced 
along the three stages of a cluster, and can serve as useful signposts for taking action in 
anticipation of the next stage in avoiding or mitigating disruption. The benefits of observ-
ing the workings of these stages with the resolution to act can be made more powerful 
when analyzing longer-term waves of innovation and historical case studies that demon-
strate these waves. While understanding the various benefits and dangers that can occur 
in a cluster’s life cycle is helpful, an expanding toolbox for cluster adaptiveness requires 
a more detailed knowledge of cluster architecture, its dynamics and points to leverage 
adaptability for successful outcomes.
A  D E P E N D A N T  A R C H I T E C T U R E                        
I t has been suggested above that the apparent benefits of cluster success can take a turn for the worse, to the point of ensuring the cluster’s decline in unstable circum-stances. For firms, this is a difficult paradox. It certainly supports the characteri-
zation of clusters as a complex systems — hard to conceive of in their myriad detail, and 
ultimately hard to manage effectively. In spite of this, Kirsten Press imagines a possibility 
for clusters to have agency in adapting to change events. Press proposes an N/K simulation 
model (originally developed to study the evolution of genomes where N counts as the num-
ber of components in the system and K measures the degree of interaction between com-
ponents) to explain when and why a cluster’s architecture assists or hampers adaptability 
to external threats. The simulation model can link the performance of agent adjustment 
to the influence of different cluster architectures — looking into when and how agglom-
eration externalities impact the fitness of firms and the cluster if economic conditions 
vary. Weak externalities, for example, make adaptation easier, but result in weaker cluster 
success (Press, 2006).                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Press’ simulation model investigates the pros and cons of architectures based on a hub-
and-spoke arrangement versus flexible specialization to cope with the challenge of glo-
balization, and then compares the different adaptability of districts. The N/K approach 
Press chooses “enables a comparative analysis of the adaptive performance of differently 
configured complex systems”, highlighting superior architectures that can adapt to exter-
nal changes. In spite of the benefits of flexibility, Press has implied that cluster develop-
ment has an element of betting to it*, and describes cluster adaptation and survival as 
path-dependant as a result of their structural properties (the architectural features that 
evolved throughout the cluster’s history which portend it’s future). Cluster architectures 
with established intermediate degrees of division of labour and a more collective arrange-
ment of governance fosters adaptability and possible future survival.                                                                    
A cluster’s successful adaptation to change is dependant on how well its agents can either 
self-organize or increase activity in other sectors to make up for failures in the original 
cluster. There also needs to be effective decentralized problem solving and communi-
*An interesting insight 
gained from a Sloan 
Business Review article 
is that while (surpris-
ingly) innovative output 
might actually decline for 
clustered firms, knowl-
edge spillover that does 
happens tends to be of a 
marketing nature, and can 
use this knowledge to find 
markets and customers 
for the right products 
(Yu, 2002).
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cation by local actors at the cluster level in order to recognize a change event and make 
effective adjustments. Survival seems to depend on an architecture of cluster-level fac-
tors to allow the contribution of positive actor-driven adaptation to change events. In this 
architecture, both formal and informal institutions would rise to facilitate the effective 
participation of cluster agents towards desirable actions. In Press’ description, “individ-
ual activities ‘drive’, while cluster level properties ‘steer’ adaptation to external events” 
(Press, 2006).                                                                                                                                                                                                   
T H E  N E G AT I V E  E F F E C T S  O F  E M B E D D E D N E S S
Players in the industrial cluster need to be able to adjust to externalities to survive, and 
good external channels of communication need to be cultivated. As seen the third stage of 
the cluster life cycle, however, a source of exhaustion could come from within. Firms can 
develop institutional behaviour patterns throughout their evolution to cope with environ-
mental risk and uncertainty — patterns that can be hard to unlearn in the face of a change 
event. Strong agglomeration externalities can lead to great success but hamper adapt-
ability to change. The close relationships in industrial clusters could eventually reduce 
access to knowledge developed outside of the district or from unfamiliar sources (e.g. 
success myopia). Both too much and too little proximity can hinder learning and innova-
tion. To function properly, proximity requires just the right amount of distance between 
agents or organizations. Proximity and embeddedness can evolve over time, from not 
enough to just enough to too much, suggesting a link between the issues of embeddedness 
and life cycle considerations. For instance, decentralized industrial districts may be at a 
disadvantage in generating innovations that require the development of new components 
as well as new ways of integrating components (Jacobson, et al., 2008).                                            
Fig. 2   C O N T I N U I T Y  A N D  C H A N G E  I N  C L U S T E R  D E V E L O P M E N T  (Press, 2006)
NUMB ER  AND  
AC T I V I T Y  O F  
LOCA L  F I RM S
T I M E
EMERGENCE ENDURANCE
EXHAUSTION?
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Fig. 2 visualizes the investigation of factors that shapes the development of the cluster 
through continuity and change: the drivers of emergence, endurance and exhaustion. 
L E A D E R S  A N D  I N T E G R AT O R S 
First-mover firms are crucial to the formation of clusters, sustaining development and 
maintenance of the cluster. In today’s clusters, firms that are in a position to lead should 
understand that much of the success of the cluster depends on their approach. These flag-
ship firms can pull a network together, and facilitate learning and adaptation throughout 
a change event. To do this, they must possess a wide range of knowledge or capabilities. 
They also need to be powerful enough to force other firms to follow their lead. Lead firms 
might be in a position to help smaller firms when, for example, there is difficulty in jump-
ing from one technology to another in an attempt to adapt. Lead firms can integrate with 
strong external connections to smooth this process of change (Jacobson, et al., 2008). A 
leading firm, for example, might assist in alliancing several independent district firms to 
form closely-linked business groups. Resource constraints faced by small firms can then 
be overcome though the shared adaptation of several independent agents in coordination 
with each other. Adaptation by arbitrage is a form of integrating for adaptation, where 
consolidation or elimination of actors can be benefit the cluster, such as when old indus-
tries can act as incubators or as a source of resources for newly-emerging sectors that 
hold promise (Press, 2006).                                                                                                                                                                
An example of a lead firm from the case studies is The National Cash Register Compa-
ny, which reigned supreme in Dayton in the early 1900s. Its example of doing businesses 
would have been considered a model to surrounding firms (exemplified by the firm’s 
willingness to open up its factory to public view). In the 1920s, General Motors lead their 
industry with the very latest in business and production organization methods. More re-
cently in Silicon Valley, a leadership or integrating role has been undertaken by denizens 
in the form of venture capitalists or lawyers who have a strong grasp of the tech landscape 
in the region, and can strategize connections among small high-specialized firms (Jacob-
son, et al., 2008). Of course, quality of leadership matters. Will a lead firm or integrator 
act with the longer-term sustainability of the greater cluster in mind, or will it treat other 
firms and suppliers as perishable commodities or leverage points for fleeting profit?                     
VA L U E  O F F E R E D
Whether a lead firm or just a supplier, all firms in a cluster need to offer value for success-
ful commercialization of their outputs. Firms dropping off the Fortune 500 “are likely to 
have experienced value deficiencies, and failed to remediate these deficiencies by rede-
signing and/or creating new work processes to provide offerings that the marketplace 
valued,” according to a paper in Journal of Enterprise Transformation (Liu, et al., 2015) As 
will be seen in the case study of the Wright Brothers Institute, enterprise transformation 
is driven by observing or anticipating value deficiencies (the Institute would recognize 
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that their technology lacked a receptive audience). In the paper When Transformation 
Fails, the authors identified processes that contributed to the failure of automobile com-
panies; they judged that success emerges from processes driven by accurate forecasting 
of market requirements, and by the adoption and execution of development processes that 
resulted in the right car at the right time. These decisions were driven less by ego and sin-
gle-minded financial dictates, and benefited from a champion or keeper of the vision who 
was able to surmount various corporate hurdles (Liu, ), 2015).                                                                               
WAT C H I N G  O V E R  T H E  G O L D E N  E G G
Overseeing all these contingencies and moving parts (though not always in a position to 
have direct control) are cities and towns throughout the world who are striving to attain 
the economic benefits that come with counting themselves as being part of a regional 
hub of innovation. This attention to regional development has brought a new focus to the 
study of the geographical distribution of wealth and of the ‘clustering force’. Cities and 
regions that exhibit the most vital cluster activity have become nothing less than the 
engines of economic growth, and a select few will continue to expand their dominance 
(Florida, 2008). In surviving the advance of globalization, many nations are now seeing 
the nurturing of industrial clusters to be of chief importance in sustaining economic 
competitiveness.                                                                                                                                                                                              
But these clusters often fail, and the resulting deep pockets of wealth and poverty are a 
distressing feature of the 21st century, leading to social and political upheaval. Economic 
inequality is the cause of debilitating effects on the economic health of an increasing-
ly sizable percentage of the U.S., with some regions and cities reaping huge rewards in 
capital and status, while others are forgotten and embittered — even enraged, and ready 
to tear down what they perceive as an elite, fixed game (Florida, 2008). This pronounced 
inequality can be argued to rival the inequality of Roaring '20s, and can be found in all 
dimensions of American life: income, wealth, education and health, to mention just a few 
(Stone, et al., 2016). To walk the streets of a city in its decline can be a haunting empirical 
exercise for a student of industrial clusters, with factories, warehouses, office buildings 
and hotels spoiled and abandoned in what should be the vibrant city center. In Dayton, the 
heavy burden of so much empty and decaying square footage downtown seems impossible 
to overcome with the few tenants that could, in theory, pay cheap rent, restore and revive. 
Pockets on once-successful decline can be seen throughout history where a region decid-
ed to devote itself to a single type of industry or way of doing things. In the 19th century, 
the British cotton textile industry grew up around Manchester and prospered for several 
decades. In the 20th century it lost its lead to overseas competitors who were quicker to 
modernize, and saw eventual collapse (McCraw, 2000). Alfred Marshall, original theorist 
of industrial clusters, recognized the risk:
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An industrial district which is dependent chiefly on one industry is liable to 
‘extreme depression’, in case of a falling-off in the demand for its produce, or 
of a failure in the supply of the raw material which it uses (Alfred Marshall, 
1890).
On the historical waves of innovation and investment, certain industrial districts, seem-
ingly, will never see an upward ascent.
 
View of an empty factory, 
unknown location
Wayne State University 
Digital Archives
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MODELS A ND FR A MEWOR KS
Two frameworks that can effectively contend with the com-
plexity of maintaining industrial clusters will be suggested. 
Historical waves of technology, innovation, finance and gen-
erations will then be introduced to show that cycles of the 
future can be prepared for by observing those of the past. 
Finally, a convivial foresight tool to effectively plan for the 




E N H A N C I N G  F O R T U N E :   
T H E  P O R T E R  D I A M O N D                                                 
K irsten Press’ N/K model was introduced as a frame of reference for understand-ing the variables of cluster architecture that can work for or against each other for adaptiveness. Another model that can be used for achieving cluster success 
can be uncovered in Michael Porter’s The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990). His 
model took the form of a diamond, and identified four key factors that enhance regional 
productivity and competitive advantage: factory conditions, local demand, inter-firm 
rivalry, and related and supporting industries. Like Press, Porter used Alfred Marshall’s 
founding theories of agglomeration externalities to explain the development of the cluster 
— the greater the number of local firms, the better the development of industry-specific 
production factors. Shared learning and collaboration plays an important part in Porter’s 
diamond, with competition pushing each agent towards greater performance in the clus-
ter (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012).                                                                                                                              
    
Attracted by Porter’s book, other researchers have identified new factors that contribute 
to cluster success, such as the nature of face-to-face interaction and the influence of the 
creative class (Florida, 2002).* 







FACTOR CONDITIONS DEMAND CONDITIONS
GOVERNMENT
CHANCE
* Richard Florida has cited 
Porter explaining in the 
years since he created his 
Diamond model that loca-
tion matters as much as ever 
in the success of regions: 
“The more things are mobile, 
the more decisive location 
becomes” (Florida, 2008).
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F U R T H E R  P O L I S H I N G :  
T H E  G E M S  M O D E L                                              
R ecognizing that the Porter Diamond may be considered incomplete because of the valuable insights brought forward since the model was published, Shyam Kamath, Jagdish Agrawal and Kris Chase introduced the Global Economic 
Management System (GEMS) model of cluster formation and sustainability. This model 
is described as bringing significance to ignored factors in making location decisions and 
cluster formation. The GEMS name signifies that it represents a broad and comprehen-
sive coverage of the issues: “Economic outcomes hardly ever have a single cause, especial-
ly in the case of such complex processes as those of long-term economic development or 
regional development. A good explanation should thus try to account for the major factors 
that affect such developmental success” (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012).                                                                                                                                     
The GEMS model takes into account new understandings of the role of business and 
socio-political climate, facilitative government policy, path dependence, a culture of inno-
vation and entrepreneurship, and agglomeration economies. Public policies and corporate 
strategies that account for these key factors may prove relatively more fruitful for estab-
lishing regional advancement. A brief summary of the new elements that transform the 
Porterian model into a GEMS model: (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012)
Anchor effect: Large firms that were the first to innovate in a particular cluster are 
often crucial to the formation of clusters. They sustain the development and mainte-
nance of an ecosystem of firms that are suppliers to and/or have dealings with such 
anchor firms (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012).
Business climate: Favourable aspect of a business climate such as the enforcement of 
private property rights under common-law systems; quality of business regulation; 
low top marginal tax rates; the absence of corruption; the climate for risk taking; and 
business innovation all have a positive impact on economic development. These were 
features of the business climate of Silicon Valley, for example. Also emphasized under 
this variable are the role of a “results-oriented meritocracy, an open business envi-
ronment, and collaboration between business, government, and non-profit organiza-
tions” (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012).
Industry networks: As firms in proximity to each other are important to the health of 
the industrial cluster, vertical, horizontal, and unrelated industry networks are also 
important to competitive success. Inter-firm linkages explore the role of cross-bor-
der networks, indicated by high levels of inter- and intra-firm linkages; presence of 
cross-border industry networks; presence of industry associations; collaboration 
between firms and research associations; and the sharing of labor and other resourc-
es between firms (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012).
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Public Policy: The role of government and public policy is described in terms of the pres-
ence of open trade and investment policies; the presence of favorable tax laws and tax 
incentives; the presence of financial incentives; the presence of facilitative incorpo-
ration and bankruptcy laws; the presence of R&D policies and incentives; the absence 
of foreign exchange and capital restrictions; the existence of laws for the protection 
of private and intellectual property; the existence of fiscal, trade, and investment 
incentives; and the educational background of public policy makers (Agrawal, J., et 
al., 2012).
Concentration of firms: The positive benefits of being near other firms in a region/
cluster; spillovers of knowledge between firms; and the presence of a large number of 
firms/suppliers in a region (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012).
Innovation and entrepreneurship:  Locational decisions, wages, and employment 
growth are known to be measurable effects of innovation and new economic knowl-
edge. In addition, there is a link between innovation and entrepreneurial discovery or 
activity as fundamental causes of national economic and firm growth. The pres-
ence of local entrepreneur-started firms; the local availability of technologists and 
managers; the presence and number of local incubators; and the extent of patent and 
intellectual property activity in the region are used to define the role of the “presence 
of local innovation and entrepreneurship” variable for cluster success (Agrawal, J., et 
al., 2012).*
Historical factors: Related to path dependence, history impacts cluster formation and 
success through the completely “natural” locational advantage of a region, the ser-
endipitous presence of key firms in the region, the fortuitous circumstances of early 
lock-in, and other similar “naturally” given circumstances. Operational indicators of 
this “presence of historical factors” variable are the historical presence of key firms 
in the region and the past history of links between the incoming firm and firms locat-
ed in the cluster (Agrawal, J., et al., 2012). 
Elements of chance: Particularly relevant to high-technology clusters, chance is often 
important to cluster formation and the development stage. Under this variable lives 
sub-elements such as the reputation of the cluster as a leading location; its geograph-
ical location; the origins of the founders in the region; and the element of pure chance 
(Agrawal, J., et al., 2012). Dayton, for example, saw the coincidental arrival of key 
personalities from other parts of the state, each feeling the inherited problems of their 
world should not have to be unchallenged (Bernstein, 1996); Likewise, Detroit’s domi-
nance in cars began largely with the elusive factor of a gathering together of business-
like and eccentric newcomers.
* Many cities in India and 
China are now producing 
patents at a rate compa-
rable with U.S. cities com-
parable in size (Florida, 
2008)
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Having the necessary thoroughness and variety to match the complexity that cluster 
systems exhibit, the GEMS model probably comes close to an ideal model for managing 
the inter-firm dynamics of clusters. Add to this the mileposts that the stages of industrial 
clusters forecast, and there is already a good mix of cluster time line and cluster system 
management that can bring a more solid approach to strategic thinking for innovation 
ecosystems. We will now look at the more expansive historical innovation timelines that 
will provide clusters with a deeper perspective of innovation and financing cycles which 
can be used alongside cluster theory, life cycle stages and structural models for greater 
decision making and foresight.
The Packard plant, Detroit, 
Michigan, 1911
Wayne State University 
Digital Archives




























H I S T O R Y  M E E T S  F O R E S I G H T :  
K O N D R A T I E F F,  S C H U M P E T E R , 
E L L I O T  &  T H E  F O U R T H  T U R N I N G             
A nalyzing past and current cyclic economic and innovation patterns can be a compelling exercise in the service of advancing regional innovation ecosystems because they give a stronger vantage point to prepare and intervene. Real poten-
tials can be anticipated where foresight methods that look only towards the future will 
entirely miss the severity of potentials like severe economic downturns. Cyclical econ-
omies have been observed since ancient times, with alternations between growth and 
crisis. Over a century ago, only the crises of business and their causes were considered in 
the study of business cycles. Only after years of accumulation of information did the study 
of periods of economic expansion take shape. The business cycle follows the economic 
activity of society, and impacts the economic policies of nations and the business plans of 
companies. The study of economic cycles following the Industrial Revolution recognized 
the need for broad and deep monitoring of rapidly industrializing economies in order to 
identify cyclical changes in the development of production (Alexandrov, 2018).                                                          
  Cycles in business can be observed in the repetition of the development of processes re-sulting in the change of key indicators and economic dynamics. Some of these indicators 
are population growth, efficiency of production, the rise of new markets and new sources 
of raw materials, structural transformations in the economy, and others. From there, sta-
tistical information is gathered, and a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the chang-
es are selected for analysis. A business cycle can take the form of long waves, economic 
growth cycles and short-term business cycles, with each economic cycle consisting of 
smaller business cycles. A downward trend in the economy could result from a series of 
smaller or decreasing gross domestic growth rates over a period. The desire of economies 
is to mitigate economic shocks or to build on any positive economic policy outcomes that 
are expected in a coming wave (Alexandrov, 2018).
L O N G  C Y C L E S  O F  I N N O VA T I O N
G ross Domestic Product has been unsuccessful as a forecasting tool, as it requires insight into how productivity can be expected to change in the years ahead, among many other things. In history, economists like Adam Smith to Karl Marx 
have struggled to understand growth; 20th century thinkers theorized that the output 
of an economy depends on its inputs — capital and labour. It is traditionally thought that 
the increase of both will increase output (The Economist, 2014). But growth has been 
experienced despite the slower increase in workforce in North America. The combination 
of technological progress plus other forms of new knowledge in the form of innovation 
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is given as the new element to the equation. Innovation, it seems, may account for more 
than half of all growth — more than the application of capital or labour. The relationship 
between innovation and the life cycles of an industrial cluster can be complex (which, 
as Marshall McLuhan shows in his Laws of Media, is better understood by zooming out 
to the extent that the previous cycle, the current cycle, and the next cycle are part of an 
evolutionary chain which can be taken as repeating patterns). It is in this stepping back 
that knowledge of the past and foresight can come together to produce insights for cluster 
adaptability.                            
K O N D R AT I E F F
The Kondratieff wave is the principle long wave model that I have used in this study, as its 
structure and theory fits best with the industries I have chosen. Long multi-generation 
cycles with the growth and exhaustion of credit across 200 years can be closely aligned 
with the fortunes of Dayton, Detroit and Silicon Valley (the latter for which it offers up 
an unfolding view of the future). In the theory of long waves, Kondratieff, who studied 
industrial capitalism and was the first person to recognize the existence of long waves, 
identified fluctuations in economic activity lasting from 40 to 60 years which result from 
indicators like technological advances, population dynamics, various social revolutions, 
credit cycles, and the renewal of capital goods. Each cycle has an upswing lasting about 25 
years, charged by the development of new technology and capital investment, followed by 
a downswing of about the same length, usually ending in a depression (often containing 
a number of recessions). In the up phase, capital flows into productive industries, and is 
then trapped in the finance system in a downturn (Mason, 2015). Though not tradition-
ally accepted by the majority of economists, long wave theory is gaining popularity, and 
is used for studying the economy in the past and for analyzing stock markets. For Kon-
dratieff, long waves are caused by crises brought on by an outdated economic structure 
contrary to modern technologies and the new, more efficient organization of production 
(Alexandrov, 2018).                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                    
In each wave, the up phase begins with a frenetic decade of expansion (a ‘K Spring’), 
accompanied by wars and revolutions, in which new technologies that were invented 
in the previous downturn are suddenly standardized and rolled out. Next, a slowdown 
begins, caused by the reduction of capital investment, the rise of savings and the hoarding 
of capital by banks and industry; it is made worse by the destructive impact of wars and 
the growth of non-productive military expenditure. However, this slowdown is still part 
of the up phase (K Summer); short and shallow recessions follow, while growth periods 
are frequent and strong (K Autumn). The downturn begins with commodity prices and 
interest rates on capital falling. In this stage, there is more capital accumulated than can 
be invested in productive industries, and will therefore be stored inside the finance sec-
tor. Recessions then get worse and become more frequent, with an inability to make the 
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necessary changes in the structure of the economy. Wages and prices collapse, and a slow 
and painful depression sets in (K Winter) (Mason, 2015).                                                                                            
It is only after the inconsistencies between the economic structure and the new tech-
nologies have been overcome that there is a revival and the conditions for new, sweeping 
development are improved. In this slow upswing, major political and policy events and the 
improvement of the conditions for the development of the economy play a part. In Foster-
ing Inclusive Innovation for Sustainable Development, Raphael Kaplinsky calls for “the 
recognition that current trajectories of economic growth and development are experienc-
ing a period of structural crisis” (Kaplinsky, 2018). We are somewhere in the middle of the 
second half of a deep Winter in the Kondratieff cycle, which started in the beginning of 
2000. This wave unfortunately suggests a recession trudging towards a depression that is 
foreseen by some to end by 2020.                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
In a 2017 European Journal of Sustainable Development paper, the authors state that hy-
per globalization created a chaos that calls for the return to sustainability which involves 
a certain degree of re-localization as a precondition for returning back the power to the 
people for creative use of its own resource base. Transition is a process that will not take 
place easily without good and bad (nationalism, fascism) consequences. The radical 
change of the development paradigm pursued by the U.S. is a process that comes as a con-
sequence from the depletion of the positive effects of the fifth technological Kondratieff 
wave and entering into a structural debt crisis (Jovanova, Nikolovska, 2017). In Postcapi-
talism: A Guide to Our Future, Paul Mason believes that the present crisis is a disruption 
to the Kondratieff cycle, and the signal of something bigger than the end of a 40–60-year 
cycle. This should be expected, as Kondratieff suggested that successive long waves are by 
no means a simple repetition of the preceding cycle. The start of the next long cycle will 
see a few trigger events, including the roll-out of new technologies, the rise of new busi-
ness models, new countries dragged into the global market and rise in the quantity and 
availability of money. These triggers can be seen as evidence of the threat of breakdown 
that leads to adaptation and survival (Mason, 2015).                                                                                                                     
S C H U M P E T E R
Another originator of long-wave thinking, Schumpeter believed that a normal, healthy 
economy needed not equilibrium, but constant disruptions of technological innovation. 
Schumpeter took the things that Kondratieff pointed out in the long-wave theory and 
studied them in even more depth. In Business Cycles (1939), Schumpeter argued that 
capitalism is shaped by interlocking wave-cycles, ranging from a short three- to five-year 
cycle produced by the build-up of stocks inside businesses, through to the 40–60 year 
waves Kondratieff had observed. He argued that “Innovation is the outstanding fact in 
the economic history of capitalist society and...is largely responsible for most of what we 
would at first sight attribute to other factors.” Schumpeter recognized Kondratieff waves 
as functioning in turn as innovation cycles. The Schumpeter cycle was very attractive 
to economists, business leaders and policy makers, as the entrepreneur and the inno-
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vator drive each new cycle, with periods of breakdown resulting from the exhaustion 
of innovation — precipitating the ‘creative destruction’ of old and inefficient models 
(Mason, 2015). Jane Jacobs has also contributed to the view that innovation drives 
economic development (as opposed to only Marshallian specialization) (Florida, 2008).                 
Schumpeter’s waves start in the late 18th century with pre-industrial revolution innova-
tions such as steam, textiles and iron, followed by increasingly short waves of 19th cen-
tury rail and steel, electricity, chemicals and the internal combustion engine of the 20th 
century, and so on. Each upward swing on the wave stimulated investment and expanded 
the economy. These long waves of economic expansion eventually dissipated and flatlined 
as the new technologies became common and investors saw less return with the fewer 
opportunities. Following this, a wave of new innovations begin a new cycle. Schumpeter 
would later warn that the bureaucratic way research labs were organized by many busi-
nesses would stifle invention (Florida, 2008).            
                                                                                                               
L I V I N G  I N  T H E  F I F T H ,  
F O R E C A S T I N G  T H E  S I X T H 
According to Schumpeter’s innovation cycles, we are now in the fifth wave, or industrial 
revolution, based on semiconductors, fiber optics optics, genetics and software — a cycle 
that has brought great wealth, exemplified in Silicon Valley, and is approaching maturity. 
Stephen Aguilar-Milan observes that Silicon Valley “reflects American views on the free-
dom of speech and individual liberty. Had the epicenter of the fifth wave been elsewhere, 
say France, then we would have today a very different Internet to the one we currently 
see.” He sees public policy around the world attempting to steer the sixth wave into their 
jurisdiction: “The authority that contains the epicenter will be able to dominate the busi-
ness environment for two to three generations” (Aguilar-Millan, 2012). The history of this 
fifth wave and the waves preceding it suggest that Schumpeter’s long economic waves are 
shortening, from 50–60 years to around 30–40 years. This fifth industrial revolution that 
started in America in the late 1980s may last no more than 25–30 years. If we are already 
more than a decade into this new industrial cycle, it may now be almost too late for the 
slow actors to catch up. The rapid-upswing part of the cycle — in which investors reap big 
margins, kill off weaker rivals and establish themselves as main players — may have only 
another couple of years left before the downswing. Latecomers can expect only smaller 
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Schumpeter believed that a healthy economy needs constant disruptions 
by technological innovation. Studying Kondratie’s long-wave theory, he 
pointed out waves that start in the late 18th century with pre-industrial 
revolution innovations, followed by increasingly short waves of 19th and 
20th century, and so on. Each upswing stimulates investment and an 
expansion of the economy. These long booms eventually peter out as the 
technologies mature and return to investors declines with a dwindling 
number of opportunities, followed by a wave of fresh innovations that 
take the same cycle. 
We are now in the fifth wave based on semiconductors, fibre optics, 
genetics and software — a cycle that is not only well underway but even 
approaching maturity. Schumpeter’s long economic waves are shorten-
ing, from 50–60 years to around 30–40 years. The fifth industrial revolu-
tion that started in America in the late 1980s may last no more than 25–30 
years. If we indeed are already more than a decade into this new industri-
al cycle, it may now be almost too late for the slow actors to catch up. Fig. 6   S C H U M P E T E R  W AV E S  (THE ECONOMIST)
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The coming sixth wave is predicted to be driven by upcoming huge advancements in the 
application of big data, artificial intelligence, virtual reality, augmented reality, internet 
of things, and blockchain technology. Unequal gains will probably be seen across compa-
nies — and by extension regions — with the major tech companies dominating all indus-
tries via the application of new technologies. Risks of this wave are high unemployment, 
high debt and the leverage of U.S. and European economies. It also brings political risks 
associated with a clash of superpowers attempting to scale the increasingly elite and con-
centrated centers of innovation possessed by mega-regions — which Richard Florida calls 
a “noxious brew” (Li, 2018, Florida, 2008). Artificial intelligence in particular is a major 
factor pushing towards the emergence of the sixth wave, and is seen as a central element 
in developing superhuman productivity and expanding the horizon of the human cogni-
tive and practical abilities (Bahji, S., 2018).                                                                                                                     
A present-day follower of Schumpeter, Carlota Perez, has used the tech-driven theory 
of the sixth wave to urge policymakers to give state support to info-tech, biotech and 
green energy — promising of a new ‘golden age’ to follow sometime in the 2020s. This 
can be seen as a neo-Schumpeterian envisioning of a green economy and its transition-
ing to clean energy (Knuth, 2018). In understanding the present phase, she departs from 
Kondratieff and Schumpeter with a ‘techno-economic paradigm’ which features a ‘new 
common sense, guiding the diffusion of each revolution’ (as opposed to the usual cluster of 
innovations at the start of the wave cycle). It is the replacement of one set of technologies 
and business practices with another, possibly guided by the state, which could  regularize 
the situation to make way for growth. Perez puts little emphasis on the struggle between 
classes or the distribution of wealth — rather on technology and government (Mason, 
2015). The sixth wave theory can be bolstered with the emerging discussion — crucial for 
industrial clusters — of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”, which forecasts an extended 
period of structural disruption and radical societal change driven by the development and 
diffusion of a number of digital innovations, including robotics, Artificial Intelligence, 
nano technology and biotechnology.                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                          
Schumpeter cycles can pair well with those of Kondratieff, in that the latter’s cycles can 
be broken up into relatively neat seasonal patterns (Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter) 
that are closely aligned to historical developments in industries, while Schumpeter waves 
indicate the shortening pace of innovation that points to the need for ever-efficient and 
nimble management of firm and cluster adaptation. Both wave theories represent sci-
ence and technical revolutions in each phase, suggesting what kind of future we should 
be prepared for. Like all K-Springs that turn into Summers, the next wave of innovation 
on the horizon will revolutionize costs — perhaps a revolution in energy — will overturn 
commercial patterns and eliminate old business models, though the full effect of this rev-
olution will probably not be felt until its diffusionary stage, when a sort of adaptation by 
arbitrage will allow an old energy source to facilitate the new. The history of Kondratieff 
waves allows us to reasonably assure ourselves that in this new wave, there will be a great 
movement of private investment, new innovation bubbles, graft, failures and fraud as 
accompanied earlier revolutions in railways, the auto sector and information technology 
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in their day. Will the next wave brought about by its generation of authors feature more 
responsible speculative risk — as opposed to credit expansion — “undertaken by those 
who can afford it and who will perform the indispensable task of shaking out the good 
innovations and corporations from the bad”? (Budden, Kopala, 2015). The predictions of 
the coming sixth cycle gives plenty to think about.                                                                                                                  
E L L I O T  WAV E S  A N D  F O R E C A S T I N G
Elliott wave theory is somewhat secondary to the Kondratieff and Schumpeter waves in 
importance in this paper, but is still relevant to many traders and institutional investors, 
having been applied to the currency market and analysis of the stock market since the 
1930s. For the topic of innovation clusters, Elliot waves are interesting for their inclusion 
of social psychology and finance. Elliott waves theory focuses on studying a time series 
in market prices, and assumes that historic patterns are able to predict future patterns 
(D’Angelo, Grimaldi, 2017). Elliot broke ground with this theory by pointing to the then-
new theory of mass psychology, and how it affected the behaviour of market partici-
pants — to such a degree that order could be distilled from the seeming chaos of the stock 
market. Elliot’s theory is somewhat based on the Dow theory in that stock prices move 
in waves. Because of the “fractal” nature of markets (fractals are mathematical struc-
tures found in nature), however, Elliot was able to break down and analyze them in much 
greater detail. Elliot Waves gained popularity in the 1970s when A.J. Frost and Robert 
R. Prechter published their classic book, Elliot Wave Principle: The Key to Stock Market 
Profits. They predicted the bull market of the ’70s and the crash of ’87.                                                              
The basics can be distilled down to five points:
1 Every action has a reaction.
2 Five waves move in the direction of a trend; then three “corrective” waves, moving  
in an opposite direction, follow the preceding five waves.
3 Five main-trend waves followed by three corrective waves is called a “5–3 move”,  
and completes a cycle.
4 The 5–3 move the becomes two subdivisions of the next, higher 5–3 wave.
5 The 5–3 pattern remains constant, even as the time span of each wave varies









• 1 represents an initial rally, signifying a shift in trend direction (the “one” leg of the 
Elliot Wave pattern). It is rarely obvious when it’s just getting going, typically accompa-
nied by news that is negative.
• A retracement follows (the 2 leg). Its low can never extend below the start of 1. 
• The market then shoots up like a rocket (the 3 leg).
• 4 is another retracement (a good place to buy), followed by 5, which is the final bullish 
breakout, apexing at the highest point of the cycle. Buyers in wave 1 (the Bulls) will have 
exited the market by this time. 
• 1–5 are impulse/motive waves following a main trend (up trend in this case). 
• An a, b, c moves down, and are corrective waves. Wave a corrections are harder to spot 
than in the dominant trend (it is here that many analysts ignore the Elliot Wave theory, 
thinking that happy days are there forever). In wave b, prices reverse higher, but volume 
is lower than the previous wave. With wave c, it becomes obvious you’re in a bearish 
trend. 
• Together, the 5 moves in the impulse/motive and the 3 moves in the corrective make 
up the 5–3 pattern/move, representing the completion of a cycle.
This is the general format of how Elliot waves function. It represents the action taken of 
all market participants in the market being traded. Psychology is represented in three 
actions: investors see a major downturn, get in, market rises, and then a pull-back. At the 
time of Elliot, this was only considered in the context of the stock market, but as years 
have gone by, it is now thought that it works for all markets. It may be that the Elliot wave 
could be an attractive device for technology firms in a cluster to understand and prepare 
for the activity surrounding the uptake, financing and decline in investor popularity for a 
new technology.
The Dodge Brothers plant, 
Detroit, Michigan, 1922
Wayne State University 
Digital Archives
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T H E  F O U R T H  T U R N I N G
A final cyclical model that can be used in seeing the future through the past is The 
Strauss-Howe generational theory, or Fourth Turning theory. Described somewhat 
fancifully as “An American Prophecy” by the authors, this theory features a repeating 
generation cycle that can be observed in American history, where historical events can 
be traced alongside recurring generational personas, or Archetypes. These archetypes 
drive the creation of a new era (called a turning) that witnesses a new social, political, and 
economic climate. These successive eras (turnings) tend to last around 20–22 years. At a 
higher level is a cycle that is the length of a long human life, usually spanning 80–90 years. 
The Fourth Turning states that after every life cycle, a crisis takes form, followed by a 
recovery, where institutions and community values are strong. Eventually, the genera-
tional archetypes who follow attack and weaken institutions in the name of autonomy 
and individualism, creating turmoil in the political environment that presages another 
societal crisis. This coupling of demography, sociology and generational insights has the 
strong possibility of being correct to a degree, and one can always take actions to prepare 
for the America they prophesize (Schumann, 2005).                                                                                                         
In the Fourth Turning, generations are identified by focusing on cohort groups that share 
three criteria. First, a generation will share an ‘age location’ in history, by encountering 
key historical events and social trends while living through the same phase of life. A 
generation living through events of a particular phase are shaped in lasting ways, and will 
come to share certain common beliefs and behaviors, and will self-identify as being of a 
membership in that generation, e.g. growing up in the Great Depression; being a mistrust-
ful teenager during Vietnam; being an adult hopeful for the future in the 1990s. Many 
potential threats could result in a crisis, such as a terrorist attack, a financial collapse, a 
major war, a crisis of nuclear proliferation, an environmental crisis, an energy shortage, 
or new civil wars. Though the generational cycle cannot explain or take account of the 
role or timing of these individual threats, the Fourth Turning can explain how society is 
likely to respond to these events in different eras. It is the response, not the initial event, 
which defines an era according to the theory. According to Strauss and Howe, the crisis 
period lasts for approximately 20 years. It also predicts that Millennials could be the next 
‘greatest generation’ (Wikipedia, 2018). Ultimately, The Fourth Turning can serve as one 
more layer of complexity in anticipating future patterns of the world through the medium 
of observing recurring patterns of the past.   
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Table 1: A selection of Fourth Turning archetypes, with  a focus on behaviour in the workplace
Source: https://compendium.ocl-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/4th_turning.pdf
G I 
1 9 0 1 – 1 9 2 4
S I L E N T 
1 9 2 5  – 1 9 4 2
B O O M E R  
1 9 4 3 –  1 9 6 0
G E N  - X  
1 9 6 1 –  1 9 8 1
M I L L E N N I A L  
1 9 8 1 – 2 0 0 0
T H E  H E R O T H E  A R T I S T T H E  P R O P H E T T H E  N O M A D T H E  H E R O
Famous people John F. KennedyKatherine Hepburn









Came of age Great DepressionWorld War II American High
Consciousness 
Revolution Culture Wars Millenial Crisis?
How raised Protected Suffocated Indulged Abandoned Protected
Endowments Community, affluence, technology
Pluralism, expertise,  






• Emergence of the car, 
movies
• Sinking of the Titanic
• Trust busting
• World War I
• League of Nations
• Prohibition
• The Jazz Age
• Great (African  
American) Migration
• Women’s suffrage
• Great Depression 








• Civil Rights Act 
• Birth control pills
• JFK, MLK, Jr, RFK 








• Berlin Wall 





• September 11, 2001













• Respectful of  
authority
• Duty before pleasure
• Patience is a virtue
• Honor and integrity
• Reluctant to challenge 
system
• Resistant to change
• Live to work 
• Optimistic
• Big influence on policy 
and products
• Willing to go into debt
• Team and process 
oriented
• Convenience and  
personal gratification
• Work to live
• Want clear  
expectations
• Want new skills, and 
will stay for them
• Want sense of real  
contribution
• Want frequent  
feedback
• Conditioned to live in  
the moment
• Used to tech  
immediacy
• Grew up learning to 
respect authority
• Give respect only 
when they get it
• Astoundingly diverse
Decision  
making style Collaborative Hierarchical Participative Independent/ Directive Collaborative
Communication 
style Constant Formal, face to face Informal, often indirect
Immediate, casual, 
direct Constant, multimedia
Can be seen as Restless Stodgy Long  winded Blunt Restless
Institutions Should be judged on their own merit Deserve loyalty Can be changed Are suspect
Should be judged on 
their own merit
Basic question When? How? Why? What? When?
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T H E  P R E S E N T  A N D  F O R E S I G H T :  
T H R E E  H O R I Z O N S                                                                                                                       
I n studying the historical innovation cycles and factors of automotive, business machine and electronics clusters, simplistic reactions to the complexity of external events, social pressures and internal business decisions and innovations can be 
seen. The complexity of change events require more than typical boardroom quibbling. 
When businesses elect to introduce the long view of historical analysis and foresight into 
their thinking and planning, the Three Horizons framework can serve as a useful com-
panion to tracing their cluster’s historical trends along the major economic and innova-
tion waves (Kondratieff and Schumpeter) with a historically well-informed eye attuned to 
the future.                                                                            
 
 
C O A L E S C I N G  F O R  C H A N G E
The complex challenges of an industrial cluster require the coming-together of people 
— with outlooks ranging from the fantastically futuristic to the soberly practical — to 
work together to solve for the future world. And they must do this in spite of a formidable 
lack of knowledge of exactly what the future will hold for the cluster. Three Horizons can 
help a group of minds ostensibly divided by pie-in-the-sky forward-thinking and stolidly 
conservative impulses to constructive agreement and future-forward action. The Three 
Horizons framework works by neutrally capturing the dynamics of change in a simple 
representation of patterns that point to a far-away future that can be grasped by all. It 
helps guide the way for needed adaptability, and armors itself for the disruptions that can 
set a cluster up for decline. To the insights brought forward by wave theories of innovation 
and investment, Three Horizons brings practical, workable solutions to complex issues. It 
offers a way forward to an initially incomprehensible future that would ordinarily doom 
its subjects to ride a pre-determined wave. Like historical waves of investing (particular-
ly Elliot waves) Three Horizons demonstrates the slow process of change, which is em-
bedded in fractal-life processes that extend far outside initial boundaries. What was once 
the dimly-imagined boundary of the future eventually becomes the present — collapsing 
old, seemingly stable patterns (Sharpe, 2013).                                                                                                                  
The horizons can be understood as three ‘voices’: the conservative managerial voice of the 
first horizon, concerned with everyday responsibilities (‘keeping the lights on’); the entre-
preneurial voice of the second horizon eager to move forward with new projects; and the 
aspirational participant of the third horizon that reaches for the imagined future of how 
things can be. If the Three Horizons was practiced by a group of companies that make up 
Silicon Valley, one might imagine the actors representing investing or owner functions 
presiding over years of growth in the Valley, but seeing trouble ahead; the entrepreneurial 
personality sensing the necessity for new thinking and wanting meaningful projects to be 
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Fig. 8  T H R E E  H O R I Z O N S  I N  A N T I C I PAT I N G  
 T E C H N O LO G Y  D E V E L O P M E N T S  
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proud of; and the impatient visionary who wants to ‘put a dent in the universe’ through radical 
reinvention. It is through these intersecting viewpoints where the framework could envision a 
shared future, with each group participating in effective activities for change (Sharpe, 2013). 
The below figure shows Three Horizons as employed by Hodgson and Sharpe. This is the basis 
of Three Horizons thinking used in a Hodgson/Curry paper that features future scenarios (hy-
pothetical models of the future) for UK transportation:
The systems thinking inherent in Three Horizons allows for helpful patterns to develop, as 
opposed to individual events, unexamined trends and other limited forms of analysis of the 
variety practiced in corporate boardrooms. The experience, Sharpe point out, is like a three-di-
mensional view of seeing the present and the future (Sharpe, 2013). Being able to look decades 
both into the past and the future will show an emergence of patterns/cycles that suggest future 
actions (and therefore being future consciousness).                                                                                                
 
 
F A C I L I TAT I N G  A  T H R E E  H O R I Z O N S  W O R K S H O P
The workshop should begin with a topic around which the three types of personalities dis-
cussed above can come together. A Silicon Valley example may take the form of: “how would the 
current processes of innovation and capitalization in the Bay area affect the development and 
long-term success of electric cars if Silicon Valley becomes the leading automotive industrial 
sector in the world over the next 30 years?” The facilitator should have participants capture the 
basic processes that currently maintain the innovation and capitalization cycle. The far-away 
third horizon envisioned by enthusiastically future-oriented participants can then be captured. 
With the first and third horizons now in front of the group, the facilitator can now invite the 
group to question of the adaptability of the first horizon for a potential future.                                                                    
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Right: Bird’s eye view of 
Hartford, Connecticut , 
created in 1864 by Jacob 
Weidenmann  
Knowol
The second horizon space is where the activity of bridging the two opposite horizons 
occurs, with the facilitator challenging participants to lean as far to the third horizon as 
possible to ensure long-term advantages of the innovations generated. Look for places 
where new processes may be starting to grow as assets for the second and third horizons. 
In a Three Horizons workshop, resistance is expected and should be considered a positive 
attribute that allows for good ideas to be tried, tested and adapted to work with estab-
lished systems. An example of adaptability is how Apple worked with the established sys-
tem of how people bought music downloads when developing Apple Music (Sharpe, 2013). 
                                    
A full Three Horizons experience designed to produce actionable second horizon points 
for change should be a full-day workshop, and could extend longer. An early milestone of 
success in a Three Horizons workshop is reducing confusion between the personalities 
that make up the different horizons, and the potential realisation that all the participants 
aspire to some shared qualities in the third horizon. The different participants will also 
be able to see which horizon dominates their thinking and how it relates to the thinking of 
their colleagues (Sharpe, 2013).                                          
 
Three Horizons may be fruitful in key projects relating to the survival of a cluster, wheth-
er it’s a cluster of central importance with vast influence, like Silicon Valley, or for a 
single organization’s presence in a small town, where the leaders of the organization’s 
local branch can help the town or district plan its future. Combined with historical waves 
theory and strategies for cluster management, they will be contributing to true systems 
thinking, taking in all the complexities of people, partnerships, products and competition. 
Partnering Three Horizons with systems thinking increases the chance of significantly 
adding to the longevity of success in the cluster, along with the ability to better cope with 
external influences compared to past efforts that have lead to the incremental activities 
(Sharpe, 2013). 
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THE CA SE STUDIES
Three case studies of American clusters and the firms 
that represented them will demonstrate factors in 
their emergence, maturity and decline — while reflect-
ing on their performance during historical cycles and 
the stages of cluster development. Also discussed are 
patterns in regional employment and wealth disparity. 
The Ford Motor Company, 
Detroit, Michigan, c. 1912
Wayne State University 
Digital Archives
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T H E  S T O R Y  O F  R E G I O N S                                       
W hile recalling that general stages of the cluster life cycle were described in the section devoted to cluster theory, significant attention will now be paid to the life cycle of key clusters and firms, with developments in their history marked 
along the Kondratieff wave. The first cluster would be disrupted by digitalization and poor 
strategic planning; the second by foreign competitors and other externalities; the third by 
national competitors and price. All three clusters suffered from internal and external activ-
ity that hindered growth. The cycle of the auto industry in particular follows the cycle of the 
K-Waves (which now shows signals that follow the credit dynamics of the K winter). While 
NCR’s signal events may not fit the Kondratieff credit cycle (they experiencing growth during 
global decline in the ’30s, and then decline during the growth period of the ’90s), this had 
largely to do with culture and an unwillingness to embrace a sufficiently forward-thinking 
future centered around digital technology.          
                                                                                                                                                                                           
     
But these industries could have taken their choice of any of the models or theories described 
in this paper, and perhaps have used them to strengthen their tenacity to adapt to changing 
conditions, whether from competition, the economy or internal rigidities. The intent of these 
case studies is to describe with adequate contextual detail the opportunities these firms en-
joyed, the challenges they faced, and the directions they took in the face of change. Their nar-
ratives contain insights related to their agglomeration externalities, their activities up and 
down a cluster architecture, regional leadership and internal culture, strong customer value 
achieved or found lacking — all the while intersecting with the larger world and history.
T H E  M A C H I N E  A G E :  T H E  R I S E  
A N D  D E C L I N E  O F  T H R E E  G I A N T S
D AY T O N ,  O H I O :  N C R  A N D  D E L C O 
A long with Detroit’s story of rise and fall, Dayton should be studied as an industrial cluster replete with lessons for firms and industries in their struggle for adaptation in the face of change. In the late 19th and early 20th century, Dayton benefited from 
hundreds of entrepreneurs with a drive for marketing inventions that built large companies, 
many publicly traded (Staley, 2008). That geographic benefits are not necessarily a prerequi-
site to the emergence of a cluster is somewhat true for Dayton, where climate had no appar-
ent advantage, and minerals, fine building stone, and stretches of tall forests are absent. 
Absent as well was any major university or capitol which would benefit a growing cluster. It’s 
transportation waterways have been both a feature and cause for disaster; Historian Mark 
Bernstein writes that “from the first, the city was an exercise in intention against circum-
stance”, and its waterways “as likely to drown as to enrich it”. Dayton would experience a 
number of small floods before the big one in 1913, which early Dayton citizens prophetical-
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ly foretold and later generations would never forget (Bernstein, 1996). The city had to 
compensate for these shortcomings with a dynamic business environment to meet the 
challenges of the age.                                                                                                                                                                                   
Dayton’s first stage in cluster development began by making practical things with the 
knowledge and mid-nineteenth resources at hand before the pool of local craftsmen and 
capital were able to build on each other’s knowledge. By sharing knowledge as they moved 
forward, they began to have “a freeing sense that a mind can make and shape a thing 
imagined and set it to perform a task.” Starting off as a city of trading, Dayton became, 
like the New England area of an earlier time, a place of small-scale manufacturing, 
eventually known as “the city of a thousand factories.” Its place as a center of internation-
ally-recognized invention would come later (Bernstein, 1996). The Dayton of that era has 
been described as a proto-Silicon Valley — of mechanical engineering know-how with 
the capital to support a whole class of inventors and thinkers. By 1900, Dayton held more 
patents per capita than any other U.S. city. Bernstein notes that “by then, imagination was 
the city’s leading industry and its most significant export”  
(Bernstein, 1996).                                                                                                                                                                                          
Dayton also nurtured spin-off companies characteristic of successful clusters — spin-offs 
that would take their place on the Fortune 500, including NCR, Mead Paper Company, 
business machine companies Standard Register and Reynolds and Reynolds, and Day-
co and Phillips Industries. As the U.S. economy took off after World War II, Dayton was 
home to the largest number of General Motors employees outside of Michigan.* Its entre-
preneurial climate nurtured inventions of all kinds, and like the Silicon Valley of the past 
few decades, innovation attracted more innovation. In one of the more famous examples 
of what can be described as the kind of embeddedness that benefits clusters, the Wright 
brothers, Charles Kettering and enterprising colleague Edward A. Deeds were known to 
socialize together and trade ideas at the Engineers Club in downtown Dayton (Jacobson, 
et al., 2008). Kettering became known early in his career for his ingenious rearrangement 
of existing components to perform a new task. He believed that instead of merely putting 
out the day-to-day fires of the mechanical world around him, the proper aim of industrial 
research was to “build a corporation’s mastery of its technical field and, hence, its options 
for the future” (Bernstein, 1998). Kettering’s first of 23 major advances for NCR was the 
electric cash register, which made the ornate and increasingly complex and heavy cash 
registers easier to ring up.                                                                                                                                                                       
*Cities in Ohio such as 
Cleveland were early inno-
vators and in automobiles 
and home to several firm 
headquarters, but Ohio 
banks had a conservative 
attitude towards the busi-
ness compared to Detroit, 
and the Ohio auto industry 
would find itself more 
secluded as time went by, 
with suppliers remaining 
dominant in the city. 




D E L C O
 
In one of the famous spin-offs of history, Kettering then brought his technical mastery to 
the operation of automobiles. Having devised a small motor for cash registers to perform 
the work that was assumed to require a much larger motor, he applied the same thinking 
to the starting of a car engine. Upon demonstration of his self-starter, Kettering’s inven-
tion won over Henry Leland of the Cadillac Motor Co., and Kettering and Deeds were 
asked to provide an electrical system for the entire 1912 Cadillac line then in develop-
ment. It was found, however, that subcontracting the production of an unprecedented 
number of batteries to supply their invention was impossible. The solution was to start 
Delco (Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co.) to manufacture self-starters for shipment 
to Detroit. The new company would soon come to employ thousands of workers. The off-
shoot of this rapidly-expanding business was Delco-Light Company, built to manufacture 
mobile electric power systems. As these products became successful, Delco built a large 
plant in Dayton dedicated to the production of small consumer appliances, including vac-
uum cleaners, toasters, waffle irons and mixers. The nationwide success of these goods 
further invigorated the Dayton economy. Delco became an important manufacturing 
center that supplied General Motors, with divisions such as Delco Moraine, Delco Prod-
ucts, Inland Manufacturing, Frigidaire, Moraine Assembly and Aeroproducts (Carillon 
Historical Park, 2018). 
Charles F. Kettering with 
a Buick automobile, 
Dayton, Ohio, 1913
Ohio History Connection 
Selections
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N AT I O N A L  C A S H  R E G I S T E R  C O M P A N Y
Successful spin-offs originate from successful forebearers. For Kettering, the mother 
firm was NCR. John H. Patterson founded the National Cash Register Company in Dayton 
in 1888; by 1911, NCR enjoyed a market share of 95 percent of the world’s cash registers. 
This extraordinary market dominance was achieved by harnessing the scale advantages 
of selling and manufacturing the type of business machines that were at the time trans-
forming retail practices, while going to unheard-of lengths in protecting itself from com-
petition (Rosenbloom, 2000). Patterson introduced a host of innovations across the entire 
range of business activities: manufacturing, marketing, corporate leadership (the annual 
sales convention), organizational behaviour and sales (the trained salesman, quotas and 
sales territory) that forever changed the business landscape (Friedman, 1998; Bernstein 
1996). Patterson did all of this largely by following his own inclinations, turning a distinct 
ignorance of business practices into a fearless curiosity that would have jolted the astute 
sensibilities of most business thinkers of the day (Bernstein, 1996). His intense overall 
interest in building efficient organizations was coupled with an equally intense vigour 
for civic engagement, and its importance should not be glossed over by today’s businesses 
that wish to be leaders in their cluster (Friedman, 1998).                                                                                        
 
Patterson and civic responsibility
A noticeable difference between Patterson and his modern leadership equivalents in 
Silicon Valley was an intense civic involvement. Richard Florida cites Robert Putnam’s 
ideas about the importance of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ in describing how recent decades 
have exhibited a less caring society, with more isolation and decline in civic life (Flor-
ida, 2008). A dramatic example of this civic leadership was Patterson’s application of 
scientific management to local government, tested out in the aftermath of the disastrous 
1913 flood which destroyed much of downtown Dayton. Edward Deeds, who was chief of 
development and construction at NCR, joined Charles Kettering in putting out a call for 
the nation’s best minds to find a solution to Dayton’s flooding problem once and for all. The 
great minds answered the call and succeeded in turning one of the most flood-prone areas 
on the planet into one of the least. Largely out of this consequential effort, the Miami 
Valley Conservancy and the Dayton Engineers’ Club was founded, which would be known 
for years after as a birthplace for innovation (Seibel, 2018). Lore has it that there was a 
rule against laundering tablecloths before being inspected, lest any important mealtime 
scribblings be lost in the wash (Bernstein, 1996). 
Nickel, bronze and 




Patterson believed that better working conditions in the factory returned more in pro-
ductivity and higher quality than the prevailing thought of a mass of workers that could 
be shunted in to replace workers who could just as easily be discarded. He created a kind 
of welfare program that focused on engendering self-respect, a broad self-interest in the 
world beyond work, and stimulated ambition. This is in stark contrast to the situation the 
average American factory worker found themselves in at the time, who had “a smoldering 
apathy toward work.” Before Henry Ford, Patterson was the prototype of the charismatic 
leader wishing to create a model working environment, encouraging a sense of mission 
among sales agents and a spirit of industrial initiative. A person’s job was a way of life 
(Bernstein, 1996). It should be noted that Dayton’s counterpart in this paper — Detroit, 
personified by Henry Ford — would demonstrate his interest in the improvement of lives 
of his employees only until the 1920s, when workers saw a ceaseless and ever-quicken-
ing assembly line extinguish self-motivation, while workplace bullying at all levels of 
the business would tarnish Ford’s image of benevolent and forward-thinking leadership. 
There seems to be a lesson here for the Fifth Wave’s warehouse workers, who number in 
the hundreds of thousands for Amazon alone: corporate leaders need to be working a lot 
harder to create 21st century model working environments, or they will be at the helm of 
a huge population of disaffected, apathetic workers who will not be in a position to show 
their full potential, ultimately at the firm’s expense.                                                                                                          
From the heartening results achieved with factory workers, Patterson then turned his 
attention to the wider world, starting with the factory environs. He set out to improve the 
neighborhood, redirected the wayward energies of local children into planting gardens, 
and cajoled neighbors to beautify their own property with prizes for good results. At 
the end of the 19th century, NCR was operating dozens of classes, clubs and brigades 
for thousands of workers. Patterson regarded himself as Dayton’s leading citizen, and 
couldn’t stand when the city’s government would not heed his advice for city reforms. He 
denounced the city’s leadership and their lack of civic mindedness and tolerance for cor-
ruption. He threatened that he would take NCR and its 3,800 jobs with him east, and then 
invited citizens to inspect his sprawling, model factory up close, to show them what they 
were about to say goodbye to (Bernstein, 1996). A 21st century equivalent of a business 
leader’s passion for the city’s health would probably involve cooperating with the city’s 
governance to mitigate the growing pollution seen on the outskirts of centers of inno-
vation, as can be witnessed in Silicon Valley. Socially, the difference between Amazon’s 
lack of care for its workers and NCR’s numerous programs to get its people involved in life 
could not be farther apart.
Lock and drill department, 




In the end, Patterson didn’t make good on his promise to leave Dayton. In the 1913 flood, 
he helped his city through the calamity with such organizational skill and perseverance 
that astounded observers. After his death in 1922, the business was taken over by Edward 
Deeds, who operated NCR in a more moderate, pragmatic manner. By 1930, an estimat-
ed one-sixth of all U.S. corporate executives had either been an executive at NCR or had 
attended Patterson’s management training programs. Among NCR’s alumni were IBM’s 
visionary CEO Thomas Watson as well as the presidents of Packard Motor Car Compa-
ny, Toledo Scale, Delco and dozens of other corporations (Friedman, 1998, Staley, 2008). 
There were clearly good things happening at NCR, from countless mechanical innova-
tions, a revolution in selling and marketing, social programs and assistance for workers 
and the wider community, spawning of spin-offs and training for future leaders. While 
the Detroit case study will be analyzed in conjunction with historical waves of innovation 
and investment, NCR’s narrative contains insights for success in the numerous factors 
detailed that made it a center for innovation and, it seems, real pride and happiness.
NCR sales convention, 
about 1910.  Thomas 
Watson, future leader 
of IBM is seated 
second from the aisle, 
first row, at the right 
hand of Patterson.
Bit by Bit
Left: John H. Patterson;
Right: Edward A. Deeds




NCR’s history is long and eventful enough that substantial stories can be told for both its 
success and its decline. Just as numerous factors can be citing its first four decades for 
things which leaders should do, the second half century of the firm details factors that 
should be lessons for avoidance. NCR’s slow and uneven transitioning to electronics be-
gan in 1938, when the company sensed electronics would one day become important to the 
development of their products and the industry. For a time, NCR was a pioneer in compu-
tational research (much in the way RCA was a pioneer in the technology of colour tele-
vision) (McCraw, 2000). NCR pioneered, among other digital technology, an electronic 
calculator in 1942. After the war, there was much pent-up demand for NCR’s more tradi-
tional mechanical products, and management failed to seize the opportunity to define the 
strategic direction for the digital computer (in the same way RCA failed to lay the ground-
work for continuing capitalization on the technology of colour television, and suffered at 
the hands of Japanese competition beginning in the 1970s) (McCraw, 2000). At this time, 
the business machine industry was highly concentrated among a small number of firms in 
the postwar years; IBM, NCR, Remington Rand, and Burroughs held the market for years 
in this highly-stable industry structure (Rosenbloom, 2000).                                                                                   
NCR continued into the 1950s and ’60s with a culture, leadership and operating methods 
that had not changed since the 1930s. Among their competitors, NCR was ultimately the 
last to move into the electronic era in a competitive way (in contrast to Hewlett-Pack-
ard’s nimble moves into an important string of digital technologies). NCR used a cautious 
strategy in slowly introducing electronics to their products, whereby sales would inform 
research and development of what type of products the public wanted. Cautious too was 
the acquiring of electronics expertise: with the purchase of outside knowledge and in-
sights of the Computer Research Corporation, NCR limited the opportunities for innova-
tion by taking the view of electronics as less than intrinsic to the future of the industry. In 
the early 1950s, some electronic components were incrementally attached to accounting 
machines, but blocked the digital group’s activities in building a general-use computer. 
The idea that electronics could lead a transformation in the development of business ma-
chines was little noted by NCR executives in their leisurely approach to product develop-
ment throughout the era (Rosenbloom, 2000).                                                                                                                
          
If little organizational capital was allocated to an electronic future, a tremendous amount 
of capital was instead built into a vastly complex manufacturing enterprise devoted to 
the highly integrated production of machine parts, employing thousands of workers. In 
the early 1960s, 2000 research and development staff worked in Dayton, but their efforts 
were constrained to working in the mechanical-centered traditions of NCR. At the time, 
it was recognized that only two percent of total revenue came from electronic devices, 
which seemed to justify pouring money into the established, current technology (Rosen-
bloom, 2000). Clusters, according to Porter, are extremely vulnerable to what he calls 
“internal rigidities,” that is, group thinking that depletes competition and a collective lack 
of imagination that can slow innovation and limit breakthrough advances in products 
(Dzialo, 2018). By the mid-1960s, NCR’s manufacturing might turned into a handicap, 
with increasing costs and inflexibility; its core competencies, notes Rosenbloom, became 
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its core rigidities. As Ford in the 1920s almost obsessively committed to vertical integra-
tion, NCR’s problem can also be seen as a vertical integration taken to the extreme, with 
its attendant consequences.           
                                                                                                                                                     
                                            
Brush with destruction
NCR’s management style was formalistic and procedural, with no rotation among teams. 
At the firm’s core, a group of executives who understood in NCR “a togetherness of the 
executive family referred to as chumminess, referred to as the Dayton mentality. Employ-
ees not working at that location were referred to as outsiders.” This seemed to be common 
among large industrial organizations of the time; RCA’s labs had likewise become a sort 
of “country club” for pet projects without any apparent commercial goal (coupled with 
an intense mutual dislike between researchers in New Jersey and manufacturing in 
Indianapolis) (McCraw, 2000). For NCR, technology’s relationship with the market was 
becoming tenuous. During the decade, big department stores began to experiment with 
digital point-of-sale technology. Some of NCR’s customers began to ask for the firm to 
offer this technology, but NCR struggled to make sense of the opportunity, citing mixed 
market signals. By the end of the ’60s, NCR’s internal resources were strained, margins 
were squeezed and costs rose. The company barely broke even in 1971, and dropped to 
third place in the point-of-sale market that they had just recently confronted. NCR would 
soon determine that as a part of their new longer-term strategy in the electronic era, it 
would have to make wrenching changes that would include letting Dayton’s operations 
dwindle away — and build up elsewhere (Rosenbloom, 2000).                                                                       






The decision was made to stop being a high-precision mechanical parts fabricator and 
instead become a high-quality assembler of purchased components as one of the main 
changes in becoming an electronics company — a transition that by 1978 was complete. 
Rosenbloom states that management’s longstanding commitment to meet the needs of 
customers allowed NCR to have the courage to make important and difficult changes to 
survive. NCR survived the coming of the electronic age because new leadership recog-
nized the need for its latent dynamic capabilities to be harnessed in breaking from the 
limitations of manufacturing which were quickly sinking the company. Just as archi-
tectural changes are needed at the cluster level, NCR as a firm had to adapt to competen-
cy-destroying innovations from outside and profoundly change how they did business. It 
can be argued that the rest of Dayton, at the higher level, did not join NCR in this move, 
which perhaps made the city less likely to produce enough talent with the necessary 
digital skills to allow other firms to thrive in the information age. The dynamic capabili-
ties for learning that NCR was able to nurture — before it was too late — allowed the firm 
to achieve new forms of competitive advantage, if only for one more generation (Rosen-
bloom, 2000).                                                                                                                                                                                                  
NCR foresight in 1984: a foresight time capsule
In 1984, NCR published a set of books celebrating its centenary, with the third volume fo-
cused on the world in the electronic age. The book is filled with foresight, including a look 
at various future scenarios. By that year, electronic funds were beginning to change peo-
ple’s experience of banking, and the writers recognized a future that would include bank-
ing at home and electronic payments. NCR contemplates if the information age will see 
an increase in the ability of human beings to apply information in the sense of wisdom. It 
also questioned if our ability to understand situations, set goals, consider consequences or 
make decisions will be enhanced or handicapped by the vast amount of information at our 
disposal.
 The text also asks how artificial intel-
ligence will analyze data (they already 
understood AI will one day produce the 
electron equivalent of human assistants), 
and if it will only take a handful of people to 
run a production facility by 1987 with com-
puter-aided manufacturing “with factories 
humming along on autopilot”. Robots were 
described as “stumblers that move with dif-
ficulty, not grace” compared to humans, but 
were already taking on sophisticated sens-
ing abilities. Prescient was a passage about 
technology’s effect on people and society: 
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The prospect of workers losing jobs to robots; forced early retirement to ensure employ-
ment for younger people in a post-industrial age; dwindling career choices; automation 
economies that make man-machine interactions for banking, shopping and other trans-
actions the only affordable choice.
The book asks if newly-automated businesses will be able to keep the economy moving 
strongly enough to create new replacement jobs and keep unemployment in check, and 
what retraining rights should employees have. It speculates that if high technology keeps 
its promise, wealth should increase, and called for a massive retraining of employees for 
the computer age — and to involve workers in planning the changeover and restructured 
work flow.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
A look at a few of NCR’s future scenarios (now 30 years in the past)  
illustrates the accuracy of some of NCR’s predictions:
The Global Business World is an Information Society
In this scenario there is a rapid and extensive exploitation of new information technolo-
gies in production. The emphasis is on management in both the public and private sectors. 
Management is a combination of various forms of information ranging from data and 
communication to judgment and wisdom.
How the Learning Society is an Information Society
The Learning Society presumes broad acceptance and use of the emerging computer and 
telecommunications technologies. It is characterized by a continuing quest for access to 
knowledge.




How the Third World’s World is an Information Society
A principal feature of this scenario is likely to be disorder in the internal control of new 
technology. One of the key features that may make it possible for many Third World 
nations to advance is their ability to obtain knowledge and technology from worldwide 
sources. Technology transfer is likely to be constrained by exporting nations. Knowledge 
and technology are clearly recognized as power and the key to productivity and competi-
tive advantage.
World of Regional-National Alliances (over 20 to 40 years)
Culture is fragmented into relatively distinct regions with strong national or religious 
sentiment
The Leisure Society (over 30 to 60 years)
Focused on production and consumption with emphasis on leisure and health industries
The Learning Society (over 30 to 60 years)
Principal mechanism of cooperation is the exchange of knowledge (including technology, 
products, services, art etc.)
The Third World’s World (over 10 to 60 years)
Developed world’s role and function fades in the face of newly industrialized country 
growth and less developed country independent growth (NCR, 1984)                                                                 
D AY T O N  A F T E R  N C R
After saving itself at the beginning of the electronic age, NCR was little-recognized for in-
dustry-defining innovation again. In 1991, AT&T bought the company for $7.5 billion, but 
sold it off to its shareholders five years later after losing $3 billion. The realization had set 
in that once a firm loses their edge in technology, it is very difficult to appear back on any-
one’s radar (Klebnikov, 2001). NCR’s world headquarters closed in 2009 and moved to the 
Atlanta area. From the 1980s on, Dayton’s dependence on traditional manufacturing em-
phasizing machining and assembly line work put the region at a competitive disadvantage 
as growing international trade and dramatically reduced transportation costs allowed for 
the global dispersion of factory work. It is part of a larger and slow-moving decline of old 
industrial districts, with cities like Pittsburgh, St. Louis and Cleveland seeing their inno-
vation and economic peaks erode, with other regions throughout the world stepping up.                     
In the background, manufacturing jobs in the U.S. accounted for 49 percent of all em-
ployment in 1950; in 2005 it was 24 percent (Florida, 2008). As late as 1990, five General 
Motors plants in the Dayton region alone employed more than 20,000 people regionally 
(Staley, 2008). Now, most GM activity has disappeared (though there are still nearly 
20,000 people who work in automotive manufacturing if suppliers of global companies 
are included). After weathering the recessions of the 1980s and 2000s, Dayton’s popula-
tion was down to just over 140,000 in 2017, having peaked at more than 260,000 in 1960. 
Meanwhile, the suburbs have grown, and now less than 20 percent of the metropolitan 
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area’s population lives in the city of Dayton (Staley, 2008). This case study of Dayton’s his-
tory as an innovation center provides numerous factors for growth and its sustainability, 
for a firm and the region. It also hold an equally powerful lesson detailing the decline that 
can set in when external threats are met with corporate rigidities, and in my opinion, the 
lack of foresight work to prepare for an initially unrecognizable future.







H A R T F O R D ,  C O N N E C T I C U T:  T H E  S W I F T  R I S E  A N D  F A L L 
O F  T H E  P O P E  M A N U F A C T U R I N G  C O M P A N Y
T he literature shows that companies most often last no more than 50 years. This smaller study of the Pope Manufacturing Company has been chosen for its more compact life span, with a meteoric rise and crashing fall that occurred within 
one generation; it is a good candidate for positioning on the Kondratieff cycles of innova-
tion. Pope started in the 1870s, when a K-Autumn, when mechanical innovations financed 
through the K Summer were still being financed through built-up credit in the market. 
The bicycle as developed through this era brought a demand for widespread, flexible 
personal transport, and was responsible for first putting urban dwellers in motion. The 
bicycle industry in New England was an early example of a successful industrial clus-
ter — in this case home to Pope, America’s greatest bicycle manufacturer. Pope produced 
technically sophisticated bicycles, becoming the largest mass producer of bicycles in the 
1880s and ’90s. Pope was one of many industrial companies in New England, which was 
home to 20 percent of America’s manufacturing workers, in spite of accounting for just 
eight percent of the nation’s population (Rosenbloom, 1998).    
                                                                
As described by Glen Norcliffe in Critical Geographies of Cycling, Pope specialized in 
high-quality factory methods that influenced future practices of testing, quality con-
trol and mass production in the automobile industry — characteristic of a lead firm in a 
cluster, according to cluster theory. Following the introduction of the instantly-popular 
safety bicycle at the beginning of the 1890s, the previous pattern of Pope’s small batch 
manufacture became untenable, and vertical production became necessary as the indus-
try recognized the new format as the standard pattern (Epperson, 2000). These develop-
ments occurred in a K-Winter, which lasted from the 1870s to the mid-1890s, a period of 
little capital for new innovations and low prices. What innovations were being developed 
at this time would come into fruition in the next K-Spring cycle which would last about a 
dozen years into the future.                                                                                                                                                                  
Following the trend of industrial clusters that form specialized departments or firms that 
are geographically aggregated, Pope made use of clustering supplier firms in a flexible 
arrangement of sub-contracting. Following this was an ambitious acquisition of firms to 
make vast quantities of light steel tubing that became part of Pope’s large vertically-inte-
grated industrial complex. The main bicycle factories in Hartford were enlarged several 
times, followed by the horizontal integration of two separate assembly lines in adjacent 
factories to produce a lower-priced marque, served by the same group of suppliers. This 
expansion occurred in the depths of the K-Winter, propped up by the 1880s and ’90s bicy-
cle craze, which attracted hundreds of manufacturers to the boom. Pope clearly wanted 
to be the best and succeed ahead of the competition. Equipment that made the now-stan-
dardized bicycle parts possible for many firms inevitably made competing designs and 
older bicycles obsolete as the cluster entered the third stage of the cluster life cycle 
(Norcliffe, 2015). The new standardization of components and suppliers allowed smaller 
and less capital-intensive outside bicycle makers to compete with the large, vertically-in-
tegrated makers on price and volume, and Pope was overtaken by the new competition. 
When Pope later tried to enter the automobile industry with new products, the challenge 
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of pursuing cars as a entirely new clean-slate innovation proved insurmountable, and the 
great Pope organization disappeared (Epperson, 2000). This exit from the industry oc-
curred just as the innovations that emerged in the 1880s-90s would fuel the spectacular 
rise of the automobile in the K-Spring in the first decade of the 20th century.                                                    
The eventual decline of the New England manufacturing cluster can be attributed to the 
eclipsing of the region’s elite high-precision manufacturing of smaller items in favour of 
western manufacturers, who mass-manufactured with large-scale stamping and pressing 
methods, as used in the carriage and farm implements trade. This is consistent with the 
life cycle of clusters as detailed in the theory, where the original cluster and its patterns 
are overtaken by different innovations and lower price points from other regions. New 
England’s decline is also due in part to the massive new factory buildings that were first 
developed on Detroit’s outskirts that could handle an unprecedented mass of material in 
their vertically-integrated processes, unlike the old New England “mill” factory design 
(Hyde, 1996). Science and history writer John Heitmann cites the shift of fortune from 
New England and the Midwest to Detroit in The Magnificent Ambersons, where the 
“widespread diffusion of automobiles, landed elites, complacent and spoiled, who were 
living in prosperous mid-sized towns, lost their economic power at the expense of the new 







D E T R O I T ’ S  R I S E  A N D  D E C L I N E :  
WAV E S  O F  T H E  A U T O  I N D U S T R Y 
 
T H E  E A R LY  D E T R O I T  C L U S T E R
D etroit’s automakers are the second historical case study that can be plotted against Kodratieff waves — in this case, two waves, from the mid-1890s to 1950 and from 1950 to the 2020s. On these waves, there are many signposts for the fi-
nancing of innovation, its profits extended with the help of credit, and then the drying-up 
of credit while new innovations are being developed but not exploited. In the literature, 
there are other waves that have been applied to the history of the Detroit car makers’ de-
cline which will also be analyzed for its lessons. Though the internal combustion automo-
bile was invented in Germany in 1885, it was in America where engineers and mechanics 
tinkered and experimented with the technology in order to make it into a marketable 
product through reasonable means of production (Dzialo, 2018).                                                                                                                                   
As in all Great Lakes clusters, Detroit was well-positioned to accept shipments of building 
materials in bulk. Hardwood from Michigan had been providing support to the carriage 
industry for generations, and many carriage makers were able to make the transition to 
automobiles (a possible example of adaptation by arbitrage, where older firms are used 
to support new industries). The declining fortunes of the traditional mining and utility 
companies influenced local money to get in on the automobile business, but it was mostly 
the coincidental meeting of future notable auto personalities that converged in Detroit 
that made it the capital of automobile innovation and marketing (Dzialo, 2018). Some of 
the features of this early cluster stage can be found in the GEMS model, where innovation 
and entrepreneurship, historical factors and elements of chance played a factor.                                       
The Detroit automobile cluster really began when the Olds Motor Works moved from 
Lansing, Michigan to Detroit in 1899, becoming the first automobile manufacturer in 
that city. In that year, there were 30 automobile firms. An early automobile man in Detroit 
remarked, “Every factory here...has its entire output sold and cannot begin to fill orders...
and it is all spot cash on delivery, and no guarantee or string attached of any kind” (Hill-
strom, K., 2007). The infant industry that soon comprised hundreds of new companies 
was easy to enter, had no government restrictions, and had access to a variety of sources 
of capital — varying from giants like J. P. Morgan to local banks and patrons (Heitmann, 
2009). In this paper, the rise of the automobile will be seen as stretching through what 
will be described as an upward Kondratieff wave (in this case the K-Spring and early 
K- Summer of the Fourth W ave), where innovations that were developed in the reces-
sion-prone winter of the previous wave are taken advantage of and enthusiastically 
financed. Like all upward phases of the wave, the automobile’s Kondratieff Summer expe-
rienced profitable fruition in spite of wars (in this wave, World War I).                                                                                                                   
The earliest movers in the automobile cluster got in cheap; Henry Ford started with a doz-
en workers and $28,000 in cash. “Low capitalizations made it difficult to achieve quality,” 
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Bernstein writes, but “mindless demand made it unnecessary.” Though the entrepreneurs 
that had moved to Detroit would make it the hub of the motoring world, they were quick in 
1909 to make use of an Ohio innovation: the ignition system developed by Charles Ketter-
ing, who had been tinkering with the invention on his off-hours away from NCR. Ketter-
ing would later become vice president of research at General Motors in 1919 (Bernstein, 
1996). When mass-production started, engineers like him were needed to tool all the 
new standardized parts that needed work together, in the process becoming specialized 
knowledge workers, or in the description of Robert Lacey in writing the history of Ford, 
“veritable princes of the production processes — the elite of the elite” (Lacey, 1986). They 
would replace the machine shop owners and factory foremen of an earlier era of craft (Liu, 
et al., 2015).                                                                                                                                                                                         
This overwhelming opportunity beckoned the mechanically adept and the entrepreneur-
ial eager. Sometimes overlooked are the European immigrants who arrived in Detroit to 
offer their expertise in the complex technological issues faced by early auto engineering 
and manufacture. The Thomas automobile company, for example, hired many French 
engineers. By 1910, firms in the Detroit area accounted for 65 percent of the output of the 
American auto industry, displacing the early Ohio and New England automobile clusters. 
By that year, the industry had consolidated into 11 firms, which included the fantastical-
ly successful Ford, the celebrated Cadillac and the outstanding Packard companies. By 
1925, Detroit’s slice of the industry had expanded to 80 percent (Klepper, 2011). In 1921, 
the U.S. government acknowledged the automobile as a staple industry in the country by 
agreeing to match the investment in highways of states along the route the modern U.S. 
highway would take, eventually becoming the national highway system (Dzialo, 2018). 
Cadillac final inspection 
department, 1912
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At General Motors, Alfred P. Sloan added professional development to Ford’s basic 
concept of a durable, affordable car that could be mass-produced for millions (Liu, et al., 
2015). A key observation Sloan made was that automobile firms based on the personal 
preferences and prejudices of their owners were not going to survive the coming years. 
Sloan knew that automobile companies had to be less personal affairs, offering more 
variety to bolster adaptability (Davis, 1988). Indeed, companies frequently outgrew 
their founders’ operational styles, and corporate operations sometimes distanced them-
selves from owners and founders (Laird, 1996). General Motors’ innovations in business 
management, along with those of NCR, set the pace for businesses in other domains, 
bringing together professional, financial and marketing specialists while standardizing 
internal systems along with the components of cars. Even Albert Kahn, the architect of 
the Detroit’s massive “daylight” plants that produced cars, exhibited a remarkable lack 
of personal pretension in his work, going about the design of mold-breaking plants with 
a systematic professionalism. He declared that architecture is “90 percent business, 10 
percent art,” and subdivided work in the studio among engineers in a manner that calls to 
mind the division of labour of a model industrial cluster (Hyde, 1996).                                                               
Ford’s factory practices, Sloan’s marketing and management, plus the eventual addition 
of a union for auto workers created the final maturation of mass production (Liu, et al., 
2015). Detroit automobile companies, beginning with General Motors, had established 
a yearly model change to combat the threat of customers keeping their cars for too long. 
It could be stated that this was a strategy of planned obsolescence that was the first 
conscious disregarding of sustainable practices in major American industry and disre-
gard for such practices even when an opportunity arises to go in a sustainable direction 
(Dzialo, 2018). At any rate, these developments in the automotive cluster align to the first 
stage of a cluster, where agglomeration benefits include firms learning through proximity, 
innovation accelerated, isolated firms out-competed, and a dominant design pattern and 
way of doing business is formalized. These agglomeration benefits would, however, be 
inverted to cause a decline in the following decades.
1925-1926 Packard touring 
car and in a Detroit 
showroom at night, 1925 
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T H E  D E T R O I T  C L U S T E R  F R O M  T H E  1 9 5 0 s  O N
If NCR’s history can be traced in a narrative of ascension and decline, Detroit’s story does 
not quite follow this bifurcation, but experienced two major declines — one during the 
Kondratieff Winter of the Great Depression that only became a Spring beginning in 1950, 
and the other that began around the year 2000, and continues to this day. This second de-
cline is occurring in what is likely the third stage of the Detroit industrial cluster, where 
decreased benefits of operating in a cluster become apparent, new locations are started 
by disruptive upstarts, and decline is brought about by internal inflexibilities and chang-
es in transportation options. This second decline, however, actually takes place within 
a complete Kondratieff wave (the fifth K-Wave, the so-called Information and Telecom 
Revolution), with the upswing, leveling and decline of a K-Spring, Summer, Autumn and 
Winter. The insight here is that during the post-World War II boom of the K-Spring-Sum-
mer upswing of the 1950s to the 1980, the seeds for decline during the K-Winter were 
sewn. Another cycle framework put forward in the literature detailing Detroit’s decline is 
yet another set of phases. Thomas Klier has found three distinct phases of the demise of 
Detroit’s dominance in the auto industry: the mid-1950s to 1980, 1980 to 1996, and 1996 
to 2008, which match the fifth Kondratieff wave (it can be argued that the end point of 
the 2008 phase is still extending into the end of the present decade). In describing these 
phases, or waves, Klier’s aim is to provide a historical frame of reference for the ongoing 
debate about the future of the auto industry (Klier, 2009). One can chart the latest devel-
opments of the industry where Klier left off with his 2009 paper on K-Waves or Schumpet-
er waves.                                                 
First phase
After World War II, the Detroit Big Three were large, successful companies, basking in 
the post-war boom; by the mid-1950s, they had become convinced that they knew what 
customers wanted. It would take them many decades to come to terms with reality (Liu, 
et al., 2015). When the very first small foreign cars made their appearance on American 
shores, the Big Three agreed among themselves that if they were to ever compete in the 
small car market, they would all need to build small cars together (demonstrating cluster 
behavioral restraints and acceptable business practice described by Press). The Big Three 
then dawdled on this basis for long stretches for the next 50 years, punctuated by mo-
ments of crisis which half-heartedly galvanized them into concentrating on small cars, if 
only for a time. The independent makes (Nash, Hudson, Kaiser and Willys) had built small 
cars, but they were expensive for the value offered. The benefits of building large cars were 
ingrained in the business: high per-capita profits, low gas prices, and longer drives made 
possible by the expansive new interstate system with wide roads (Klier, 2009).                                            
A recession from 1957–59 proved the ’50s to not be without challenges (though the re-
cession happened at the beginning of a long K-Spring and Summer that would last until 
1980). It was during this time that the Volkswagen Beetle was introduced to U.S. shores. 
After Volkswagen had made this initial step into the new market, it had a 10 percent U.S. 
market share, with 75 percent–80 percent of the U.S. small car market. The American 
public would come to realize that the German low-cost car was better-made and drove 
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more directly down the road. The Big Three first responded by importing their own for-
eign-built cars from their European subsidiaries, and in 1959 began selling domestical-
ly-built small cars. These American small cars were successful, and the market share for 
foreign makes in the U.S. fell to 4.9 percent by 1962. They were frequently ordered with 
deluxe trim, however, and within a few short years the American small cars grew larger, 
having fought back the inroads made by the foreign makes (Klier, 2009).                                                                                                                                      
During the mid-1960s K-Spring and Summer, continued interest in small cars saw a new 
wave of imports to the U.S., which saw their market share level back up to over 10 percent. 
As they had tried in the late 1950s, the Big Three responded by importing their own small 
cars from Europe. In the late 1960s, the Chevrolet Vega, Ford Maverick and Pinto and 
American Motors Hornet and Gremlin were introduced, but this time to a less-enthusi-
astic reception. The small cars made by foreign car makers had by this time established 
themselves with a reputation for quality, and now had a strong dealer network that al-
lowed their popularity to steadily increase (Klier, 2009). By the early 1970s, the Japanese 
car makers were outselling the original Volkswagen Beetle, while the American small 
cars introduced a few short years earlier had once again grown in size. By this time, new 
safety and environmental regulations coupled with a gas crisis that began in 1973 made 
operations harder for the Big Three, and was made worse by a deteriorating economy. By 
the point where the Kondratieff Summer was flat-lining into Autumn (where credit be-
comes increasingly important), Chrysler almost went bankrupt, and needed a $1.5 billion 
government bailout. By 1980, foreign makes had taken a 25 percent market share in the 
U.S., helped by the experience gained by perfecting cars in their home markets. The end 
of the 1970s saw Japanese automakers dominating quality ratings in every segment in 
which they participated, giving them a big competitive advantage (Klier, 2009).                                                               
Another perspective on the ascent of the Japanese automakers centers on the country’s 
attitude towards workers. As well as perfecting lean production methods, Japanese busi-
nesses believed in — and expected — lifelong employment, and made a point of investing 
in employees to protect business stability, compared to the large layoffs typical of Detroit 
mass production. Given that people were employed for life, it only made sense to invest in 
them so that they had multiple skills that would benefit the company. Typical of this spirit 
was Toyota, with its internal flat team concept — a concept of togetherness and trust that 
extended to suppliers, who also enjoyed close relationships and long-term commitment 
(Liu, et al., 2015). One antecedent of this attitude towards workers can be found in NCR’s 
story, which was one factor in allowing that firm to thrive for more than half a century in 
Dayton.                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Second phase
The fortunes of American car makers improved by the mid-’80s (Following a severe re-
cession typical of an early K-Autumn) with improved sales and cheaper gas prices. Japa-
nese car makers by this time had started to manufacture vehicles in North America while 
continuing to concentrate on perfecting small cars. During this time, Japan was distract-
ed by a weak domestic economy, with Nissan and Mazda in a particularly difficult situa-
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tion, needing financial and management assistance from non-Japanese car companies. 
Major American innovations were introduced in the minivan and future forward-looking 
Ford Taurus. But longer-term success was hampered by the Big Three dabbling in merg-
ers and acquisitions in the late 1980s, which cost them much time and attention.                                
                            
This was also a period where the Detroit Big Three were increasingly leveraging the 
active credit market characteristic of K-Autumns. When these business adventures ran 
their course, GM struggled to break even, and the investment quality of the company 
dropped. From 1986 to 1991, GM downsized their operations significantly as they sloped 
down an ever-slightly descending K-Autumn towards the steep drop-off of the K-Winter. 
During this second phase, the Big Three found success in developing a variety of light 
trucks, notably the Ford Explorer, which in 1990 caused Ford to produce more light trucks 
than cars in their U.S. assembly plants. Charging forward with a greater-margin product 
seemed to make sense, with less-stringent fuel economy regulations for light trucks —  
a category which included minivans and SUVs (Klier, 2009).
Third phase
Toyota demonstrating its 
dealership and service 
presence in America, 1975
Hemmings Motor News
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In the mid-1990s, foreign car makers went into light trucks in a big way, with Honda intro-
ducing the Odyssey minivan in 1995, and Toyota introducing their North American-sized 
Tundra pickup truck in 1999. In this phase, Japanese and other foreign car makers would 
flourish in North America, while the fortunes of the Big Three would fall by 26 percentage 
points between 1996 and 2008. By 2004, when the Kondratieff Winter had just begun and 
maintenance of growth had run its course, the light truck run was at its end, and bond rat-
ings had fallen for all three Detroit car makers. In addition, Detroit now employed a large 
force of workers with long tenure at a higher wage rate (resulting from years of shedding 
jobs), and the structural cost of many retirees increasingly siphoned off a magnitude of 
the Detroit car makers’ affluence (Klier, 2009).                                                                                                                
Looking back, 2007 was the final year of a long plateau of U.S. auto sales — nine straight 
years of at least 16 million light vehicles starting in 1999, an artificially-prolonged stabili-
ty financed by a K-Winter dependance on finance and credit. It was, in fact, a profit-drain-
ing pairing of chronic overproduction with frantic rounds of heavy factory incentives to 
clear excess inventory (Snyder, 2017). The 2008 recession saw major upheavals for the 
Detroit auto makers, while the price of gas rose dramatically. The Japanese could now im-
port small cars from all over the world, transforming the Big Three into what could now 
be called a global Big Six. Ten foreign headquartered automakers were now producing 
light vehicles in the United States (Klier, 2009). Meanwhile, the Kondratieff Winter may 
continue until perhaps the 2030s.                           
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Recent signals and trends
Unlike Silicon Valley, which can obscure poor performance within a bubble of promising 
technology and relatively easy capital, the auto companies have been floundering in the 
long Kondratieff Winter of the Fifth Wave. The four best-selling automakers have bled 
share, while four smaller makes have soaked up the remainder. Sales competition has 
tightened considerably among brands, surprising new winners have emerged and light-
truck sales have dominated sales at the expense of cars. In November, 2018, General 
Motors announced that it planned to idle five factories in North America and cut roughly 
14,000 jobs in a bid to trim costs. The New York Times called it “a jarring reflection of the 
auto industry’s adjustment to changing consumer tastes and sluggish sales.” The cuts 
affect an assembly plant Ohio, factories in Michigan, Maryland and Ontario. This follows 
another stage of Detroit attempting to lure buyers to domestic small cars — this time 
in the form of electric and hybrid options — but finding that consumers are attracted to 
pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles. On top of this, automakers have paid a price for 
the trade battle that the Trump administration has set in motion. As of June, 2018, GM 
slashed its profit outlook for the year, with tariffs driving up production costs, raising 
prices even on domestic steel (Bluestein, 2018). While Oshawa, like many Canadian cities, 
is trying to turn itself into a hub for technology industries, even successful measures are 
unlikely to help many former GM workers. Toyota’s Woodstock plant, which opened ten 
years ago, is the last new car factory Canada has seen (Austen, 2018).                                                                                                     
One strategy for dealing with the collapsing car market in the past has been to stuff 
unwanted sedans into rental lots and other commercial fleets. That has only delayed to-
day’s capacity crisis. Those lower-profit fleet sales have inflated the market, keeping U.S. 
vehicle deliveries above 17 million for the last four years, even as sales to individual retail 
customers peaked three years ago. Over all, the American auto industry has added nearly 
350,000 jobs since the industry bottomed out in the wake of the recession. But the indus-
try still employs tens of thousands fewer people than before the crisis, and hundreds of 
thousands fewer than in 2000. Even though they are facing a potential slump, car makers 
continue to spend heavily to develop electric vehicles and self-driving technology, both to 
meet regulatory mandates and to anticipate the future of driving. This shift is expected to 
remake the global industry, while enabling companies to enter new and potentially lucra-
tive businesses, such as driverless taxi and delivery services (Bluestein, 2018), which may 
only see true fruition in the Kondratieff 6th Wave.                                                                                                              
In summing up the Detroit narrative of The Big Three, one finds that they declined for a 
number of reasons: they were unable to balance the tension between differentiated offer-
ings and market demands, the presence of rigidities and hubris similar to that of NCR, the 
inability to effectively meet the challenge of competitive newcomers, similar to how the 
Pope Manufacturing Company suffered at the hands of far-away challengers, as well as 
economic adversity characteristic of the fifth Kondratieff Winter that the industry con-
tinues to suffer under. Strategically, offering the market completely undifferentiated, poor 
quality vehicles was obviously undesirable in the long run, and it undermined percep-
tions of vehicle offerings. This mindset, developed during the fifth K-Spring and Summer 
of the 1950s through to 1980, led these companies to fail to identify their true strategic 
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positions. Kondratieff upswings (car makers experienced two of these in the fourth and 
fifth K-Waves) was followed by an Autumn, which lasted 10–20 years, and sloped down in 
Winters lasting about 20 years. A big question is if the current Kondratieff Winter (start-
ing in 2000) is expected to last more than 20 years. Complicating this is that enormous 
amounts and goodwill and money have been squandered in for so long (Liu, et al., 2015). 
If it is to last longer, how can the innovations being developed today be implemented in a 
thoughtful way in the next upswing to benefit the planet environmentally and socially? 
If the next Spring occurs earlier (in the 2020s), an upswing with see the digital systems 
of connectivity and the 4th industrial revolution flower into profitable economies, which 
will hopefully bring several regions — Detroit included — dispersed throughout North 
America along on the journey upward.








FA L L I N G  B E T W E E N  T H E  C R A C K S : 
U . S .  P O L I C Y                                                    
S o far, theory, strategic models and lessons of history have been proposed to assist firms and clusters to better-adapt to their own time and the near or distant future. In the GEMS model, public policy and business climate also play a role in the 
sustaining of healthy industrial clusters. This paper will draw some attention to the role 
of government and the powerful sway of major centers of creativity over the past several 
decades in creating undesirable conditions for many regional clusters and populations 
who have been left behind. More than ever before, economic opportunity is tied to loca-
tion, according to a report by the Economic Innovation Group. The U.S.’s most prosperous 
areas enjoy the clustering of new jobs, leaving a quarter of the remaining new jobs for the 
other 60 percent of the country’s regions. Many of the nation’s communities that were 
worse off saw zero net gains in employment and new businesses since the beginning of the 
21st century, with more than half experiencing net losses for both measures. Meanwhile, 
America's labor force has become increasingly employed by large companies, narrowing 
geographic diversity and, arguably, limiting wage growth (Hart, 2018).                                                                                          
How productive a state’s industries are plays a major role in economic distribution, rather 
than a state’s geographic size. A 2007 examination found that California’s share of U.S. 
GNP was 14 percent, Texas’ 8 percent, and states such as South Dakota and Kansas less 
than 1 percent. An outsized success in a single state could mean visible growth for the en-
tire country; the computer and electronics boom in California from 2000 to 2007 and the 
corresponding state’s rise in productivity boosted U.S. prosperity by 0.2 percent per year 
(Caliendo, 2018). For many decades in America’s economic landscape, differences in the 
economic fortunes among states were not nearly as dramatic. A gradual convergence of 
prosperity among the states was once the rule for generations, particularly in the middle 
of the 20th century, when the southern states caught up with the North in economic de-
velopment. Mississippians, for example, saw their incomes (comparable with those of the 
north) rise to a level in 1980 that would have been unimaginable in 1940 (Longman, 2015).       
Decades before the term “flyover states” could be used to describe the Midwest, the 
average per-capita income of that vast region was only somewhat less than that of New 
York City. Cities in Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa and Ohio were ranked among the 
top-performing economies in the country. This convergence of income across regions lead 
to what would be accepted by most as a single American standard of living, made possible 
by a 30 percent increase in hourly wage equality gained between 1940 and 1980. In the 
years since, however, the San Francisco Bay Area and New York City saw an enormous 
rise in income, 88–172 percent greater than that of the average American. Richard Florida 
describes how some major cities (even if they are not geographically in proximity) are 
beginning to be seen as ‘mega regions’ — vast regions of wealth and activity that number 
in the tens of millions of people and billions of dollars in economic output. In these su-
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per-regions, cities like New York and London have more in common with each other than 
neighboring American cities (Florida, 2008).                                                                                                                         
With this intensifying of commerce and affluence in these contained international re-
gions comes a pattern of migration which is untypical and unpredicted for Americans: a 
widespread move of a large population of workers from wealth-producing regions to those 
which have been showing far less growth. And while Gross Domestic Product of a ostensi-
bly busy region may be high, wages within that region may be comparatively low (Florida 
states that socio-economic mobility and geographic mobility are not identical in meaning 
or opportunity, and that people may overestimate the benefits of moving)*. This phenom-
enon can be observed in cities like Atlanta and Houston, which on paper are thriving, but 
have a working population that earns increasingly less than that of Washington, New 
York or San Francisco (Longman, 2015). In the Sun Belt, where much of the auto indus-
try has relocated from factories in the North, per-capita income has fallen behind that 
of America’s coastal cities. Florida writes of the U.S. as splitting into two distinct labour 
groups: the “geeks”, who enjoy high-paying, higher-skill work and the “grunts”, who with 






































Fig. 11 R E G I O N A L  P E R  C A P I TA  I N C O M E  A S  A  P E R C E N TAG E  
 O F  T H E  N AT I O N A L  AVA R AG E ,  1 9 2 9 – 2 0 1 7  (Brookings Institution) 
* This is in contrast to a more 
creative and ‘open’ personality 
type of mobile worker that is 
moving back to the older cities, 
with their gentrification and 
catered to by service workers 
living farther and farther away 
(Florida, 2008).
** Interestingly, Florida shows 
that in spite of lower pay in com-
parison to higher-paying work 
in a factory or as a machinist, 
many people choose to work in 
service sector for its flexibility 
and potential for creativity. This 
underlines the necessity for a 
re-think in how services should 
be compensated to develop a 
more stable (less likely to be 
outsourced) and middle-class 
service sector, who can use their 
creative tools to serve customers 
better and increase the bottom 
line (Florida, 2008). 
Service, as an intangible asset, 
can create value by anticipating, 
responding to and shape the ever 
-changing demand of customers; 
businesses should pay more at-
tention to this potential arsenal 









































































Fig. 12 P E R  C A P I TA  I N C O M E  O F  VA R I O U S  R E G I O N S  C O M PA R E D  
 T O  N EW  YO R K  M E T R O P O L I TA N  A R E A  (Brookings Institution) 
East Austin, Texas 
'gentrification'
Ralph Barrera / 
American-Statesman
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For many decades, the U.S. tried to guard against the oversized influence of a select few 
geographic areas, but the inequality of regional opportunity has grown to be more pro-
nounced since the 1970s, and even more so since the recession of 2008–10 (Fleming, 
Mantel, 2018). Phillip Longman, writing in The Atlantic, argues that public policy is the 
‘missing piece’ in moving toward regional economic parity. The point at issue is that the 
American government no longer takes the appropriate steps to check the unwarranted 
competitive advantage of a few dominant cities to monopolize power over the rest of the 
country. These checks once rested at the federal level, having been established in the late 
19th century, reaching their peak power by the 1960s and ’70s, and falling to deregulation 
in the years since. Early regulations and anti-trust efforts, meant to curb railroads, grain 
distribution and the country’s manufacturing base from benefiting only a few key eastern 
states, had the goal of maximizing local control over local businesses. Public measures 
“helped to contain the forces pushing toward greater regional concentrations of wealth 
and power that inevitably occurred as the country industrialized” (Longman, 2015).                             
A policy of that earlier era that seems to hold significance in today’s tech world is a Roos-
evelt-era policy that limited patent monopolies, mandating that America’s largest corpo-
rations licence their patents for light bulbs and transistor technology for the benefit of a 
wider swath of economic regions (transistor technology would become the basis for the 
digital revolution). These anti-trust laws kept small communities from being swallowed 
up by a small number of ‘Frankenstein’ companies which would otherwise control the lo-
cal economic affairs and destinies of its citizens. The better scenario, it was argued, freed 
thousands of small entrepreneurs and independent businessmen to be part of enacting 
policies that would benefit their region. For many years, American businesses followed 
the rules, and businesses that controlled more than a double digit percentage of a regional 
sector were severely curbed (in contrast to the Walmart of today, for example, that con-
trols half or more of all grocery sales) (Longman, 2015).                                                                                                
These regulations began to be relaxed, first in inter-state transportation which allowed 
for more affordable pricing in air travel that benefited coastal cities, but in the long term 
stifled access to smaller and mid-sized cities. In time, a small handful of companies 
located in large cities would control shipping and electricity, making the operating of a 
business hard for many smaller companies. Meanwhile, the middle-class living in the 
centers of larger cities that once had access to an efficient and growing network of rail and 
highways, found their lifestyles no longer tenable because of a failure of investing in these 
networks. Many eventually picked up and left, moving to gridlock-free regions where free-
dom of movement was thought to be better. In Who’s Your City, Richard Florida tries to 
define why certain groups of people move from one region to another, calling the concept 
of place “the central axis of our time”. In moving to places with few options for high-qual-
ity employment, there is a risk for things to become worse when faced with a downturn 
in one’s situation — in contrast to the faith of many in a ‘flat’ world where everybody is 
connected and is a beneficiary of equal access to prosperity (Florida, 2008).                                                
Returning to public policy, a major shift in how anti-trust cases could be prosecuted now 
ruled out any consideration of social cost, regional equity or local control in deciding 
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whether to block mergers or stop the proliferation of monopolies. The loss of local control 
over countless regional businesses in favour of absentee management has seen a marked 
decline in the benefits of corporate involvement and social capital in the civic life of those 
places, again in contrast to the social capital that Patterson felt important in building 
up NCR (Longman, 2015). A collapse of regulation in commercial businesses like retail 
was mirrored in the banking industry, where once-strong regional money centers such as 
Philadelphia and St. Louis were eclipsed by a handful of elite cities such as New York and 
London, bringing the geography of finance close to the patterns of the Gilded Age on the 
19th century.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The digital technology sector, once distributed across multiple regions through the 
licencing of transistor patents, was now highly protected under the guise of “intellectual 
property” rather than engineering, allowing for the geographic concentration of monop-
olistic power in this sector than before. The new business model for startups would soon 
include the eventual selling off of their platform to one of the large tech giants before 
competing with them could doom the enterprise. In order to be in a position to sell the in-
novation when the opportunity arises, inventors need to be physically located where large 
concentrations of the creative class are seeking to be acquired or can help with selling 
these acquisitions — places like Silicon Valley or Seattle. Longman writes that under-
standing this change from a leveling policy of dispersion of the opportunity and wealth 
among regions to the winner-take-all world of tech, retail and commerce today is import-
ant to turning the problem of regional inequality around (Longman, 2015).                                                 
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Fig. 13  R I S E  O F  T H E  C R E AT I V E  C L A S S  E C O N O M Y  (Florida, 2008) 
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A NA LYSIS
Given the insights of the theories of industrial clusters,  
as well as knowledge of different models and frameworks  
for cluster success and lessons from historical waves of  
innovation, we are in a position to bring analysis to two 
emerging clusters and an established cluster that is  
experiencing maturity and possible decline.





E M E R G E N C E  A N D  M A T U R E S E N C E        
Having looked at strategies, government policies, and theoretical structures and cycles in 
the discussion of clusters of innovation, we will now analyze some of these factors in one 
dominant tech cluster, that two that are up-and-coming: dominant Silicon Valley, and up-
and-coming Dayton and New York City.                                                             
T H E  S M A R T E S T  C L U S T E R  
S E E S  M A T U R I T Y: 
S I L I C O N  VA L L E Y
T he pattern of success followed by cluster spin-offs has been an important feature of the innovation narrative for Silicon Valley, as it was for Detroit and Dayton. In the 1930s, William Hewlett and David Packard were given a loan to start a com-
pany in Palo Alto, California that would rise to national prominence when it entered the 
computer business in the 1960s. Hewlett-Packard pioneered one electronic device after 
another over the decades, sometimes selling to consumers, similar to the NCR tradition. 
The company eventually employed 100,000 people, and importantly, retained the abili-
ty to reinvent itself in taking on new technologies, redefining what computing could be 
(McCraw, 2000, Gandy, 2012). “The HP Way” of systematic innovation was widely copied, 
spawning spin-offs as numerous HP alumni went on to start their own firms — among 
them, Steve Wozniak, co-founder of Apple Computers.                        
                                                                                                                                                         
In the 1950s, the large Stanford Industrial Park dedicated to the development of high-tech 
firms took root, giving rise to more than a thousand companies. Several dozen of these 
made their home in the Park, including the Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory, which 
spawned Fairchild Semiconductor, and later Intel. These companies ushered in the Third 
Industrial Revolution (scientific), which followed the Second (the internal combustion 
engine), which followed the First (the steam engine) (McCraw, 2000). From the begin-
ning, Silicon Valley followed the pattern of the first stage in cluster development: shared 
sources of technical knowledge, the ability of firms to manage their size (as HP did in 
launching new products as needed), and an accelerated flow of innovation.                                                   
These events flourished in a Kondratieff Spring of the Fifth Wave, which saw the coming 
of an information and telecom revolution. This wave started with the invention of the 
transistor in 1949 and continued on to the K Summer with the introduction of the mi-
croprocessor in 1970. Personal computers, the internet and mobile phones would enjoy a 
tremendous amount of capitalization through these years. By the 1990s, the factors that 
made up Silicon Valley’s success were celebrated as creative destruction, the release of 
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economic energy by resourceful individuals, and the balancing of centralized and decen-
tralized management within organizations. A more effective division of labour allowing 
for the survival of the Silicon Valley model can be compared to that of the industrial 
tech cluster of Boston Route 128 when these regions faced the newly-emerging demand 
for low-priced, customized digital products. The small, cooperative networked firms of 
Silicon Valley were better able to address this challenge compared to the inflexibility 
of Boston’s structure, which encountered difficulties because of its closely-integrated 
nature, hindering adaptation. The author of an Economist article at the time argued that 
the chief contribution of the Valley was organizational innovation, rather than merely the 
technological. Silicon Valley allowed risk taking, tolerance for temporary failure, toler-
ance for job-hopping, a rigorous meritocracy, inter-firm cooperation and flexible organi-
zational structures. It was also individual in its lax enforcement of non-disclosure laws as 
described earlier, which allowed for the much more frequent hopping of employees from 
one firm to another. In this way, the Valley was again more hospitable in comparison to 
Route 128, with its strict non-compete violations (McCraw, 2000).
Staff at Fairchild  
Semiconductor in  
the 1950s, California 
New York Times
 IBM's first plant in San 
Jose, California  
accommodated just  
over 100 IBM employees.
Arkenia.com
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S I L I C O N  VA L L E Y  A N D  T H E  R I S E  O F  T E S L A
A study of Tesla’s emergence in Silicon Valley is helpful in comparing the strategies and 
innovation milestones for modern electric vehicles versus the status-quo rigidities of the 
Detroit car makers. In a study that first included the phrase ‘disruptive technology’, Clay-
ton Christensen (1997) studied the possibility of the electric car becoming a key transfor-
mative innovation (Tyfield, 2018). The new age of electric cars (and especially self-driv-
ing cars) will bring with it new standards of engineering and digital infrastructure to 
vehicles. As in the early automotive industry, a new organizational form characterized by 
considerable ambiguity faces automotive firms once again.*                                                                                                   
Tesla’s notable achievement is that along with making electric vehicles desirable for 
many, it succeeded in bringing the automobile into the digital world in a way that the 
Detroit car makers could not. It broke into an auto industry which was assumed to be 
off-limits to anybody that was not one of the global car giants. For the Big Three — and for 
NCR in Dayton — cluster rigidities shaped the manufacture and marketing of its prod-
ucts. A focus on internal combustion vehicles, regardless of the possibilities of modern al-
ternative drive-trains, as well as increasing dependence on the technological limitations 
of third-party suppliers, seems to have put an end to American car makers as perceived 
innovators (Dzialo, 2018).                                                                                                                                                                   
Tesla started out as a spin-off of a small company called AC Propulsion, which turned 
out experimental electric technology and vehicle concepts for established automakers 
pressed into electric vehicle research. Observing his Valley colleagues investing heavily 
in research and development for lithium-ion batteries, tech entrepreneur Martin Eber-
hard wondered if similar technology could be transferred to cars. He convinced AC Pro-
pulsion to help him build a prototype car that could one day be sold in quantity. Eberhard 
and his colleagues would soon discover that the Detroit cluster had “quietly made itself 
inviting to startups” (Dzialo, 2018). The tech community was skilled at a particular kind 
of sourcing that Detroit was not as adept at: sourcing the kinds of electronics that could 
be combined to make a desirable E.V. It was from this skilled sourcing that Silicon Valley 
could take advantage of the rigidities of the automotive establishment to try to out-cluster 
the incumbent region. In this case, it was the promise of particular agglomeration benefits 
— and perhaps an impassioned Silicon Valley attitude against the status quo — that made 
this first stage of this electric vehicle cluster in the Bay Area come to fruition.                                        
An interesting strategic innovation pursued by Tesla was to eliminate dealerships, so that 
feedback could be gleaned straight from the users. With the exception of a light-weight 
frame made by the long-established Lotus, the other components sourced by the team 
were far more advanced than what most car makers could get their hands on. In Detroit, 
both car makers and suppliers used long-established approaches to developing technology 
for cars; it can be considered that the Big Three were weakened by rigidities causing, as 
Bryce Dzialo observed in an historical analysis of Tesla, “complacency and stagnation 
of innovation in accordance with Porter’s writing” (Dzialo, 2018). These elements of the 
Porter Diamond that were allowed to become ineffectual can be defined as 1) firm strat-
* At the turn of the century, 
consumers were initially 
confused in deciding the 
ideal source of power, 
the number of cylinders, 
systems of steering and 
control and mode of stop-
ping (Rau, 1994).
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egy, structure and rivalry and 2) related and supporting industries. The apparent value 
of Silicon Valley’s offering was very strong: the first Teslas sold to the public changed the 
opinion of electric cars overnight. They were to no longer be the slow, ugly electric ‘golf 
carts’ that had often represented an E.V. future. Tesla would be a striking and stylish 
sports car that would consumers would love, albeit in the pursuance of high-end display, 
not as a ‘green’ car that embodies self-sacrifice and sobriety (Tyfield, 2016). By this time, 
Elon Musk had become the major investor in the company (Dzialo, 2018).                                                      
                                                       






Tesla quickly went public — the first automaker to do so since Ford, 54 years earlier. Tesla 
itself is unique in that it began as a technology company with the challenge of building 
hardware not yet mastered by Silicon Valley engineers, including those at Tesla. This al-
lowed Tesla the freedom to stretch free of local competition but with all the tech support 
it could possibly need. Tesla even boasted investment from Google co-founders Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin (Kolakowski, 2009) (Dzialo, 2018). While Tesla tried to solve these 
new and interesting problems in establishing itself as an automotive force, the Detroit 
cluster seemed willing to explore only how to avoid emissions regulations, while doing 
the bare-minimum in electric vehicle research. The difference between the established 
cluster and Tesla’s vision is stark; If Elon Musk is to be believed, Tesla is trying to reduce 
oil dependency for cars as a big-picture motivation — to change the world. At the very 
least, “Tesla generates awareness, perhaps even fear, about where the evolution of energy 
and sustainability in business and society is leading the automotive industry.” Tesla will 
certainly be seen as a watershed moment in automobile history, but caution should be ex-
ercised as to whether it will lead to a complete transition to electric vehicles over internal 
combustion in the time frame they believe it will (Dzialo, 2018).                                                                                
T H E  N E W  R I S E  O F  E N G I N E E R S  A N D  C O D E R S 
Years from now, Elon Musk will probably be recognized as providing an important service 
in sharing Tesla’s technology in an open-source spirit of cooperation to get the electric 
vehicle industry off the ground (somewhat reminiscent of Nikola Tesla, who in 1891 
ripped up his royalty contract with George Westinghouse, partly so that his electric tech-
nology could continue to be championed). If the former tinkerers of Detroit could become 
millionaires within a decade of their first mechanical experiments, the modern digital 
coders have found similar success. A new measure of power and prestige for engineers in 
the early 20th century, for example, brought a massive increase in engineering programs, 
with the number of American engineering graduates increasing from 100 a year in 1870 to 
4,300 a year in 1914. What had been a trade became a profession.                                                                           
In fact, many engineers believed that their systematic view of life would benefit the coun-
try in ways politicians could not effectively contribute. Along with American economist 
and sociologist Thorstien Veblen, they believed that the solution was to turn policy and 
administration over to skilled technologists who would exercise systematic control over 
the economy. In the recent past, Silicon Valley’s hacker mindset  —  rebellious, but narrow-
ly focused  —  has shown the programming elite of the region to not be especially active 
politically, which, Doug Hill in Medium writes, “isn’t to say that faith in technocracy isn’t 
alive and well there”. Google’s Eric Schmidt and Netscape founder Marc Andreessen 
are among those who believe that technology is quite capable of solving all of the world’s 
problems, if only government will get out the way — and government increasingly shows 
signs of agreeing with them (Hill, 2015). Meanwhile, it’s becoming difficult to separate 
scientists and technicians from the captains of industry. It will be interesting how the 
generation of coders and engineers (‘heroes’ endowed, as the Fourth Turning describes, 
with a mindset favouring community, affluence and technology) will produce cars for 
their contemporaries in the sixth Kondratieff wave, represented by psychosocial health 
and biotechnology and the new economy that follows.                                                                                                        
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T E S L A’ S  M I S S T E P S
Unfortunately, news stories from recent years show a firm struggling to succeed in the 
basics of running a car company. One of the more dramatic examples of this problem 
was made famous when Elon Musk seemed to try to get the better of shareholders with 
his famous tweet, “Am considering taking Tesla private at $420. Funding secured.” This 
instigation is similar to Henry Ford’s 1918 announcement, made upon his (demonstrably 
insincere) early retirement from the business, that he would organize a “huge new com-
pany to build a better, cheaper car”, to be set up in direct competition with the old Ford 
Motor Company, seemingly indifferent to the business he had built over a decade. When 
asked about the current company, Ford replied “I don’t know exactly what will become of 
that.” Interestingly, upon this news, fifty-one Chambers of Commerce across the U.S. sent 
telegrams to Detroit urging the advantages of their community as the site for new Ford 
plants (Lacey, 1986).                                                                                                                                                                                    
Tesla’s vehicles are limited in that their very success depends on being targeted precisely 
to what is by definition a small fraction of demand. To improve upon this small fraction, 
Tesla created the Model 3, which is failing to keep up with demand, quality and possibly 
the company’s chances of remaining profitable (Boudette, 2019). The management of the 
organizational challenges of a such a quantum leap in manufacturing have already been 
proven to be daunting and problematic for Tesla, especially when positioned against an 
industry with a fast-moving and extremely advanced manufacturing model (Tyfield, 
2018). Efforts to supply hungry buyers with the Model 3 has also been hindered by logisti-
cal challenges. It can also be argued that gasoline has advantages in energy density, cost, 
infrastructure and transportability that electricity doesn’t have and won’t for decades 
(Stephens, 2018) In March, 2019, Tesla was forced to close many of its retail stores in an 
attempt to cut costs, signaling broader problems with the company (Boudette, 2019).                                        
A similar problem relating to a luxury car maker attempting to enter the middle-class 
range happened with the Packard Motor Car Company in the 1940s and ‘50s. When that 
firm made the decision to incorporate a mass-produced medium-priced car in their tradi-
tional senior car lineup after World War II, they found that they could not compete with 
the price cutting, yearly model changes and manufacturing efficiencies of the Big Three. 
They soon disappeared from the automotive landscape (Tyfield, 2018). Tesla has rarely 
turned a profit in its nearly 15-year existence, and has suffered the bailing out of many 
executives (41 in 2018). It’s Model 3 did not impress Consumer Reports, who cited long 
stopping distances in emergency braking test and difficult-to-use controls in not recom-
mending the car (Stephens, 2018). The heart of the auto industry’s future are likely the 
labs of existing automakers and suppliers who design and supply components to automak-
ers. These shops have become the engines of the future for the auto world. Because of all 
this, the cars of 2020 and 2030 “may be manufactured in Detroit, or Stuttgart or Hiroshi-
ma, but their brains will probably have originated in Silicon Valley” (Innovation & Tech 
Today, 2018). Tesla’s coming of age has occurred in a Kondratieff Winter, characterized 
by a collapse of capital and a difficult economy, leaving the company little elbow room to 
thrive. Time will tell if the company will be around to enjoy the fruits of its patents and 
innovations in the rise of a K-Spring, sometime in the 2020s.                                
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T H E  D O W N S I D E  O F  S I L I C O N  VA L L E Y
The uncertainty of Tesla lives in a larger story critical of Silicon Valley’s excesses and 
shortcomings. Thorstein Veblen (who coined the term “conspicuous consumption,”) 
observed in 1899 a chasm between business and industry that anticipates the differences 
between Wall Street and Main Street. In his work, “pecuniary classes” have no other aim 
or motivation than maximizing profit, which can easily be achieved through restricting 
output, reducing competition and manipulating monopolistic power — as opposed to 
contributing to the economic success of society. This can be considered a mindset and 
motivation in the Kondratieff Winter. Thorstein also complained about the over-selling 
of useless goods that he felt were ruining society (Hill, 2015). The modern parallel can 
be seen in time-wasting recreational technology and ‘casino capitalism,’ in which tech is 
exploited to the full in order to benefit individuals who make no contribution in enhancing 
productivity or developing needed goods and services. There is also criticism of Silicon 
Valley’s cult of disruption as increasingly destructive and amoral, and venture capital’s 
speculative rent-seeking as shortsighted and exploitive of prior state investment. More-
over, disruption’s acceleration of obsolescence has generated mountains of electronic 
waste, a major contradiction in Silicon Valley’s green claims (Knuth, 2018)                                                   
Many of the tech startups set up in Silicon Valley, ostensibly to be near angel investors, 
venture capitalists, investment banks, and tech talent are increasingly keeping only small 
teams there. Utilizing less-costly satellite offices, remote co-working spaces, or other re-
mote-work options are valued by the majority of their employees. The operating costs for a 
tech startup in Silicon Valley can be three or four times that of one in emerging tech hubs 
such as Austin, Pittsburgh, Columbus, Ohio, the Charlotte-Durham North Carolina area, 
Wilmington, Delaware, and Boise, Idaho. A private equity investor recently observed that 
a tech company in his portfolio relocated to a Midwest tech hub and added six months of 
cash burn onto its balance sheet. Doubtless, many tech companies are already looking 
closely at Apple’s own satellite strategy as they seek ways to grow faster and run their 
operations more efficiently while still attracting and retaining the best available tech 
talent. Inevitably, that examination and scrutiny of Silicon Valley living will lead to more 
innovative, remote working opportunities (Shipley, 2019). "You can create that distinct 
community just by leaning into your own community." A promising tech worker might go 
to Silicon Valley for deep training with a mentor (in the same way young executives went 
to NCR in Dayton for ‘the training’), and then move back home to invest in their commu-
nity or to a city where they can conceivably raise a family. Solutions to the problems of 
varied regions cannot all be solved in Silicon Valley — they have to be solved through the 
lived experiences of people in their respective regions (Rosenbaum, 2018)                                                
Even in 1997, The Economist called attention to the “remarkable insensitivity of ‘Silicon 
Valley nerds’ to the problems of government and the broader needs of society.” A threat 
from within seemed to be manifest in their apparent care for nothing but money and the 
next breakthrough idea (McCraw, 2000). Silicon may also be facing problems with capi-
tal. Corpulent venture capital funds, searching for the next billion dollar opportunity, are 
investing “in any team with a half-decent pitch and the right connections”. Tellingly, U.S. 
investment recently hit its highest level since the dotcom era. This is interesting, as the 
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Kondratieff Winter is meant to see a collapse of capital. Silicon Valley’s current depen-
dance on finance and credit may be of the type that is not conducive to funding quality 
innovations of the K-Spring and Summer investments. Pointing to the apparent bubble 
as merely unprecedented innovation, Wendy Liu writes in The New Internationalist, that 
their entrepreneurial hubris overlooks the role of larger economic trends:                                                        
The current low-interest-rate environment post-2008, combined 
with general economic stagnation, has led to a situation of ‘over 
accumulation’ — too much capital sloshing around, needing a place 
to go. At the moment, technology seems like a good bet and inves-
tors are jumping on anything remotely tech-related in the hope that 
it will eventually provide a return. Is this sustainable? Unlikely. I 
would categorize the threats to Silicon Valley into three main areas: 
consumer backlash, mismanagement, and worker organization.
Privacy concerns are the current focus of consumer backlash, with the Cambridge Ana-
lytica scandal spurring closer looks into Facebook’s business model. Consumer boycotts 
are materializing, and there is the possibility of regulatory intervention, as Facebook 
recently has proposed to change its business model. Companies once valued at billions 
are on the verge of liquidation in the midst of the exposing of fraudulent technology, or 
fines being exacted for flouting laws. There is now an endless parade of once-glorified 
tech start-ups failing. “If this trend continues,” Liu warns, “there could be reverberations 
throughout the economy, given that venture capital typically comes from pooled sources 
such as pensions and university endowments”. Lastly, the possibility of worker organi-
zation in the industry is starting to threaten business models. Companies like Amazon, 
Deliveroo, and Uber maintain low consumer costs through exploiting underpaid, over-
worked and precarious workers. But these workers are starting to strike back through 
direct action and legal challenges. Though it’s yet unclear whether workers can extract 
lasting concessions before jobs are automated away, there is potential for massive disrup-
tion of existing business models. The bottom line Liu states, is that Silicon Valley will not 
magically solve the problem of over-accumulation. Just like the financial frenzy pre-
2008, it’s a temporary fix, and it can soon come crashing down (Liu, 2018).




T H E  C E N T R E  O F  C A P I T A L  T H A T 
WA N T S  T O  B E  M O R E : 
N E W  Y O R K  C I T Y                                           
T here are examples of a number of towns and cities all over America that are attempting to become the newest cluster; many will struggle to be noticed by the kind of talented people who want to live and work in a vibrant place and start 
companies that will spin off other companies that form clusters. New York City has no 
problem being noticed, but not always for desirable things, and until recently, not often for 
being a tech cluster. New York City was home to a very early cluster that found immense 
profit in the Stock Exchange, with numerous banks and brokerage houses springing up 
in offices in the vicinity of Wall Street. As a city of vast wealth and population, New York 
City may not seem like an underdog in becoming a tech center. But in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2008, the city’s leaders realized that a new path for the city’s econom-
ic security should be forged that does not involve destructive forms of finance. A plan 
emerged to develop tech start-ups and tech workers, making it a talent engine comparable 
with Silicon Valley. Though Amazon has recently pulled out of the city, New York will 
continue to advance its pool of tech experts and regional capabilities — it was, after all, 
its talent pool of 5000 tech workers that lured Amazon to the city in the first place. The 
New York Times reported that “in December [2018], Google announced a major expansion 
that could double its New York workforce to 14,000 over the next decade, without the rich 
government incentives that proved a lightning rod for the Amazon deal.”                                                                     
Tech’s rise in New York goes back nearly two decades, with long-established internet 
ventures (especially Google) making early bets on the city. To this, the Bloomberg admin-
istration also made smart policy moves that welcomed tech activity, fulfilling the Public 
Policy and Business Climate elements necessary for the GEMS model to function for 
cluster adaptability. Entrepreneurs, technologists and corporations in significant num-
bers chose the city as a place to work and live, just as the city’s industries were undergoing 
digital transformations. Industry-leading firms in the city, such as finance, advertising 
and media had to become adept at digitization in spite of not being tech firms. When they 
adapted to compete, they helped to revitalize the city’s economy in the process (adap-
tation by arbitrage). The city has begun to nurture a homegrown talent engine, while 
expanding graduate schools that focus on science, technology and entrepreneurial inno-
vation as part of the city’s development plan. As can be seen time and again, it is the urban 
amenities — museums, theater, opera, dance, jazz clubs, art galleries, bars and restaurants 
— that offer a clear alternative to life in suburban Silicon Valley.                                                                      
Like Chicago, New York City tech prides itself on solving real-world problems, rather than 
developing new technology and then waiting to find a market (the mistake Dayton real-
ized it was making with its own technological innovation, and, it can be charged, Silicon 
Valley is recently guilty of). The city is also starting to demonstrate the pattern of cluster 
growth, with entrepreneurs building on success stories with spin-offs, human networks 
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and self-confidence that inspire risk taking that in turn can be copied. A New York tech 
entrepreneur marvels at how much the tech scene has changed since she moved to the city 
a decade ago: “Now, you just step out onto the street and you hear tech product discussions 
all the time.” A faculty member of Cornell claims that the big problems of industry and 
important concerns are to be solved in New York: “If you’re doing pure tech — a super-fast 
chip or advanced systems software — Silicon Valley is still the place to be,” she said. “But 
when it comes to everything else, New York really has a chance to be the place to be.” 
(Lohr, 2019). There is an underlying sentiment in the narratives of Ohio and New York 
that suggest there is, as Florida described, a “sorting” of population according to values, 
culture and politics in the U.S., where smart and talented people are making decisions on 
which region should win their allegiance, with the expectation that the like-minded will 
multiply into the region. It is believed that this shift is greater than that occurred from 
farms to factories (Florida, 2008).                                                                                                                                        
In the paper Surfing the Sixth Wave, Stephen Aguilar-Millan recognizes that “we have 
reached a point where locations do not wish to compete with the epicenter of the newly 
emerging paradigm, but to copy it”. Ever since Silicon Valley established itself as the 
epicenter for the emerging technological paradigm, a host of imitators arose around the 
world. Along with the “Silicon Alley” in New York, emerged a “Silicon Fen” in eastern 
England, “Silicon Roundabout” in London, and so on. All of these were pale imitations of 
the original Silicon Valley. However, they did serve to diffuse technology in their various 
localities. This process of diffusion of technology developed in the Valley happens at a 
much faster pace than the initial development of the technology, owing to the degree to 
which the global economy is presently more integrated than in earlier periods in history 
(Aguilar-Millan, 2012). It can be expected that technology will be put into faster and fast-
er practice as the Fifth K-Wave ends and the Sixth Wave begins. 
Tata Innovation Centre on 
Roosevelt Island, extolling 
its proximity to key points 
in New York City
Tata Innovation Centre
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A  B E T T E R  M O D E L  O F  I N N O VA T I O N 
F O R  D A Y T O N :  
T H E  W R I G H T  B R O T H E R S  
I N S T I T U T E                                         
T his paper analyzed Silicon Valley as a cluster that enjoyed over half a century of growth and veneration but is now lagging as a place of social, capital and environ-mental integrity. It then focused on New York City’s wise repositioning strategy 
from calculating plunderer responsible for the Great Recession to inventive up-and-com-
ing tech center producing meaningful innovation. I will now turn back to Dayton and one 
group’s attempt to harness the region’s ongoing technological research into a cluster that 
can meaningfully recapture some of its former glory. It has been observed that regions 
that excel in scientific research may not always exhibit commercial adaptation (Flori-
da, 2008). In American business history, Thomas K. McCraw states that leading-edge 
technology companies by the mid-20th century “funded expensive research laborato-
ries, many whose projects had only tenuous connections to future commercial products” 
(McCraw, 2000). For the past decades, scientific research and development capabilities at 
Dayton’s Air Force Research Laboratory remained strong, with a largely civilian work-
force of 21,000 minds that are extensive in their creativity and talent. But the result of all 
this research could not bring about the vibrant commercial possibilities comparable to 
the culture of innovation in the era of the Wright brothers and Charles Kettering.                                                      
In the last couple of years, however, a new culture of innovation has been awakened, ac-
cording to the Wright Brothers Institute (WBI), an “innovation runway for the Air Force 
Research Laboratory”. Several years ago, WBI — an organization that serves as a partner-
ship intermediary with the Air Force Research Laboratory — began assessing why so lit-
tle technology from the laboratory group and the region as a whole made it to commercial 
markets. The Institute concluded that the region lacks a strong integrated commercial-
ization process. Though capable of developing technology, the region’s workforce could 
offer little value to the region in economic output, as most of this effort was not converted 
into economic output. “Solutions looking for a problem,” was frequently expressed as the 
problem by technology developers. The Stanford Research Institute, on the other hand, 
was known to possess a high-performing technology commercialization model with an 
impressive success rate. The two groups teamed up to share knowledge, and the two-year 
effort funded by a grant by the Department of Defence saw WBI partner with consulting 
and analysis firms to bring new model of commerce to Dayton. As described  in their pro-
motional piece,    
Various market concepts were piloted which ultimately yielded a 
variety of start-up businesses and new product lines within existing 
businesses that are in various stages of maturity. The grant provid-
ed a proof-of-concept for a commercialization model, unique to the 
State of Ohio. Rather than expecting entrepreneurs to “go it alone”, 
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or mimicking a Silicon Valley approach to commercialization, this 
model provides a balance between the agile flexibility needed to start 
a new venture, with the structure that matches Midwestern values 
and risk tolerance…[while transitioning from] “Rust Belt” to “Inno-
vation District”.
WBI discovered that typical technology commercialization, funded primarily by venture 
capitalists, had a success rate of ten percent. In contrast, an ideal market-pull method-
ology uses future customers in the product development process, resulting in a much 
higher success rate — proven in startup examples such as Apple’s Siri technology and the 
Da Vinci surgical system. This model is reflective of practices used in the Lean Startup 
movement, which WBI explored as a model for application to the Dayton region in 2014. 
The improved commercialization model showed tremendous promise to shorten time-
to-market and reduce the capital investment needed to reach break-even points. It also 
promised to achieve commercialization success rates of over 80 percent on business that 
can achieve $100M valuation within five years of launch.                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                          
Their market-pull model’s intelligence comes from assuming that buyers do not care 
about technology but do care about what value it can bring to them. This model features 
research such as market analysis and tech mining, which is completed prior to launching 
a business. This ensures that start-ups have strong market pull, the right technology and 
a unique value proposition that allows for rapid capitalization. Additionally, constant 
refinement and iteration is considered critical components to success, allowing for mod-
ification of a product or service during the development of the business. Feedback from 
user groups, technical experts and business professionals can be incorporated iteratively 
while the product can get to market faster, and with fewer pitfalls. An interesting analysis 
compared Dayton’s then-current Defence Contractor mindset — which did not have the 
ability to take the region into the desired future — to the mindset of an innovation culture.  
D E F E N C E  C O N T R A C T O R  C U LT U R E I N N O VAT I O N  C U LT U R E
Technical talent Entrepreneurial/business talent
Top-down needs requirement Market assessment
Compete Collaborate with competitors
Looking for threats Looking for opportunities
Solve an engineering/scientific problem Solve a market problem
Secure environment Open environment
Patent for professional accomplishment Patent for market protection
Stove-pipe solution System integration
Avoid risk Embrace risk




After this journey of reassessing the processes of innovation and marketing in the re-
gion, the partnership determined that there is a capacity in the region to commercialize 
technology coming from the Air Force Research Laboratory and local universities, if 
they could understand the market and win readily-available capital investment funds. 
The Market-Pull Commercialization Model allowed them to begin assessing needs of the 
market and integrate those needs into their thinking, thus providing needed alignment 
between the desire to “tech push” and the “market pull”. Importantly, the traditional 
stage-gate process was modified during the course of the program to incorporate findings 
uncovered by exercising the model. They found success in folding new ventures into an 
existing start-up under a common umbrella, which provided synergies that benefited both 
ventures by vastly increasing the market potential. In addition, several ventures resulted 
in a new product line or a spin-off for an existing business. This often proved much easier 
and quicker than starting a company for scratch (Wright Brothers Institute, 2018).                                    
In their conclusion to the initial partnering project, it was noted:
This commercialization model is giving Dayton the confidence it 
needs to attract investors and embolden entrepreneurs. While many 
have tried to replicate commercialization models from other large 
cities, mid-size Midwestern communities like Dayton have had min-
imal success in adopting those cultural principles. There are still 
areas that need improvement. Cultivating a pool of experienced en-
trepreneurs will help integrate Air Force technologies into commer-
cial products, faster. More access to capital, especially early pre-seed 
and seed capital, will enable start-ups to focus on tech development 
and delivering high-quality products, rather than fundraising. Evan-
gelizing “market pull” over “tech push”, through words and actions, 
is needed to make this the norm (Wright Brothers Institute, 2018). 
 
WBI is one of a number of public, private, and university partnerships that have supported 
Ohio’s recent surge in homegrown start-ups. If quality of life where one works is consid-
ered important to a thriving cluster (apparent in places like Austin and Seattle), many 
are seeing this ingredient in Ohio. In the Forbes article “Why Ohio Is The Best State In 
America To Launch A Start-Up”, Peter Taylor writes, “Manhattan has the nightlife. San 
Francisco has the lifestyle. But Ohio has both for a fraction of the price”. Ohio also has 
exciting, vibrant, diverse cultures, where people traditionally have a loyal work ethic, 
which is harder to find on the coasts. Start-up costs such as overhead are far less, allowing 
the investment dollar to count for more towards a goal. An Ohio-based venture capitalist 
suggested that the Midwest is a kinder, gentler venture capitalist culture compared with 
Silicon Valley: “we are entrepreneur-centric, but we still appreciate having our friends 
out West joins us as we find a great entrepreneur with lots of upside potential.” Taylor also 
describes Ohio attitudes of innovation as better for mentoring (Taylor, 2017).                                           
If a region like Ohio can establish the basis for a healthy industrial cluster that creates 
value for the world, Porter shows that the economic power and efficiency of a cluster can 
offset mounting pressures to relocate abroad: clusters, in other words, get more focused 
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(Florida, 2008). To the thoughtful business model that WBI is now using to make Day-
ton’s technology commercially viable, it could suggested that this great project can be 
enhanced by considering some of the methods and insights brought forward in this paper: 
understanding their cluster as a complex system which demands ever-more comprehen-
sive problem solving methodologies critical for the 21st century; recognizing that pos-
itive agglomeration externalities can become problematic elements if a proper balance 
between the higher and lower-level cluster agents are not working with optimal synergy; 
using the GEMS model to monitor all the aspects of a cluster that need to be in good health 
and working together; the historical long cycles of innovation and capital that reflect on 
the past and portend the future; and finally, the Three Horizons framework that can bring 
people together to coalesce for a shared understanding and future-focused change.




Table 2: THE FIVE INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS COMPARED 
T H E  T H R E E  S TA G E S  O F  C L U S T E R S 
C L U S T E R 
S TA G E D AY T O N D E T R O I T H A R T F O R D S I L I C O N  V A L L E Y N E W  Y O R K  T E C H
First stage • Little geographical or 
educational infra-
structure present 
• Cluster emerges  
with manufacture of 
simple implements 
• Key leaders move to 
Dayton from Ohio 
region to challenge 
problems of the age 
• Cross-border indus-
try network estab-
lished between Delco 
and Detroit
• Well-positioned 
on Great Lakes for 
industry 
• Arrival of  
mechanically adept 
from Northeast to 
integrate bicycle  
and carriage trade 
for emerging  
automobile  
• Intense learning 
and spin-off activity 
among firms 
• Other automobile 
regions outpaced 
• Chance convergence 
of notable person-
alities
• Cluster emerges 
with heavy concen-
tration of manu-





• Precision metal 
working industries 
would account for 
12 percent of region-
al employment in 
1880 
• Adept at absorbing 
innovations that 
arose in other parts 
of the country
• Universities collab-




• Military contracts 
helped build key 
organizations 
• Early entrepreneurs 
willing to take big 
risks for big gains 
• Emergence of local 
networks that allow 
firms to make use 
of diverse available 
skills 
• Out-competes  
Boston’s Route 128 
with greater flexibil-
ity of structure
• Weaknesses of 
banking and 
finance as main 
industry motivates 
city to invest in tech 
• Built tech capa-
bilities on nascent 
strengths in adver-
tising’s use of tech 
• Well-funded uni-
versities and smart 
public policies will 
allow tech to flour-
ish in the future 
• New York City is 





• Dominant business 
machine design 
emerges 




the nation; training 
in Dayton becomes 
mandatory for many, 
even if Dayton cluster 
becomes less import-
ant over time 
• External push of elec-
tronics is embraced 
early on, but fails 
to influence major 
change of strategy 
• Dominant auto 
design emerges; 
growing demand 
for cars allow for 
greater integration 
of production and 
growth 
• Mode of manufac-
ture and business 
practices become 
standardized, led by 
General Motors 
• Major 1950s con-
solidation of firm 
numbers  
• Importance of prox-
imity for knowledge 
transfer declines 
(foreign makes set 
up in other parts of 
the nation)
• Consolidation of 
many firms under 
Pope Manufactur-
ing Co. in becoming 
the largest bicycle 
manufacturer in 
U.S. 
• Production of steel 
tubing, rubber etc 
integrated 
• Increased competi-
tion upon invention 
of the safety bicycle 
and Midwest-de-
rived efficiencies of 
production




chip makers results 
in more diverse 
spin-offs 
• Cluster grows to 
encompass several 
counties 
• Silicon Valley likely 




eration and capital 
strategy take hold 
and lead to decline
Third stage • Increased standard-
ization of digital 
point-of-sale retail 
systems make NCR’s 
mechanical manufac-
turing irrelevant 
• Decreased benefits of 
Dayton cluster with 
globalization 
• Internal rigidities do 
not allow for explora-
tion of new strategies 
until late
• Like Dayton, 
Detroit became a 
mono-structured 
“company town” 
unable to adequately 
adapt to external 
threats 
• Lack of diversity to 
generate new ideas 
• Lost their ability to 
adjust to changing 
environment 
• Hobbled by  
recessions and poor 
product quality
• Major competition 
from low-cost 
producers all over 
country extinguish-
es bicycle cluster 
and manufacturing 
cluster as a whole 
• Poor transportation 
links to growing 
interior population
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Table 3: HOW THE CA SE STUDIE S AT THEIR BE ST FOLLOWED  
 THE GEMS MODEL OF CLUSTER FORMATION AND STABILIT Y
C L U S T E R 
S TA G E D AY T O N D E T R O I T H A R T F O R D S I L I C O N  V A L L E Y N E W  Y O R K  T E C H
Anchor 
effect
• Major supplier 
firms of automotive 
parts in Dayton 
anchored by Delco 
• Influence of NCR 
on many aspects of 
life in Dayton
• Oldsmobile first 
anchor firm in Detroit 
that led to spin-offs 
• Thriving cluster 
of parts suppliers 
throughout the region
Pope Manufacturing 
Co. the innovator in 
bicycles, supporting 
many suppliers who 
were eventually folded 
into the company
• Early semiconductor 
labs, HP anchors 
• Outside multinational 
firms and military  
• Later influence of 
Apple in regional app 
proliferation 
• Google a major 
anchor firm that 
brought tech to NY 
• Key local advertis-
ing and financial 






in early period was 
favourable, with no 
state income tax until 
1926, and relatively 
light franchise tax on 
corporations
• Banks quick to finance 
early auto industry 
• Auto leaders drove 
firms to rapid growth 
and sophistication in 
spite of sluggish and 
conservative ‘old mon-
ey’ investor  families 
of the city
Typical unregulated 
business climate of the 
Gilded Age, creating 
enormous wealth 
• Low marginal tax rate 
• Climate for risk taking 
• Business innovation 
• Results-oriented  
meritocracy 
• Open business envi-






NYC as a base 
• City nurturing 
talent  









• Many companies 
linked by auto 
supply business
Strong linkages between 
auto makers and sup-
pliers, national dealer 
network
• Pope Manufactur-
ing Co. developed 
a sales network 
that was flexible in 
weathering slumps 





fessional + tech  
information shared 
• Social meeting of tech 
• High job mobility
• Many linkages in 
creative industry 
• Similar collabo-
rative mindset to 
Silicon Valley among 
tech workers
Public policy Home rule’ gover-
nance: business lead-





bile oriented. Funds 
directed to the building 
of expressways to get to 
factories and the down-
town offices
Bicycle and Pope’s rec-
ommendations helped 
change public policy 




in employment contracts; 
fostered a less loyal, more 
footloose talent pool that 
moves fast
NYC fosters initiatives 
to lessen economy’s 
dependence on finance 
and bolsters tech pro-




of business machine, 
auto and electronic 
firms
By 1938, two-thirds of 
U.S. car makers were 
headquartered in Detroit
Bicycle makers drawn 
to Hartford because 





benefits were quickly 
realized by tech firms 
clustering into Silicon 
Valley
As tech firms continue 
to increase in NY, the 




NCR led innovative 
business, manufactur-
ing, sales strategies, + 
progressive commu-
nity spirit, worker 
support 
• High entrepreneurial 
firms ‘put America on 
wheels’ 






ture that would lead 
to automobile being 
possible
Innovative commer-
cialization of tech in the 
move from transistors to 
consumer devices
Strong academic,  
advertising and tech  
relationships will 
foster much innovation 
and entrepreneurship
Historical factors  
and elements  
of chance
Meeting of mechan-
ical, electrical and 
business innovators 
in Dayton at the time 
was unique
Automobiles benefited 
from key personalities 
that arrives in Detroit, 
major oil discoveries 
and the flowering of 
technical innovations in 
a K-Spring
Development of 
bicycles made possible 
of key learnings from 
precision engineering 
elsewhere in America 
+ great advertising 
insight by Pope
• Chance meeting of 
tech brought together 
at Stanford Industrial 
Park  
• Government’s need for 
transistor technology 
to fight Cold War
New drive for tech 






SCA NNING THE PR ESENT
A collection of signals, trends, risks and implications 
bundled into social, technological, economic, environ-
mental and values-based criteria (STEEP-V) can 
assist the construction of different possible futures  
for industrial clusters. These signals and trends point  




S T E E P -V                                                                                                               
S O C I A L                                                                                                                  
T H E  O L D  C I T Y  A S  C L U S T E R  O F  I N N O VAT I O N
 
Where the talent goes: the question to exit the industrial campus  
for the lure of the hip downtown location                                                                                                                        
S I G N A L S
In 2016, General Electric’s headquarters left Fairfield, Con-
necticut for downtown Boston. The company valued the idea 
of being near the urban high-tech young ventures and talent in 
order to become more innovative and digital, while avoiding the 
dreaded situation of being disrupted. G.E.’s CEO: “I can walk out 
my door and visit four start-ups. In Fairfield I couldn’t even walk 
out my door and get a sandwich.” Talented young people love 
working downtown, less so the “aging suburban complexes with
                                                              lots of parking” (Kerr, 2018).                                                                                                 
Chattanooga is experiencing a boom in entrepreneurship. Over 
the past several decades, the downtown particularly has become 
a lively mixed-use district. Unlike many innovation districts, 
which have major corporations or research universities as their 
primary anchors, Chattanooga’s energy revolves around EPB, 
the city’s public electric and telecommunications utility, and the 
Edney Innovation Center, an 11-story building that combines 
community programming, business services, co-working and 
private office spaces. The district’s vision plan focuses on six 
key values, including innovation, education, culture and history, 
public life, and treating the district as an urban lab (Benz, 
 Storring, 2018).                                                                                                                                
   
Columbia Gateway, a once-revolutionary suburban park in 
Maryland, is rejuvenating itself as an innovation hub rather 
than succumbing to an exodus of workers who prefer walkable, 
livelier business environments. It's to be a dense mixed-use 
transit-connected area where startups, institutions and re-
search-intensive corporations cluster together and connect 
through community-oriented places and programs (Benz, 2018).
Source: Boston Globe
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Bronzeville, Chicago, has been a tough place to live for African 
Americans for 80 years. But its proximity to downtown, ample 
public transit options, rich cultural history, and lakefront access 
have fueled a resurgence in recent years. Major new develop-
ments serve growing demand for housing and affordable retail, 
while smaller-scale placemaking efforts are helping to support 
local entrepreneurship, create inviting streetscapes, and 
 enhance public spaces (White, 2018).                                                                                
Columbus, Ohio is being recognized as a successful cluster 
where many highly-educated people and businesses call home 
by existing around a good, well-funded university, exhibiting 
smart urban planning and a welcoming business climate (Smith, 
2018). Columbus took the No. 1 spot on Forbes magazine’s list of 
emerging venture capital startup cities edging out the more
 traditional major cities (Yates, 2018).                                                                         
Columbus, Ohio is experiencing a form of tech growth with the 
rise of ‘mid-tech’ businesses, which may entail intense training 
but without the need for the kind of skills required in high-fly-
ing Silicon Valley. These tech jobs seem to have a lot in com-
mon with the older style of blue collar jobs. Mid-tech jobs now 
compose more than a quarter of all tech employment in major 
Midwestern metropolitan areas, including Columbus, Ohio; Cin-
cinnati, Ohio; St. Louis, Missouri; Detroit, Michigan; Nashville, 
Tennessee; and Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota-Wisconsin 
 (Coren, 2018).                                                                                                                                         
Over the last three to five years, there's been a growing buzz in 
Chicago's technology community — a renewed creative culture  
is manifesting into global recognition. Among other up and com-
ing cities, a new KPMG report lists Chicago as a contender to be 
an international hub for innovation because of its talent and
 infrastructure (Akkawi, 2017).                         
Even before its selection of a second headquarters, Amazon 
in late February added 2,000 jobs to its workforce in Boston, a 
center of specialized tech workers (Ecker, 2018).    
Source: National Trust 









R I S K S
For organizations contemplating moving their leaders from the old location to the down-
town ‘innovation’ office, the need to uproot an existing workforce, change legacy customer 
locations, and establish new local political connections and responsibilities means that 
any relocation will be disruptive, offsetting the advantages a talent cluster might offer 
(Kerr, 2018).                                 
While drivers of job growth and revitalization, urban innovation districts tend to reflect 
the knowledge-based industries that comprise them, and thus often lack diversity in 
terms of workforce, business ownership, and decision-making (Benz, Storring, 2018).                        
For all their positive impacts, efforts at “placemaking” (strategies for livable, for-
ward-thinking sustainable business clusters) are constrained by policies, practices, and 
investment structures that are failing to keep pace with the changing needs of firms, 
institutions, and workers, hampering the scope and scale of their impact.                                                       
Local and regional planning organizations may advocate for transportation, economic de-
velopment, and land use policies and investments to support existing economic districts. 
But in practice, these investments are often more reactive than strategic, triggered by 
government or philanthropic programs — like Enterprise Zones, Promise Zones, and most 
recently, Opportunity Zones — or by private firms, anchor institutions, or other organi-
zations looking for a development site. Add to this mix the competition for resources and 
revenues among and within jurisdictions, and you get the sort of scattered, transactional, 
and uncoordinated development projects that don’t “add up,” in form or function, in ways 
that help achieve larger economic goals. Further, when public and private sector leaders 
do more strategically prioritize place-based investments, they often focus on either miti-
gating the symptoms of entrenched poverty, or on attracting “talent” from out of town. In 
neither case is inclusive economic growth — that is, business and job growth that benefits 
everyone — the main objective (Vey, 2018).                                                                                                                                 
 Companies may overinvest in downtown locations and be at risk of having to pull out for 
the same reasons that former talent hot spots have deteriorated in the past (Kerr, 2018).                         
Ideas generated within the urban talent hub may fail to spread to the rest of the organiza-
tion (Kerr, 2018).                                                                                                                                                                                         
Ill will generated both from the location the head office is moving from, but also from the 
new location where the organization might have sought excessive tax breaks (Kerr, 2018). 
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Talent may flow into an organization in a new creative urban hub, but it can just as easily 
flow out of the organization and into neighboring competitors or other businesses (Kerr, 
2018).                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Clustering of companies and talent in urban areas can generate distinct winners and los-
ers both across and within cities and metros. The wage gap between creative and routine 
workers — and between creative and routine metros — has increased considerably over 
time (Florida, 2016).                                                                                                                                                                                     
Increased cost of living: fast rising food prices, utility costs, basic services, costs of 
housing and rental. Addressing these concerns is a major priority for future growth and 
prosperity of the urban innovation hub (Engla, et. al, 2018).                                                                                                      
M AT U R I T Y 
Emerging
Over the last 20 years, downtown centers have accounted for considerably more tech 
hires in metropolitan areas, compared with their smaller influence two decades ago. 
Cities like Columbus have seen impressive growth via tech cluster activity over the past 
two years. Also, for the first time since 2011, net domestic migration in Silicon Valley was 
negative, meaning that more Silicon Valley residents left the region for other parts of the 
U.S. than arrived from other parts of the U.S. (Reback, 2017).
Essex Crossing, Lower 
East Side, Manhattan, New 
York City: a mix of housing, 
retail, entertainment, food, 
job training and office 
space that will serve both 
low income people who live 




I M P L I C AT I O N S 
More formerly-suburban companies will move to urban centers to take advantage of 
a technologically-fluent workforce and get in front of potentially disruptive futures or 
have a better vantage of new advances; they will find the move very expensive unless city 
centers can manage the resulting density of activity and stressors on relevant elements of 
its  infrastructure. Businesses will feel pressured to relocate their headquarters, or set up 
urban innovation labs where organizations small and large will act like innovation start-
ups, which will be a major challenge for some.                               
The best talent may appreciate centers of work where there are industry-academic part-
nerships that satisfy the curiosity of the brightest creative workers. All regional econo-
mies will continue to face global competition to attract entrepreneurs and create jobs, and 
will have to find new strategies to kickstart their own innovation economies that mean 
vibrant social cultures of investment and national and global leadership.                           
Robots and AI will continue to become a part of the daily lives of people, and its implica-
tions for industry clusters in urban environments will have influence relative to the kinds 
of jobs that can make valuable use of the technology. Perhaps those that can make valu-
able use of strategic skills and can evolve their skill set quickly will have a more positive 
experience with AI, while tech workers/routine workers who are less at the forefront of 
policy making or invention/innovation activities (and perhaps less frequently living in the 
downtown innovation hub) will have an uneasy relationship with AI (Florida, 2018).                             
Emerging development of denser, more creative downtown holds promise for improving 
accessibility, fostering increased sociability and civic engagement, while generating job 
growth and innovation. Leaders in urban, suburban, and rural communities are under-
standably hungry to better understand and harness the forces behind them to benefit 
more people and places. They are seeking strategies that scale beyond individual lots or 
blocks to reinvigorate arts and creative districts, university and medical districts, subur-
ban business parks, Main Streets, and other economic districts. And they want to employ 
those strategies in ways that help strengthen the broader regional economy and ensure 
that all citizens can participate in its growth (Vey, 2018).                               
Globalization will see two sides: the geographic spread of routine service and manufac-
turing work in some regions, and a smaller number of high-level clusters where the cre-
ative and ambitious flock to achieve success in design, finance and media (Florida, 2008)
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T E C H N O L O G I C A L                                                                   
F U R T H E R  W E A LT H / F U R T H E R  D A M A G E :  
R O B O T S  A N D  A I  A R E  O N  T H E  V E R G E  O F  B R I N G I N G 
A B O U T  T H E  N E W E S T  S H I F T  I N  I N D U S T R I A L  C L U S T E R S
 
The growing ubiquity of robots will transform industry in both tech  
and legacy industrial clusters. Will robotics correct or reinforce  
America’s growing spatial inequality?                            
S I G N A L S
The U.S. is still the leader in robotics innovation, but applica-
tions of robotics and AI are coming from around the world. At a 
2017 robotics exhibition, the sheer number of exhibiting com-
panies with “Shenzhen” in their name indicates that China is 
deadly serious about taking the lead of the consumer electronics 
industry. But South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, France, Israel, and a 
host of other countries are just as eagerly working to find their 
own niches in AI, robotics, and related technologies                          
 (Demaitre, 2017).                                                                                                                                 
New offerings from robot manufacturers are making the process 
of buying and setting up robots easier than ever. The online 
marketplace used in combination with a variety of third-party 
hardware and software platforms offer flexibility that can make 
the process of adopting and implementing automation easier for 
manufacturers across a variety of industries. These robots can 
be customized for multiple jobs during their lifespan, helping 
smaller companies just getting into automation, providing much 
more security than a larger robot installation whose an upfront 
price tag may be a hindrance to its implementation (Wagner, 
 2017).                                                                                                                                              
   
A new Regional Studies paper shows that half of the 30 robot-
ic regions in the U.S. are in Rust Belt metros, lead by Detroit, 
Chicago and Boston (care of MIT research), with a few smaller 
metros in Ohio, Iowa and Colorado having high concentrations 
of robotics for their size. Places that serve as robotic integrators 
(designing and implementing robotic systems) are also old Rust 
Belt manufacturing hubs. TIn Shanghai, a massive new con-
tainer port has already eliminated 70 percent of the labour costs 
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R I S K S
There is little evidence of a rise of tech centers anywhere in the U.S. other than a narrow 
group of cities, while other parts of the world are stepping up, partly as a result of the 
exclusionary and anti-innovation policies of the Trump administration, which may have 
lasting effects. The rise of the rest of the world is the biggest challenge to America’s domi-
nance in decades (Florida, 2018).                                                 
M AT U R I T Y
Growing
In the way of Moore’s Law, robotics are becoming more complex and at the same time 
cheaper, making them increasingly attractive to many types of manufacturing business-
es. Aided by a growing presence of robotics industries and innovation happening through-
out the world, the influence of robots is steadily growing.                                            
      
I M P L I C AT I O N S
Automakers are turning to new suppliers that employ data analytics to identify compo-
nents at risk of failure. Faulty parts are yanked off the line before they can be installed. 
All this happens remotely, with clients simply subscribing to the system, which analyzes 
a continual flow of data transmitted from factory floors. It is part of a vast machine of 
connected technologies collectively dubbed Industry 4.0, which entails data analytics, AI, 
and wireless connectivity (Lorinc, 2018).                              
Digital technologies can reap huge rewards. Cities that mastering AI can enable indus-
trial-equipment manufacturers to boost their market capitalization by as much as 25 
percent (Business Wire 2018).                                   
Although the automotive industry has been using robots for decades, the rise of collabora-
tive robots or cobots has made automation more flexible and useful to small and midsize 
enterprises (RBR Insider, 2018). Multiple industries can benefit from adoption or expan-
sion of automation, but only if they understand their own processes and needs and can 
work well with partners (RBR Insider, 2018).                                                                                                                       
The future may still favour the human mind, as most jobs consist of multiple sub-sets of 
tasks from different domains, requiring a multitude of skills. A job could require commu-
nication, numerical calculations, logical reasoning, data aggregation, analytics, creativ-
ity, social skills, dexterity, processing of auditive, olfactory or visual stimuli and much 
more. Balanced automation will progress slower and will not be as disruptive as currently 
predicted (Weber, 2018). 
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Our society could also shift away from its technological innovation trajectory, because 
of potential resource scarcity, pollution, conflicts or other external influences. Cultural 
change would not be as fast as technological transformation (Weber, 2018).                                               
Another direction could involve a general use of widespread planned automation, where 
a great many tasks are recognized by the general public to be better when automated, 
while many human-only experiences are still valued. An alternative political, social and 
economic system, which is compatible with the future status quo (Weber, 2018).                                    
A more dramatic scenario would be rapid automation, where human labour and our value 
system, as capitalism as an underlying theory for innovation might be called into ques-
tion. In the case of full-automation, corporate monopolies that will have created these au-
tomated systems or amassed the most data, would eventually aggregate power and money, 
while breaking the logical implication from productivity gains to higher wages, because 
there would not be enough human jobs. In consequence the driver of growth, consump-
tion, would be inhibited. Social inequity in the extreme or a universal basic income could 
be a way of life (Weber, 2018).
Scania of Sweden's new 
 generation of trucks will 
be built care of the com-
pany’s biggest  industrial 
investment of the past 
two  decades. The world’s 
most modern cab factory 




E C O N O M I C                                                             
F I G H T I N G  O L I G O P O LY  W I T H  D I S P E R S E D  
C L U S T E R  S U C C E S S
 
The trends seem to point to a small number of financial and business  
groups reaping all the rewards in the tech center, but a few cities are  
forging an alternate path to thrive.                                                     
S I G N A L S
Central Indiana Corporate Partnership has developed six talent 
and industry sector initiatives that focus on a combination of 
interventions to kickstart clusters of innovation in Indiana, 
including talent development; technology development; capital 
provision; district/infrastructure development; and research,                
   information provision and education (Parilla, 2018).                                             
Tesla is in retreat, shuttering most of its stores in a bid to cut 
costs. Expecting a loss in its first quarter, the company is jarring 
investors’ faith in the firm and its founder. It seems as if the 
Tesla board is letting Elon Musk wing it. Tesla has also laid off 7 
percent of its work force in January, 2019, the second job cut in 
the last eight months. Profit margins on the new Model 3 are
 close to zero these days (Boudette, 2019).                                                                                                                              
   
“I was just talking to an executive at Flex, which is in Michigan, 
and they're hiring 250 folks in Detroit. The software company 
basically is a cloud computing company that allows manufactur-
ers to be more productive because they allow manufacturers to 
be on the cloud [just in time]. That’s an example of a technology 
that’s helping create jobs in Michigan. Talent isn’t just concen-
trated here in Silicon Valley.”
  – Silicon Valley Congressman Ro Khanna (Recode, 2017).                            
   
A new set of understandings and policies is needed to push back 
against today’s epidemic of divergence geographic economic 
success and to knit the country back together. Scholars, journal-
ists, politicians, local leaders, and investors are all beginning to 
reassess the costs of inaction. No longer does nonchalance about 
the pulling away of “superstar” cities and the decline of “left-be-
hind places” seem tenable (Galston, Hendrickson, Muro, 2018).
S T E E P -V 
Source: Cicpindiana.com
Source: YouTube:  
Tesla Model S Problems
Source: Flex.com
Source: Wikipedia:  
Rust Belt
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General Motors announced Monday that it planned to idle five 
factories in North America and cut roughly 14,000 jobs in a bid 
to trim costs. It was a jarring reflection of the auto industry’s 
adjustment to changing consumer tastes and sluggish sales
 (Boudette, 2018).                                                                                                                                     
North Texas has risen to become one of top U.S. data center 
markets. North Texas area has made inroads in this sector, 
it is located in a central time zone, is not coastal, and there is 
technically no seismic activity. Also, this area is not prone to 
large-scale flooding or weather extremes. Many applications 
needed for business, commerce, industry, and social media all 
compute from these platforms, much like when a large corpora-
tion relocates a major headquarters or manufacturing operation 
to the region, other companies that supply to, and benefit from, 
the presence of the large installation are lured here as well
   (Kirkpatric, 2018).                                                                                                                             
   
The artificial intelligence computer scientists working on the 
self-driving car have an average salary at Google of $345,000. 
It is very difficult holding onto specialists with expertise in a 
market the big five tech companies are interested in controlling. 
Today, the number of new tech businesses is at a 30-year low. 
Oligopolization has set in, and it’s fair to assume that some of 
those new businesses that the big five’s anti-competitive behav-
ior is keeping locked out of the market would have been born in 
metros less expensive than San Francisco, Boston, or Seattle. 
Instead, as there are fewer and fewer tech IPOs and more and 
more acquisitions by the big five, it seems as though many start-
ups angle to be acquired by those super-rich companies located
 in those super-rich metros (Ecker, 2018).                                                                        
Since 2010, Seattle’s growth has outpaced that of any other of 
the nation’s 50 largest cities, even sprawling Sun Belt power-
houses like Austin, Texas. Seattle is a major technology cluster, 
which creates high-paying jobs for knowledge workers. The in-
flows of money to the tech industry spill over into a huge variety 
of local services — everything from food to law to health care 
and real estate — and generates plenty of work even for those 
who aren't engineering whizzes. That positive dynamic drives 








R I S K S
As housing costs rise, routine workers — especially those in routine-in-local jobs — are 
shunted off to less expensive metros which, by definition, have smaller concentrations 
of higher-paying creative-in-traded jobs. This creates a vicious cycle in which the ad-
vantaged become more advantaged over time, while the disadvantaged sink further into 
poverty (Florida, 2016).                                               
General Motors announced Monday that it planned to idle five factories in North America 
and cut roughly 14,000 jobs in a bid to trim costs. It was a jarring reflection of the auto 
industry’s adjustment to changing consumer tastes and sluggish sales (Boudette, 2018).                   
Austin, Texas, which now has a successful tech cluster, is like Silicon Valley seeing a 
challenge in facing an increased cost of living — fast rising food prices, utility costs, basic 
services, costs of housing and rental. Addressing these concerns is a major priority for 
future growth and prosperity of this urban innovation hub (Berbegal-Mirabent, Engel, 
Pique, 2018).                                   
Using tax incentives to try to poach companies from elsewhere tends to weaken commu-
nities’ tax bases, while any growth benefits are zero sum, at least in economy-wide terms 
(Irwin, 2018).                                  
M AT U R I T Y
Emerging
The world seems to be growing to the idea that Silicon Valley as the all-important tech 
cluster without equal will come to an end in a number of years. Other cities both in the 
U.S. and the world will show that different cultures and different forms of building inno-
vation will prove resilient and will demonstrate competitive success.                                                                                   
I M P L I C AT I O N S
Regions can improve their economic performance by improving its existing assets, rather 
than attempting a transformation by chasing industries situated elsewhere (Dizikes, 
2014).                                  
“Policymakers can use analytics to understand what their sources of relative advantage 
are,” Stern says. “And while they, of course, want to avoid picking winners and we want 
to let a lot of experimentation flourish, we can prioritize those activities that leverage 
the things about our regions that are unique, distinctive, and meaningful. That leads to a 
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smarter type of economic development than simply chasing the next big thing”(Dizikes, 
2014).                                                        
Taking a longer view of cluster development makes it easier to see beyond clusters as 
self-contained and localized to their more nuanced role as interactive spaces that foster 
communication and collaboration between foreign and local organizations and individu-
als and enable the integration of developing countries into the global economy (Hannah, 
2017).                                                    
Universities need to be leveraged better — to make them healthy, and upgrade the ones 
that need upgrading, and make them more research focused (Irwin, 2018).                          
An overhauled immigration policy to help attract more people with advanced skills, espe-
cially to struggling regions, and changes to labor laws such as banning the “non-compete” 
clauses that make it hard for people to switch jobs (Irwin, 2018).                            
The lack of quick and plentiful funding for digital startups in cities like Chicago may 
serve as a helpful constraint that can guide disruptive innovators and cut through the 
noise. These alternative visions are shaped by demand, not investors. The tech industry 
is calling for a culture of substance, and the timing might be right for the value-driven 
culture of Chicago and other cities to step up to the plate. The stress of running a company 
without customers — the Silicon Valley way — is seen as a distraction that gets in the way 
of real value when profit is seen as a guide to innovation (Akkawi, 2017).                          
What is the economic future for a Hartford or Akron or Tulsa or the countless smaller 
towns and rural areas that didn’t get so much as a serious look from companies like Am-
azon? They will still need heavy investment in digital skills, even in areas without a large 
existing high-tech sector. New channels will need to be in place to ensure that businesses 
in struggling areas have access to capital, including small-business lending from banks 
and venture capital for start-ups (Irwin, 2018).                             
The recent spate of auto plant closures poses a tough challenge for policy-makers who 
could be faced with a radical reshaping of the labour market, a business-as-usual scenar-
io, or anything in between. Yet, the Oshawa plant closing reminds us that these conversa-
tions shouldn’t default to a “wait-and-see” approach, which won’t help workers who are in 
need of better supports right now. Instead, there’s a growing international consensus that 
governments must focus on overhauling skills training for adult workers who might face 
multiple job transitions (Johal, 2018).
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E N V I R O N M E N T A L                                                             
C R E AT I V I T Y,  C A P I TA L ,  T O X I C  WA S T E L A N D
 
It’s now clear that environmental degradation, along with other excesses,  
is now part of the story of Silicon Valley.                              
S I G N A L S
Although air pollution from traffic congestion and sprawl is the 
most visible environmental problem caused by Silicon Valley, 
there are others, including groundwater plumes of solvents that 
have moved under working-class housing areas near industrial 
zones. These plumes of solvents migrate to working-class neigh-
borhoods and communities of color to be far more exposed to
 pollution than whiter and wealthier areas (Ottenberg, 2018).                      
Saudi Arabia’s alleged involvement in the disappearance and 
possible murder of a dissident Washington Post columnist is 
putting Silicon Valley in a difficult position, with potentially 
billions in business deals at stake. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), 
whose district includes Silicon Valley, specifically called out the 
tech sector for taking money from Saudi Arabia given its record
 of human rights abuses (Neidig, 2018).                                                                        
   
In addition to an incoming tidal wave of middle- and work-
ing-class residents fleeing sky-high housing costs in Silicon 
Valley, the Central Valley absorbs emissions from mammoth 
traffic jams to the west. The resulting sprawl pays its real estate 
investors, delivering profits through property investment and 
capital accumulation, rather than fulfilling the American sub-
urban dream. Property capital aims to stretch suburbia as far as 
possible, with the highest profits come from land value apprecia-
 tion, not from building houses (Ottenberg, 2018).                                                   
                 
Silicon Valley is now one of the leading generators of inequal-
ity. The housing crisis is becoming an embarrassment, with 
hundreds of thousands of people being priced out of the city and 
having to move either far out into the Central Valley, where they 
are 100 miles away from the center, or they give up and go to 
Las Vegas or Reno or Oregon, or wherever the possibilities seem 
better for ordinary working folks (Florida, 2018).






M AT U R I T Y
Growing
The environmental and human costs inherent in Silicon Valley are beginning to be acute-
ly felt, and will increase until there is either a major change in infrastructure or ultimate 
and long-term deflation in the tech industry and the Bay Area.                           
I M P L I C AT I O N S
Given how much warming is already locked in, green tech can only accomplish so much. 
Tech titans may find it hard to accept abandoning estates to wildfires or office parks in 
low-lying areas to floods, but climate change will not spare them. They do, however, have 
the political and economic clout to blunt its effects. If they wanted, they could promote 
smarter building, smarter development and a more thoughtful use of resources. So far, 
however, the will for this has been lacking, leaving capitalism’s prized tech empire belch-
ing out air pollution and exposed to fire and flood (Ottenberg, 2018).                             
Towns that want to become successful clusters will want to take heed of the unexpected 
environmental problems that resulted from Silicon Valley’s explosive growth and plan for 
transportation and housing accordingly.




P O L I T I C A L                                                             
S C R A M B L I N G  F O R  T H E  L O C A L  T E A M :  
P O L I T I C I A N S  G A M B L E  O N  T H E  T I C K E T  F O R WA R D
 
In the face of federal uncertainty, luring the biggest tech companies to a home 
town is risky political business, and it can ultimately sell a town short.                                        
S I G N A L S
In 2017, Howard County in Maryland was among the many ju-
risdictions criticized for offering undisclosed — but presumably 
generous — tax incentives for Amazon to relocate to their city
 (Benz, Storring, 2018).                                                                 
With the federal government mired in gridlock and hyper-par-
tisanship, local leaders are stepping up to advance solutions to 
their unique economic, social, and environmental challenges. 
As a result, the public maintains high trust in local government 
while its faith in federal institutions has eroded dramatically
 (Vey, 2018).                                                                                        
Trump administration’s immigration policy has threatened 
the livelihoods of tech workers and researchers in the US. The 
restrictions introduced make harder to recruit and retain top 
talent from abroad, being particularly troublesome for the U.S. 
tech-hub — circa 71 percent of tech employees in Silicon Valley 
are foreign-born and 43 percent of Fortune 500 companies in 
2017 were founded by immigrants and their children. Almost 
half of Fortune 500 companies were founded by American 
   immigrants or their children (Berbegal-Mirabent, Pique, 2018).           
                 
Cities from Memphis to New York to a small community in 
Georgia that offered to rename itself after Amazon are offering 
billions in subsidies and whole departments of city employees 
dedicated just to servicing Amazon’s needs in the hope of be-
coming home to Amazon’s “HQ2.” Larry Hogan, the Republican 
governor of Maryland, offered Amazon $5 billion in incentives 
and called HQ2 “the single greatest economic development 
opportunity in a generation” (Ecker, 2018).







R I S K S
More public transport and funding in Silicon Valley is needed and it’s being blocked by the 
Republicans in California in the administration.  
—  Silicon Valley Congressman Ro Khanna (Recode, 2017)                                    
                                                                                                        
The “spiky, unequal” cycle in which the advantaged (higher-paying creative-in-traded 
professionals) become more advantaged over time, while the disadvantaged (routine 
workers) sink further into poverty provides a substantial challenge to local and national 
policymakers (Florida, 2008).                                       
A sense of unfairness can become a major issue for other businesses and some taxpayers 
upon learning that city officials have promised over-the-top financial rewards that other 
businesses would never get in luring a huge company like Amazon to set up there (Florida, 
2018).                                   
I M P L I C AT I O N S
Governments should subsidize more independent multi-disciplinary research evaluating 
ethical, social, legal, environmental and technological implications of future automation, 
while developing ideas for solving issues that might arise (Weber, 2018).    
                              
Smart policy, using tools both from America’s own experience and from models in other 
countries, can help alleviate the pain and spread some of that prosperity — but only if 




VA L U E S                                                                                                                               
L E AV I N G  T H E  VA L U E S  O F  S I L I C O N  VA L L E Y  B E H I N D 
 
From disaffected former residents of Silicon Valley to longtime citizens  
of far-away locales in-the-know emerges innovation hubs that offer more  
than quick riches and excess                                
S I G N A L S
Recently, Peter Thiel, the President Trump-supporting bil-
lionaire investor and Facebook board member, became Silicon 
Valley’s highest-profile defector when he reportedly told people 
close to him that he was moving to Los Angeles full-time, and 
relocating his personal investment funds there (Founders Fund 
and Mithril Capital, two other firms started by Mr. Thiel, will 
remain in the Bay Area). Mr. Thiel reportedly considered San 
Francisco’s progressive culture “toxic,” and sought out a city
 with more intellectual diversity (Roose, 2018).                                                     
Apple’s recent announcement that it’s building a new $1 billion 
campus in Austin, Tex. adds momentum to the trend among tech 
startups and investors to look beyond Silicon Valley to incubate 
and grow the next generation of innovative companies. More-
over, in what amounts to doubling down on its satellite strategy, 
Apple also said it will establish new sites in Seattle, San Diego, 
and Culver City, Calif., as well as expand in cities across the U.S., 
including Pittsburgh, New York, and Boulder, Colo. over the next 
three years — welcome economic boosts for those areas 
 (Shipley, 2019).                         
“We don’t believe in raising a lot of cash early on and then 
throwing all that money at the problem of not having a business 
model until somehow everything starts to work.” says Tailwind 
Founder and CEO Danny Maloney, who moved out to Oklahoma 
City to launch the business. He had to fight back against investor 
doubts about their location before getting funding. He did just 
that. “They said we had to prove it to them we could be succes-
 ful from here” (Reback, 2018)                     
                 






“How could you have this gross inequality, how could you have 
so many working people earning minimum wage? A quarter 
of them are earning minimum wage; a third of them can’t earn 
a living wage. And then the homeless situation is just beyond 
immoral. Perhaps the most disgusting homeless situation any-
where in this pretty heartless country.”
— Author Richard Walker of San Fransisco in conversation with
 Richard Florida (Florida, 2018).                               
                                                                                                                        
   
R I S K S
But tomorrow, will the Gateway cluster development still be able to retain and cultivate 
this center of employment and innovation in a landscape where its firms and workers 
demand a more dynamic, urban environment? (Benz, Storring, 2018).                                                                     
To what extent do concerns about localized gentrification distract from the potential of 
inclusive citywide economic growth? This question is especially hard to answer when an 
innovation district is young, and the upsides uncertain (Benz, Storring, 2018).                                          
M AT U R I T Y
Emerging
As the influence of Silicon Valley begins to wane and frustration of those who live there 
makes them look to other locales for a future that is more livable, the positive traits of 
many other cities are becoming more apparent.                                                          
I M P L I C AT I O N S
The coming years will likely prove that culture is a consideration that lies deeper than 
excitement generated around the quick establishment of a tech cluster or the explosive 
growth of a particular startup (Akkawi, 2017).                                                   
This evolution of remote workers (as opposed to gathering daily in a geographic cluster) 
will create both opportunities and challenges for communities throughout the U.S. — 
to provide both the education and quality-of-life options that top tech companies will 
require as well the infrastructure to make productive remote working possible (Shipley, 
2019). 
Source: Al Jazeera 
America
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C R I T I C A L  T R E N D S  
A N D  U N C E R T A I N T I E S                         
T H E  E V E R - C H A N G I N G  G E O G R A P H Y  O F  C L U S T E R S
O ver the last 20 years, the downtown centers of choice cities have accounted for a great percentage of more in-demand tech hires, compared with the influence of these centers two decades ago. Cities like Columbus, Ohio, have seen impres-
sive growth via tech cluster activity over the past two years. Growth in Silicon Valley, on 
the other hand, seems to have gone in a different direction. For the first time since 2011, 
net domestic migration to the Bay Area was negative, meaning that more Silicon Valley 
residents left the region for other parts of the country than arrived from other regions 
(Reback, 2017). The impulse for millennials to work in vibrant urban areas — with their 
inner-city atmosphere, walkable areas and amenities — will continue at the expense of 
the prevalent (and aging) corporate suburban complexes. For organizations contemplat-
ing moving their leaders or skilled employees to a downtown ‘innovation’ office, there are 
ba few important factors to consider. Uprooting an existing workforce or changing legacy 
customer locations and other elements of an existing cluster could mean that reloca-
tion will be disruptive, possibly offsetting the advantages of a move to the more exciting 
environment. Additionally, ideas generated within the urban talent hub may fail to spread 
to the rest of the organization. Additionally, talent may flow into an organization in a new 
creative urban hub, but it can just as easily flow out of the organization and into neigh-
boring competitors or other businesses. The poor alternative, however, is to be disrupted 
by the decampment of employees looking for the more dynamic working environment of 
downtown (Kerr, 2018).                                                                                                                                                                              
A newer generation of workers will be enthusiastic about centers of business that engage 
in what is known as “placemaking”, that offer greater community engagement, better 
health and other forward-thinking considerations for an improved quality of life (Vey, 
2018). However a significant number of people returning to the old urban centers could 
make excess urban density a problem once again. Placemaking can also be restricted 
by policies, practices, and investment structures that are failing to keep pace with the 
changing needs of firms, institutions, and workers, hampering the scope and scale of their 
impact (Vey, 2018). For example, local and regional planning organizations may advo-
cate for transportation, economic development, and land use policies and investments to 
support existing economic districts. Ostensibly created to trigger growth, government 
or philanthropic programs or private firms, anchor institutions, or other organizations 
looking for a development site may be reactive rather than strategic. With competition for 
resources and revenues among and within jurisdictions added to the equation, the result 
can be scattered, transactional, and uncoordinated development projects that do not add 
up in form or function in ways that help achieve larger economic goals. 
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Inclusive economic growth in another important uncertainty. In Silicon Valley, the feel-
ing of “scraping by on six figures” has become common for tech workers who feel poor in 
the tech bubble (Reback, 2017) with the increased cost of living that equates to fast rising 
food prices, utility costs, basic services, costs of housing and rental. Addressing these 
concerns is a major priority for future growth and prosperity of the urban innovation hub 
(Engel, et. al, 2018). The urban clustering of talent can instead result in a zero-sum situa-
tion of regional winners and losers. The wage gap between creative and routine workers — 
and between creative and routine metros — has increased considerably over time (Flor-
ida, 2016). The “blue-collar” tech worker that supports the forward-moving leaps of the 
tech trailblazer could be a promising future for many in cities like Columbus, Ohio, where 
a comfortable middle-class life is a possibility, or in Seattle’s plan for increasingly dense 
and numerous dwellings. Everyone appreciates centers of work where there are indus-
try-academic partnerships that satisfy the curiosity of the brightest creative workers and 
offer a way up for those who want to get out of the routine.                                                                                            
How does a city or region build an innovation hub where more than few can afford to live? 
Can Seattle provide the answer in their opting for density in their technology cluster 
planning? If so, cities will have to demonstrate a sustained commitment to building hous-
ing at a rate that is greater than their scope would ordinarily allow. Technology workers 
will make their homes there, but so will those not employed in tech (or so-called ‘blue 
collar tech’), who will likely be able to afford less than their high-tech counterparts and 
will benefit from rent that can be held down at reasonable levels (Smith, 2018). As a city 
that is growing at a rate that exceeds 50 of the country’s largest cities (including Sunbelt 
successes like Austin), Seattle’s ability to generate considerable opportunities even for 
those who aren't engineering or tech standouts can be a lesson for other cities (Smith, 
2018). This will be important as the largest companies move more of their operations to 
downtown areas. Innovation districts tend to reflect the knowledge-based industries that 
comprise them, and thus often lack diversity in terms of workforce, business ownership, 
and decision-making — which leads to patterns of low affordability (Benz, Storring, 2018). 
Developments like Columbia Gateway in Maryland seem to be leading the way in their 
dense, mixed-use, transit-connected area where startups, anchor institutions, and re-
search-intensive corporations cluster together and connect through community-oriented 




R O B O T S  A N D  A I  A R E  O N  T H E  V E R G E  O F  B R I N G I N G  
A B O U T  T H E  N E W E S T  S H I F T  I N  I N D U S T R I A L  C L U S T E R S
T hough the U.S. is still the leader in robotics innovation, robotics and AI will likely find a significant niche in multiple countries, while indications point to China in taking the lead in all things electronic. The healthcare, consumer, and 
manufacturing industries in particular will be big potential users of robots and AI, which 
will bring robotics partnerships, mergers and acquisitions (Demaitre, 2017). For all the 
jobs that robotics purportedly eliminate, it should be noted that regions in the U.S. where 
much of the manufacture of these robots occur are in Rust Belt metros, lead by Detroit, 
Chicago and Boston, with a few smaller metros in Ohio, Iowa and Colorado having high 
concentrations of robotics for their size. Places that serve as robotic integrators (de-
signing and implementing robotic systems) are also old Rust Belt manufacturing hubs 
(Lorinc, 2018). Could this lead to a scenario where those skilled in designing the future 
live in cities, while the manufacture of the machinery that will build this future can con-
tinue in the Rust Belt? If this is possible, it may lessen the continuing upheaval resulting 
from the severe ‘spikiness’ of the mega city as center of innovation, surrounded by the 
constrained, routine workforce that Richard Florida indicates is the possible future of 
lopsided regional progress.                                                    
Moore’s Law holds that robotics follow a trajectory of becoming concurrently ever-com-
plex and cheaper, making them increasingly attractive to all levels of manufacturing 
businesses. When combined with mobile computing and big data analytics, robotics and 
AI will transform not only strategies central to business operations, but also worker and 
customer experiences — and ultimately business models. The manufacturing process has 
always been subject to large-scale change, having been influenced so completely by pro-
ductivity-enhancing innovations of the past. It is estimated that AI will make a quarter 
of all factory tasks automated by 2030. An automotive think tank at the University of Wa-
terloo sees the age of “light out” factories in the future, with no workers at all. An autono-
mous truck would simply back up to the loading bay, and robots load or unload the vehicle 
(Lorinc, 2018). The switch to “Industry X.0” — a vast machine of connected technologies 
— is already being practiced by many companies attempting to keep up with the changing 
digital landscape. Getting it right is challenging — but the strong business case of data 
analytics, AI, and wireless connectivity makes it compelling to progressive businesses 
(Business Wire, 2018).                                                                                                                                                                              
  
Researchers suggest global spending on these technologies will be more than $200 billion 
(US) in the next five years (Lorinc, 2018). Mastering AI can enable industrial-equipment 
manufacturers to boost their market capitalization by as much as 25 percent (Business 
Wire 2018). Suppliers can also harness data analytics, and those that can identify compo-
nents at risk of failure will be favoured by automakers in particular. Multiple industries 
can benefit from adoption or expansion of automation, but only if they understand their 
own processes and needs and can work well with partners (RBR Insider, 2018). Though 
the areas of the U.S. Rust Belt where robotics are being manufactured is notable, the tech 
centers where applications are envisioned exist only in a narrow group of cities. At the 
same time, other parts of the world are stepping up, partly as a result of the exclusionary 
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and anti-innovation policies of the Trump administration, which may have lasting effects, 
especially on start-ups that heavily rely on international talent. Though the U.S. remains 
the world’s leading center for venture capital, trends from the past few years show the U.S. 
share of total venture capital investment has declined from roughly 70 percent in 2012 
to slightly more than 40 percent in 2017. Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific region has seen 
tremendous growth in venture capital funding, increasing its share from about 14 percent 
to nearly 40 percent. The rise of the rest of the world is the biggest challenge to America’s 
dominance in the coming decades (Florida, 2018).                                                                                                             
To what extent will the future favour the human mind? The complex tasks for the future 
will likely require multiple skills from different domains — skills of communication, 
logical reasoning, analytical skills, dexterity and visual stimuli among others. For these 
reasons, many have the view that automation will progress slower and will not be as 
disruptive as currently predicated. There could indeed be a cultural shift away from the 
dramatic forward momentum of technology, with potential resource scarcity, pollution, 
conflicts or other external influences necessitating a leveling of tech’s trajectory. Con-
versely, a widespread use of planned automation would accept that many tasks are better 
off automated, while at the same time valuing many human-only experiences (like many 
kinds of human-centered services). An example of a dramatic scenario would bring rapid 
automation and a questioning of values — like those of capitalism and innovation. In a 
world of full automation, Viktor Weber, writing for the World Economic Forum, has the 
opinion that “corporate monopolies that will have created these automated systems or 
amassed the most data, would eventually aggregate power and money, while breaking the 
logical implication from productivity gains to higher wages, because there would not be 
enough human jobs. In consequence the driver of growth, consumption, would be inhib-
ited. Social inequity in the extreme or a universal basic income could be a way of life.” 
Governments should subsidize more independent multi-disciplinary research evaluating 
ethical, social, legal, environmental and technological implications of future automation, 
while developing ideas for solving issues that might arise (Weber, 2018). 
Source:
Car Magazine;  
Brookings Institute
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P U S H I N G  A G A I N S T  O L I G O P O LY  A N D  D I S P E R S E D  
C L U S T E R  S U C C E S S
M any small towns have had enough of being left behind while superstar cit-ies take the future into their hands. An outbreak of new thinking seems to be raising the possibility of a response. The need for new policies is at the 
forefront of this thinking in pushing back against the extreme geographic divergence of 
economic success in the U.S. Scholars, journalists, politicians, local leaders, and investors 
are considering the cost of decades of inaction, and realize that “left-behind places” are 
no longer tenable (Galston, Hendrickson, Muro, 2018). The decision of tech companies to 
open headquarters in centers like New York and Washington demonstrates that strug-
gling cities cannot expect a single big gift from technology leaders that will ease their 
hardship (Irwin, 2018). New strategies need to be taken up so that the country’s employ-
ment gains can spread to new places other than New York, Boston, the Bay Area, Seattle, 
and Washington, D.C., along with fast-growing Sunbelt areas like Dallas, Atlanta, and 
Orlando (Vey, 2018). At the same time, recent developments suggest that large tech com-
panies may not have free rein to preside over a workforce of city people willing to go along 
with inequitable policies, no matter the firm’s hold on the public’s hearts and wallets.  
               
The big coastal cities that are drawing in much of the tech investment have limits to their 
viability. In February, 2019, Amazon indicated that it would pull out of an agreement to 
build a large corporate campus in New York when it encountered political resistance to 
Jeff Bezos’ lack of recognition towards unions and the expansive tax breaks that were 
promised by New York’s governor and mayor which drew the ire of many in the state as a 
proclivity towards more socialist policies becomes popular (Goodman, D, 2019). Though 
it may reflect a political failure on the part of officials who wanted opportunity for their 
region, it also “reflects the hubris of one of the world’s most valuable companies, which 
sought billions of dollars in tax incentives it didn’t need, and then got cold feet when local 
organizers and officials objected to that largess.” It also shows that making customers 
happy alone may not be enough to succeed when a firm is up against political resistance or 
criticism over corporate shortcomings (Roose, 2019).                        
Cities may in the future be more likely to disregard the concessions to large oligopolies in 
what is now seen as a race to the bottom in an effort to be one of the few who are chosen as 
headquarters or major satellite. Instead, it is argued that a region can improve its econom-
ic performance by improving its existing assets, rather than attempting a transformation 
by chasing industries situated elsewhere. Analytics can be used to understand what their 
sources of relative advantage are, while giving prioritized allowances for experimentation 
for those activities that leverage that which is unique, distinctive, and meaningful. This 
leads to a smarter type of economic development than simply chasing the next big thing 
(Dizikes, 2014). Taking a longer world-view of cluster development makes it easier to see 
beyond clusters as self-contained and localized to their more nuanced role as interactive 
spaces that foster communication and collaboration between foreign and local organiza-
tions and individuals and enable the integration of developing countries into the global 
economy (Hannah, 2017).
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Part of the crisis of capital that Silicon Valley is facing is socially-derived. Develop-
er-turned celebrities have centered around increasingly superficial social novelties — and 
have possibly lost what once made the Bay Area a center of important innovation — while 
other cities are filling the gap to produce more pragmatically important innovations. 
Will older cities take back the mantle of being the nation’s innovation hubs by catering to 
capitalists who require a more traditional quick cash-flow return on investment? Silicon 
Valley, in contrast, has been content to wait years to amass an uncertain customer base 
for an innovation before realizing profitability (Akkawi, 2017). Today, the number of new 
tech businesses is at a 30-year low; there are fewer and fewer tech IPOs and more and 
more acquisitions by the big five (Ecker, 2018). If oligopolization has set in, is there enough 
opportunity for smaller startups that have a chance of competing against the big five tech 
companies to be able to get a foothold without being bought up right away, or be crushed? 
We are entering a “third wave” of venture capital funding in tech companies, according to 
the Startup Ecosystem report. The first wave of tech startups were the original gateways 
to the internet, like AOL and Netscape; the second wave consisted of social media compa-
nies like Facebook and Twitter. The third wave, according to the report, will be defined 
by sophisticated “deep tech” firms, specializing in fields such as artificial intelligence and 
blockchain (Florida, 2018).                                                
Like tech, finance also tends to cluster. As the banking industry has become more con-
centrated, more and more of its wealth has been located in select areas. The five largest in-
stitutions now have nearly 50 percent of all banking assets. And while there are financial 
services operations scattered throughout the country, they are often badly-paid back-of-
fice operations. As bankers cluster around New York, Midwestern and rural America have 
fewer small, regional banks geographically proximate and culturally sympathetic to the 
small businesses that need investment and lines of credit (Ecker, 2018). Areas that are 
not obviously candidates will still need a heavy investment in digital skills, even in areas 
without a large existing high-tech sector. New channels will need to be in place to ensure 
that businesses in struggling areas have access to capital, including small-business lend-
ing from banks and venture capital for start-ups. There also needs to be more federal sup-
port for people who want to move to greater economic opportunity in the face of a decline 





C R E AT I V I T Y,  C A P I TA L ,  T O X I C  WA S T E L A N D
I n Silicon Valley, there has been an emigration to Central Valley of scores of middle- and working-class residents fleeing sky-high housing costs in the metro area (Ot-tenberg, 2018). There are also hundreds of thousands of people having to give up and 
move to Las Vegas, Reno or Oregon, or wherever the possibilities seem better for ordinary 
working people (Florida, 2018). This mirrors the emigration from older industrial cities 
with poor public transit to the Sun Belt cities with better roadways (but poorer wages). 
The sprawl pays its real estate investors, delivering profits through property investment 
and capital accumulation, not from building houses (Ottenberg, 2018). The Central Valley 
also receives emissions from massive traffic jams to the west. Although air pollution 
from traffic congestion and sprawl is the most visible environmental problem caused by 
Silicon Valley, there are others — including solvents that have moved under working-class 
housing areas near industrial zones. And solvents do not migrate to affluent Palo Alto or 
Menlo Park. Predictably, proximity to environmentally hazardous industry causes work-
ing-class neighborhoods and communities of color to be far more exposed to pollution 
than whiter and wealthier areas. The area also has another looming water problem in the 
rising sea level, with the Union of Concerned Scientists predicting chronic inundation all 
around San Francisco Bay by the end of the century (Ottenberg, 2018). Towns that want 
to become successful clusters will want to take heed of the unexpected environmental 
problems that resulted from Silicon Valley’s explosive growth and plan for transportation 
and housing accordingly.                                                                       
S C R A M B L I N G  F O R  T H E  L O C A L  T E A M :  P O L I T I C I A N S  
G A M B L E  O N  T H E  T I C K E T  F O R WA R D
A  major critical uncertainty is the future of politics and industrial clusters.    One question is what trajectory people’s confidence or distrust in government  will take in the years to come. In 2017–19, with the federal government mired in 
gridlock and hyper-partisanship, local leaders are stepping up in advancing solutions to 
their unique economic, social, and environmental challenges. As a result, the public main-
tains high trust in local government while its faith in federal institutions has eroded dra-
matically (Vey, 2018). Bay Area author Richard Walker comments that: “We have a long 
and pretty honorable tradition of progressive politics in the Bay Area. And the question is, 
where’s that going? Even though we’re still the bluest of the blue, that doesn’t necessarily 
mean that our radical edge, our progressive edge, is doing well. A lot of that has been blunt-
ed” (Florida, 2018).                                                      
Governments should subsidize more independent multi-disciplinary research evaluating 
ethical, social, legal, environmental and technological implications of future automation, 
while developing ideas for solving issues that might arise (Weber, 2018). Congressman Ro 
Khanna from Silicon Valley toured a depressed far-away state, and felt positive about the 
ways regions that have experienced hard times could create growth. He related that there 
are apprenticeship programs in these regions that pay; he also said that the job of the Val-
ley should be to support these programs, to look at investing in some of these programs, 
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and not to say, “Okay, we’re here to tell you what to do,” or, “We’re here to teach you.” 
It should be about partnership, empathy and an understanding and concern about the 
country’s future and everyone participating (Recode, 2017). Smart policy, using tools both 
from America’s own experience and from models in other countries, can help alleviate the 
pain and spread some of that prosperity — but only if voters demand that elected leaders 
choose to do so (Ecker, 2018). Given that service work is such a fast-growing sector of the 
economy, programs should be instituted to make sure that these service jobs are designed 
in a way that they can provide real financial value to firms and be entitled to compensa-
tion proportionate to that value.                                                   
L E AV I N G  T H E  VA L U E S  O F  S I L I C O N  VA L L E Y  B E H I N D 
O ther cities’ recent emergence as innovation or tech hubs may be an example of a more prudent business culture that has more to it than brilliant technologists or opulent living — but of hard work and getting things of value done with disci-
pline and dedication (Akkawi, 2017). Tailwind Founder and CEO Danny Maloney moved 
out to Oklahoma City to launch his own business, with the opinion, “We don’t believe in 
raising a lot of cash early on and then throwing all that money at the problem of not having 
a business model until somehow everything starts to work.” He had to fight back against 
investor doubts about their location before getting funding. “They said we had to prove 
it to them we could be successful from here” (Reback, 2018). A backlash against Silicon 
Valley values is now well underway, with the Bay Area increasingly coming to stand in the 
public’s mind for exploitation, excess and elitist detachment (The Conversation, 2018). 
In the interview given by a Bay Area congressman, he made clear the problems of Silicon 
Valley in its new San Francisco center:  
“How could you have this gross inequality, how could you have so 
many working people earning minimum wage? A quarter of them 
are earning minimum wage; a third of them can’t earn a living wage. 
And then the homeless situation is just beyond immoral. Perhaps 
the most disgusting homeless situation anywhere in this pretty 
heartless country. We are one of the leading generators of inequality, 
which is hidden because we look at our high median income — the 
highest in the world of any big city — and say, “Wow, that’s great. 
Capitalism lifts all boats” (Recode, 2017). 
It is a far cry from Patterson’s Dayton, where the city’s chief firm was committed to its 
citizens so wholeheartedly. There will probably always be positive lessons to draw from 
Silicon Valley — reasons why the Bay Area will likely be a center that ambitious people 
with ideas will still flock to for a while to come: the risk-taking and speed with which peo-
ple move, and the passion people have for developing ideas. A risk-taking attitude is key to 
the Valley's investment strength, and current lead over most U.S. cities. “Getting comfort-
able with risk is something they do in San Francisco better than anywhere,” according 
to David Hall (David Hall, partner, Rise of the Rest Seed Fund). “The investor class in 
cities we invest in are relatively risk-averse.” What cities across the United States need is 
more late-stage capital from more millionaires and billionaires “ready to double down on 
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their hometown” (Rosenbaum, 2018). Venture capitalists, who recognize a bargain when 
they see one, have already begun scouring the Midwest. Two investors recently amassed 
a $150 million in the “Rise of the Rest” fund. Backed by tech luminaries including Jeff 
Bezos of Amazon and Eric Schmidt, the former executive chairman of Alphabet, the fund 
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SCENA R IOS FOR  
THE FUTUR E
From the scanning of signals, trends, risks and  
implications derived from the present, we can envision  
futures that can take on radically different forms.    
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S E C T I O N A L I T Y ,  E Q U I T A B I L I T Y  
A N D  T H E  FA N T A S T I C A L                                         
T E C H  G E M S  I N  A  N AT I O N A L  WA S T E L A N D
T hree decades into the 21st century, The middle and wage-earning classes have emptied out of principle cities just as many residents were forced to leave San Francisco in the 2010s because of an explosion in the cost of living, leaving only wealthy “mansions on a 
hill” for tech superstars, with vast numbers of service and lower-skilled tech workers inhabiting 
far-flung outskirts – including communities that failed at revitalization efforts. This zero-sum 
world is a frustration for millenials, who grew up believing that vibrant urban areas are the spac-
es that provide the best quality of life, but now largely cannot afford to live in them. The present 
generation of workers have the feeling of being on the outside, looking in. This cost-of-living 
crisis has replicated itself in the centres of most major cities, including those that are not even on 
the list of the 20 largest in America – such as Boston, Denver, Washington, Nashville, Portland, 
Sacramento, Omaha, Minneapolis and Cleveland. These cities have joined a few expensive and 
congested “mega regions” of economic activity, surrounded (and fundamentally separated) by 
hundreds of miles of lower level service and manufacturing regions that lack diversity – while 
being economically and socially disconnected. Many companies that are not apart of these urban 
innovation hubs suffered from non-existent playbooks on how to enter the new technology revolu-
tion, failing to pay attention to the digital until it was too late; they would not survive the Kon-
dratieff Winter that ended in the mid-2020s. Those cities that survived the tension and trauma of 
the passing from K-Winter into the K-Spring largely swelled into mega regions of tech, enjoying 
the K-Spring of transformed value systems, social practices. organizational cultures, and new 
business models ushering in productivity not seen since the 1950s - ‘70s.                                                                          
The former corporate campuses of large organizations have closed down since moving to the 
downtown metros, or have dwindled in importance to become service centres or warehouses. 
The brightest staff had made it clear in the later 2010s that they wanted to be around people that 
are leading innovation, and companies had no choice but to move their leadership into downtown 
innovation labs, where talent is constantly flowing in (but also out) of companies. The digitaliza-
tion of businesses demanded by Industry 4.0 in needed a whole new set of tech leaders to oversee 
the myriad processes required to make the great leap to new business and manufacturing pro-
cesses, while redefining the nature of work. These digital leaders, who impart their knowledge 
into reimagining products, services and processes, are seen as more expansive in their skill level 
in comparison to the IT and IO leaders of the recent past – and the best of them live in the high-
priced downtown areas. These smart tech workers began to be paid more and more, now living in 
proximity to each other and assisting their community in getting hired for better salaries else-
where or starting spin-offs together. Other suburban offices held on for longer than they should 
have because of strategic but inflexible policies and investment structures intended to make 
existing outlying areas attractive for investment. The traditional long product development and 
sales cycles no longer worked for them, as the Schumpeter technology cycles should have made 
clear that the upward wave of new technology would run its course and then slope downward 
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much faster than in previous cycles. Businesses that kept their employees away from this envi-
ronment inevitably suffered a brain drain.                                                                                                                   
Manufacturing has moved almost entirely to India, China and Mexico, leaving the tech-for-
ward American cities to make innovation their main export, while compelling what talent is left 
throughout the nation to the biggest tech centres. Two terms of anti-innovation policies, poor 
investment and other exclusionary political actions during the late 2010s and early 2020s hurt 
the long-term wealth of the nation as a whole, which had difficulty meeting the challenges posed 
by other competing nations which took up the slack of forward-thinking investments.The less 
tech-forward cities have nothing but services to offer, and the population that works in these 
regions can only try for jobs that have some semblance of creativity in spite of the region-wide low 
pay. One bright spot in the nation is the manufacture of high-tech robots throughout the Rust Belt 
for the now-dominant AI world of the Sixth Kondratieff Wave. Organizations that prepared for the 
future based on reading historical K-Waves and their future implications understood that a great 
K-Spring of investment in previously-developed but under-funded robotics and AI would one day 
take hold, and prudently invested in its manufacture. The “blue collar” nature of employment for 
less-skilled tech workers of cities like Columbus, Ohio, remained middle class for a limited period 
of time, but in time experienced a race-to-the-bottom in wages. These formerly down-to earth 
centres of technology-supporting industry were a temporary bright spot for a struggling middle 
class to get a foothold in the tech industry. But as industry eventually made its way overseas, only 
the historical downtown areas were left to thrive, populated with well-paid tech investors and 
inventors. In the past, massive tech companies had been criticized for wielding outsized influence 
in regions, but the status-quo now sees the largest of these companies headquartered in only the 
largest tech-heavy cities, with nothing resembling a headquarters in any mid-sized town, in spite 
of promises of ever-more generous tax breaks. The talent just isn’t there to make those centres 
viable anymore.                                
Though the Kondratieff Spring of the mid 2020s witnessed rapid automation, with a new amass-
ing of data and wealth, a scarcity of resources and painful after effects resulting from armed con-
flicts were experienced during the Kondratieff Summer of the 2030s-40s, which saw a shift away 
from technological innovation for much of the population. Civic engagement is rarely encoun-
tered in the urban tech centres that survive – the population does not stay around long enough 
to foster it. The flow of talent in and out of centres of innovation never ends, largely because of 
neighborhoods constantly being transformed from livable spaces for up-and-coming tech workers 
to unaffordable, gentrified neighborhoods that increasingly take over much of a city’s blondaries. 
Many of the tech workers, in fact, will join the service workers on the outskirts of town where the 
only livable housing is. Sufficiently dense public transit, however, does not follow them with their 
heir displacement, and the problems of 21st century San Francisco are repeated time and again in 
multiple tech centres. The luster of being a member of a high-level cluster of creative and ambi-
tious design, finance and media professionals is becoming less attractive as time marches on. 
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THE RESIDENCES OF 
WEALTHY TECH STARTS




SERVICE SECTOR  
SEQUESTERED IN REGIONS 
BEYOND THE CITY CENTRE
I L L U S T R AT I O N  1 .  A  W E A LT H Y  T E C H  C I T Y  S U R R O U N D E D  B Y  D E C L I N E 
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A N  E V E N LY- D I S P E R S E D  W O R L D  O F  T E C H :  
T H E  G L O B A L  R O B O T I C S  I N D U S T R Y
T hough the U.S. had been the leader of robotics for some time, the rest of the world caught up, and now there are centers of invention and manufacture for robot-ics in numerous centers throughout the world. This development, however, did 
not spell doom for the U.S. industry, as the sheer variety of robots and their materials 
required for different manufacturing purposes throughout the world has necessitated 
several hundred plants and tech laboratories throughout the U.S., employing middle-class 
assemblers and the high-flying tech whizzes that design them. Robotics is now a high-
ly-flexible industry of hardware and software, where robots and factories are frequently 
customized for multiple jobs during their lifespan, allowing for new entrants to thrive. 
Meanwhile, the ever-growing need for data centers in the stable climate and geography of 
the Midwest and south west has created a number of construction opportunities for data 
centers. In time, there will be acquisition and mergers in the manufacturing of robots, but 
the industry created by the need for these high-tech and complex machines of industry 
will have provided 30 years of expansive manufacturing and engineering opportunities 
much like those Dayton and Detroit enjoyed in the first half of the 20th century.                         
                                              
Chattanooga, Dayton, Maryland and Columbus experienced their boom in entrepreneur-
ship the late 2010s and early 2020s, and two decades on, have continued to thrive based 
on the well-informed practice of customer-centered commercialization models applied to 
pockets of knowledge and talent that was previously latent but underdeveloped in these 
cities. This talent was supported by access to workshops where these tried-and-tested 
business and innovation models could be practiced and made to work for entrepreneurs 
and partners. To these business models, the GEMS framework provided guidance on the 
overall health of the clusters of which these cities were a part of, with cluster-wide results 
of success factors reviewed every quarter by leader firms, who make sure that important 
factor conditions are addressed by the various cluster agents, including important cul-
tural and social considerations. Universities and colleges were augmented by important 
technological centers on campus, where the all-important principles of digital transfor-
mation are taught to future local tech leaders who will help guide the city’s firms through 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In addition to centers of learning, electric and telecom-
munications utilities have prudently been incorporated by the cities themselves to avoid 
the loss of control of important infrastructure to far-away conglomerates that once held 
so much control over the affordability of utilities for the population of these clusters.                            
Columbus stands out as a centre for innovation where robotics are taught and built. Cen-
tered around a well-funded university, Columbus turned their institution into a centre 
for robotics innovation, where the processes of digitalization are pioneered by scores of 
graduates, many of which reside in the region, building up robotics firms and fostering 
spin-offs from success. Having been built, the new generation of robots require little 
manual attention once in operation in their respective end-use plants. It is the age of the 
“lights out” factory, where robots are commissioned into use, and are predominantly left 
to run for long manufacturing runs, sometimes lasting an entire business quarter. With 
manufacturing and delivery largely left to robots, a majority of middle-class workers have 
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thankfully been re-employed in the numerous value-creating functions that modern busi-
nesses must engage in to remain relevant: manning website chat bots, strategic thinking 
at all different levels for multiple business models and corporate efforts, an increased 
employment of personalized virtual selling, and other forms of quality personal atten-
tion now in demand. An embracing of the more intangible aspects of business have been 
a feature of this sophisticated world of business, where the manufacturing of objects and 
levers of finance are no longer the sole considerations of measuring the health of an orga-
nization and economy. To get to these new higher-value service jobs, a greater network of 
transit has been built in more cities, bringing back a world of dense mixed-use areas much 
like the downtown world of streetcars, storefronts, affordable retail and lake fronts that 
long ago were the thriving picture of American towns.                                                                                               
The older concept of manufacturing has long been discounted, with the dated policies of 
the 2010s and 20s abandoned for a widespread embracing of a more sophisticated view 
of what building things and serving customers entails for all levels of American talent 
and labour. The knowledge that clusters operating with these strategies put into place 
can boost their market capitalization by as much as 25 percent has been a motivator in 
moving to what has become the Industry 4.0 paradigm of industry. The use of data ana-
lytics as part of this evolution has been adopted at a moderate speed over a generation by 
industry leaders and suppliers alike, easing the disruption. A new ‘blue collar’ tech has 
been supported – a happy return to a strong middle class that lives alongside the wealthier 
tech leaders in well-planned urban centers typified by Columbus. Cities like this support 
a ‘mid-tech’ workforce that compose more than one half of all tech employment in regions 
that have embraced the Sixth Wave of new energy, AI, big data and other products and 
enablers of the new digital industries. This is true even in Chicago, where greater access 
to helpful business models have lessened the blight of poverty-stricken areas and have 
moved more citizens into the creative culture. Massive companies like Amazon have 
retreated somewhat from the consciousness of innovation leaders as a force to emulate 
or attract to cities, while the desire for companies to become mammoth conglomerates 
has waned after being compelled to pay their fair share of taxes demanded by the current 
generation.  
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USING STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE CLUSTER 
ADAPTABILITY, HISTORICAL CYCLES OF  
INNOVATION TO UNDERSTAND THE PAST  
AND THE FUTURE, AND THREE HORIZONS  
TO INVENT PROJECTS AND STRATEGIES TO 
BRING EACH OTHER INTO THAT FUTURE
IN THE 2030s, DAYTON IS A PART OF MANY 
FORMERLY DEPRESSED REGIONS THAT HAVE 
EXPERIENCED A RE-EMERGENCE BASED ON AN 
EVENLY-DISPERSED INDUSTRY OF ROBOTICS 
AND THE USE OF BETTER BUSINESS MODELS
I L L U S T R AT I O N  2 .  F U T U R E  D AY T O N  C L U S T E R  S U C C E S S 
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A  W O R L D  S H A P E D  B Y  A N  U N K N O W N  N E W  E C O N O M Y
T he world’s economies are fundamentally different in the Kondratieff Spring of the 2030s. But before that happens, the K-Winter of tepid investment and growth had to run its course. Resembling time periods of the past (namely the 1930s), 
America continued to experience a “Great Devaluation” in financial markets that started 
in the mid-2000s, experienced a crash, and then lived in the long shadow of slow and dis-
appointing economic growth, with chronic underemployment of labour and capital. Like 
in all K-Winters, a lack of enthusiastic investment, fears of deflation, troubling inequality 
and the failure of banks to spur healthy consumption were hallmarks of the cycle ending 
in the mid-2020s. Indeed, there was an every-nation-for-itself mindset reminiscent of 
the ‘30s, when peace-keeping alliances gave way to authoritarian havoc that portending 
a terrifying future. The change from the long K-Winter to the K-Spring saw the creative 
destruction of public institutions – some dysfunctional, others necessary and life-giving 
– and an ultimate shifting of power and wealth from the old to the young.                                                                            
A debt crisis grew as businesses continued to hoard cash as the K-Winter lengthened into 
the 2020s, delaying investments. And as China’s exports declined, it bought fewer U.S. 
Treasuries, influencing interest rates to fall, impacting the U.S. economy in unprecedent-
ed ways. The K-Spring was to be a new golden age, but by definition needed to be heralded 
by traumatic adverse events to galvanize public action, as the Fourth Turning generation-
al theory suggests. Indeed, war happens in every Fourth Turning. This cycle coincides 
with the Kondratieff Winter which began in 2008, and lasts until the  end of the 2020s. 
The tremendous fortunes wasted on warfare in faraway places made the situation much 
worse than it could have been. Much of the 2020s was demoralizing, with rising prices, 
stagnant wages and a dearth of international competitiveness manifested in the U.S. Ig-
noring the need for basic research in things like AI greatly decreased the capacity to lead 
the next wave of innovations that would have given the U.S. the leading edge in things like 
military technology, while students from other countries have become the leading-edge 
mathematicians and engineers, beneficiaries of a far-advanced level of education in 
the top categories. By 2030, the U.S. had lost its status as the world’s dominant reserve 
currency – a milestone in its ultimate loss of influence. This occurred while being contin-
uously and threateningly challenged by China, Russia and others for control over oceans, 
space and cyberspace. These factors brought about a complete rewriting of what can be 
considered the American social contract.                                                              
                              
The world of the Sixth Kondratieff Spring could hardly have been planned for. The bare-
ly-conceived of technological discoveries of the 2030s have revolutionized the already 
altered mega-political reality of an expanded information technology. Most tried-and-
tested business models centered on innovation bringing about capital have been totally 
wiped out, with outer-space travel defining the age. A group of scientists from a China 
mega region displaced Tesla to conquer matter itself, transforming the lives of everybody. 
Energy from shale deposits – removed from the earth in newly-efficient ways that have 
stretched the earth’s deposits ever-longer – have created a stronger dollar that for the next 
decade will restore investor confidence, at least until the 2050s. Concentrated solar-pow-
ered energy, including solar photovoltaics is still popular among some quarters, complete-
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ly running countries like Germany, though the cost has not quite dropped in the way the 
previous generation expected it would.                            
China, as expected, became the production powerhouse for the world, “thanks to low 
wages, cheap loan capital, entrepreneurial power centers, and the creation of capital 
goods, which have far outpaced the rest of the capital world.” Like the American industri-
al clusters of old, Chinese assemblers numbering in the hundreds of thousands of workers 
succeed with cluster architectures of excellent balance among firm and system agents, 
while working with nimble and inexpensive delivery systems that guarantee on-time 
delivery that has come close to Amazon’s decades-old dominance of moving things. 3-D 
printing of bionics and organics took their turn at disruption for many industries, varied 
from orthodontics to fast food. Combined with nano technology, plastics and many fabrics 
have rivaled metals for sheer strength, making all kinds of products lighter and stronger 
for quick delivery via suppliers and retailers, heightening profitability. These nanoparti-
cles may become the properties of everything, while biomaterials and bio-processes will 
eliminate the excessive use of non-renewable materials, processes, and destructive cycles 
of industry. Modern renewable energy can become a substitute for fossil fuel in the gener-
ation of power, heating and cooling, transportation fuel and off-the-grid energy services  
(Casti, Wilenius, 2013). These innovations are but one of a parade of other innovations 
that have seen profitable use in the K-Spring, including advanced robotics, autonomous 
vehicles, energy storage, advanced oil and gas exploration and recovery and renewable en-
ergy. Then again, new technology and prices could fail rapidly just as a Kondratieff Spring 
is underway, the outcome of a dramatic X-Event.                                                         
Thanks to The Dog Bone Portfolio: A Personal Odyssey into the First Kondratieff Winter, 
by Margret Kopala and John Budden for insights on what this particular scenario may hold 
for the future.
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IN THE KONDRATIEFF WINTER, THE FEDERAL  
RESERVE WILL NO LONGER HAVE AMMUNITION  
TO WITHSTAND THE NEXT SHARP RECESSION,  
HAVING FORCE-FED BILLIONS INTO BANKS DURING 
THE 2008–10 RECESSION
THE END OF A KONDRATIEFF WINTER FEATURES 
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEMS THAT  
SUSTAINED THE THE LONG WAVE OVER DECADES, 
WHERE FINANCIAL , BUSINESS AND SOCIAL  
MODELS PROVE NO LONGER USEFUL 
INNOVATIONS THAT BEGAN APPEARING IN THE 
K-WINTER NOW TAKE HOLD IN THE K-SPRING: 
A NEW ENERGY MATRIX WITH SOLAR, WIND, 
BIOMASS AND SHALE FRACKING, USE OF BION-
ICS AND DRONE DELIVERY
EXCESSIVE DEBT CAN ONLY BE ADDRESSED 
THROUGH GROWTH, INFLATION OR DEFAULT. 
THE LACK OF GROWTH IN THE K-WINTER MAKES 
DEFAULT THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO, CLEAR-
ING THE WAY FOR FUTURE GROWTH
THE RISE OF CHINA, 
 REPRESENTED IN THEIR 
DOMINANCE OF SPACE 
TRAVEL AND EXPLORATION 
I L L U S T R AT I O N  3 .  L E AV I N G  A  K O N D R AT I E F F  W I N T E R ,  H E A D I N G  I N T O  T H E  S P R I N G 
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DISCUSSION
This section will attempt to give insight to the future  
development of clusters (especially the upcoming  
Kondratieff Sixth Wave) based on the cumulative  
lessons in this study — stages of clusters, strategy 
frameworks and forecasting. Avenues for future  
research are suggested, along with acknowledgments  
of the limitations of this study.




T he life cycle of industrial clusters follow two varieties of paths, each providing its own insights: the first are three stages specifically associated with cluster development; and second, where the emergence, maturity and decline of clusters 
fall on multiple historical waves of innovation/technology and finance. The three stages 
can be used by cluster leaders to understand which stage they are approaching in their life 
cycle. As a tech cluster, for example, New York City can be seen as living in its first stage 
as an emerging tech cluster, where agglomeration benefits are starting to materialize – 
albeit at a more measured pace since Amazon’s decision to not set up headquarters there 
in February, 2019. From the vantage point of this first stage, New York can look towards 
the second stage of the cluster life cycle, where the consolidation of firms, growth of in-
frastructure and standardized processes will herald the cluster’s maturity, while greater 
costs of doing business and other looming negative agglomeration externalities may point 
to an uncertain future with the third and final stage of cluster development in sight. The 
case studies of Dayton, Detroit and Hartford ultimately demonstrate all three stages, and 
their narratives offer up factors that can be read as signposts of warning for a developing 
cluster. There are lessons in strategies, attitudes, culture and reaction to change in the 
analysis of these case studies that leaders of a cluster can identify as forthcoming issues 
that can be addressed before they happen. A moral attributed to many thoughtful people 
throughout history is that “only fools learns from their own mistakes. The wise learn 
from the mistakes of others.”         
                           
The historical cycles of innovation, on the other hand, show circumstances and develop-
ments that may seem out of a cluster’s control, but can be planned for and capitalized on. 
The upcoming Kondratieff Spring, according to Margret Kopala and John Budden, will 
breathe revolutionary life into: 
space travel, quantum teleportation, shale energy, cheap solar and 
photovoltaics, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, 
Higgs Boson, Khan Academy, big data, internet of things, carbon 
capture and storage, life extension processes and products (Budden,
                           Kopala, 2015).                              
Along with these scientific developments (much of it a part of Industry 4.0), Budden and 
Kopala predict war – no less than World War III – instigated over South Pacific, Eastern 
Europe or Arctic resources. This will occur over the usual span of the K-Spring where 
similar conflicts within past waves are plotted. A K-Summer recession in 2036 is identi-
fied, followed by several years of expanding credit lasting until 2047 when the new econ-
omy bubble crashes, ushering a K-Winter depression lasting until perhaps 2065 (Bud-
den, Kopala, 2015). K Waves should then be seen as a combination of trends and critical 
turning points before rolling into the new trend, following a cyclical history of observable 
temporal changes. Markku Wilenius and John Casti identify the most shocking turn-
ing points as X-Events that are even more dramatic turning points, as identified in their 
exploration of the Sixth Wave; these can take the form of hurricanes, asteroids and other 
shocking events. Indeed, anything can happen given the coming together of context and 
a random trigger. Complex situations require complex thinking and structures; without 
this, a complexity gap can develop. How an established system might collapse can be 
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determined by the size of this complexity gap from the triggering event  (Casti, Wilenius, 
2013). Once a collapse or disruption occurs, can there be a rebirth?                                                                        
Institutions, clusters and firms can only do so much to prepare for seemingly random 
events that can end a trend. And though Kondratieff Wave theory suggests a cycle length 
of 40-60 years, might an X-Event shorten this considerably? Like Schumpeter waves, 
could K-Waves become progressively shorter as developments and events occur at faster 
intervals? Should Budden and Kopala’s long-wave future of more than 40 years be treat-
ed as an actuality? Certainly not on its own. It needs to be reinforced with other sig-
nals, trends and foresight work from other authors and methods to create a reasonable 
multi-decade look into the future to prepare for. One of these methods is Three Horizons, 
which offers a convivial approach to plotting and solving for the future. But Budden and 
Kopala are basing their assessment of what is to come on the empirical plotting of similar 
trends and events on multiple historical waves going back over 200 years. It shows that 
the above technologies are currently being developed, but are underfunded or otherwise 
not yet diffused throughout society to their fullest advantage. This current K-Winter will 
give way to the wholesale movement of investors into these sectors in the K-Spring. This 
is why waves of innovation like those of Kondratieff are valuable for foresight work when 
paired with strategic frameworks for success. One study strengthens the other.  Looking 
to the Sixth Wave will offer predictions based on observing trends and extrapolating on 
them based on its upward trajectory.                                                                                                                                   
The Sixth Wave may be a future of scarcity, abundance, fragility or an astounding era of 
evolution. Given the technological and scientific innovations fermenting as we enter the 
2020s, a revolutionary paradigm shift is expected to be the only insurance against the 
massive changes brought about by order-of-magnitude shifts in the environment and 
world population. Europe, for example, is on trend to experience an astounding drop in 
population before the century is through (Germany will see a population of 80 million 
decline to just 40 million by 2100). North America and Latin America will see a moder-
ate stalling of population, with the U.S. likely to be able to take care of its old during this 
century, care of a robust-enough infrastructure (at least in comparison to places like the 
Middle East). Literacy, it is suggested, may be the cause of this population drop, and large 
nations might get a lot smaller over time. A global food crisis might be another reason for a 
disruption in populations, ushering in protectionist policies and the breakdown for stasis 
of international agreements (Casti, Wilenius, 2013). Technological and social infrastruc-
ture will need to be willed into reality so that people can lead more meaningful lives. 
There will be more networking opportunities in the new digitized space that has been 
created, whether it remains a free-for-all public arena or a platform for private sharing.                   
Society itself may become more local and private, given the severe distrust in institutions 
that has become a hallmark of the past decade, rising sharply in its trend year after year, 
driven by an unrelenting pursuit of special interests. Or will a Fourth Turning, in its cy-
clical fashion, bring us together as the new generation ages into their future Hero clothes? 
Whatever the resulting upward trajectory, we know from cyclical history that at a certain 
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point the revolutionary and profitable new technology networks will offer diminishing 
returns, with the familiar stagnation of credit demand and the dropping of interest rates 
ending at the nadir of the K-Winter cycle. The key drivers of the coming Sixth Wave vary 
among authors of long wave studies. It can – and certainly has – been argued that perhaps 
Kondratieff and Schumpeter Waves are too deterministically loaded to be of great use 
in an increasingly complex and unpredictable world. And whatever the coming decade 
brings in cyclical familiarity or random disruption, there will be massive learning chal-
lenges for societies. The present systems will simply not take us to where we need to go 
(Casti, Wilenius, 2013).                                 
The GEMS framework indicates what firms and clusters need to be good at for their 
cluster to succeed, and can function as a sort of checklist of ‘ducks in a row’ for maintain-
ing that fitness. GEMS bears some resemblance in practice to the Balanced Scorecard 
framework for organizational strategic thinking, in that it encourages a balanced con-
sideration of multiple factors for successful big picture planning of activities in service 
of an agreed-upon purpose. This study includes a table of GEMS factors populated and 
cross-referenced with examples of how each case study realized success with each factor, 
illustrating the varied efforts a firm or cluster can execute on to help achieve long-term 
survival. The study of cluster theory beyond the three stages of cluster development and 
recognition of the importance of complex systems thinking can strengthen the grip leader 
firms have on cluster success and adaptability. Put together, it would be demanding to 
adopt all of these frameworks and theories synchronously – but the more strategic, histor-
ical, foresight and theoretical arms that can be brought to bear on a subject as elaborate 
as industrial clusters, the better the chances component firms will have for surviving as a 
cluster.                                   
 
 
F U T U R E  R E S E A R C H
E mbracing complexity in systems thinking is touched upon in the theory section of this paper. While the GEMS framework has been introduced as a strategic device for addressing some of the complexity of industrial clusters, there is 
key additional literature in the field that offers guidance on applying new structures, 
functions and processes that have the ability to be responsive in a fluctuating business 
landscape. This is a highly-relevant skill in a world increasingly affected by chaos and 
complexity. Systems thinking is composed feedback loops and delays, pathways, redun-
dancies, external shocks, diversity and other elements that are part a language to be mas-
tered in solving the problems of the world by restructuring one’s environment for agility 
in recognizing changed circumstances, and then adapt to the change. The properties that 
make up this structure to assist in assimilating shocks (while probably not remaining the 
same afterwards) will forever be reconstituted and tested for success. Though some of the 
literature has suggested systems approaches for the lifecycle of industrial clusters, more 
work can be done in combining the basic systems rigging to create ideal systems that can 
work alongside other strategic and historical/foresight exercises. 
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The writing of Alfred Marshall, Michael Porter and Richard Florida have been often cited 
as key to understanding the benefits and risks of firm agglomeration into clusters. The 
writing of Jane Jacobs is only briefly touched on in this paper, and is recognized as being 
very important for studying urabanization, and probably by extension, industrial clusters. 
She was the first to write about the idea that cities are the key forces of wealth, rather than 
nations. With select cities transforming into mega regions of tech wealth, how do Jacobs’ 
writings on the livability of the dense urban centre suggest we preserve the benefits she 
outlined that are important for future urban planning? Can top-down cluster develop-
ment in bringing numerous ingredients together derived from frameworks like the GEMS 
model bring success to clusters, or is it really just hard-working entrepreneurs combined 
with geographical factors that bring an emergence about? These experiments throughout 
the world are being attempted now, with different combinations of firms, institutions, 
populations, infrastructure and beliefs. Each of these places can be treated like a case 
study with factors that can be entered into a table to monitor their respective successes or 
failure, which can add greatly to future study of clusters. Further study of Dayton’s new 
innovation labs would offer up much insight for follow up, as they have been very active in 
publishing their vision, frameworks and activities relating to their activities as an emerg-
ing centre of downtown innovation.                                 
Industrial clusters abroad are an area of study that would contribute to North Ameri-
can attitudes and habits in the management of regions of innovation. The Italian textile 
industry in particular has been cited as exhibiting successful organizational practices, 
with economic downturns and downsizing over the years failing to seriously diminish 
its strength by new competitors. There seems to have been fairly good academic stud-
ies relating to this industry, with frameworks that attempt to demonstrate its success 
as something that can be repeatable for other industrial clusters. On the financial side, 
further research into money markets, the Federal Reserve system, deflation and infla-
tion, national debt, the stock market and other aspects of monetary policy are obviously 
important as to what will occur in society over the next decade and more. Not going to 
depth on these subjects was certainly a limitation of this paper, and might have made an 
economic cycle such as Elliot waves more prominent in the writing, possibly brought up 
to the same level as Kondratieff Waves in attention paid in the section on long waves. A 
detailed examination of exactly how a particular cluster might use the strategic frame-
works, historical waves, foresight method and case study comparison all together has not 
been laid out here, as I think a suggested formulaic approach might draw an unnecessary 
boundary for readers as to how all these varied instruments might work in concert.   
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C O N C L U S I O N                                
A s stated in the discussion of long wave theory, Kondratieff waves of historical innovation may not have always been embraced by most economists, but care-fully following the development of innovation, its investment and diffusion over 
the decades cannot help but offer insights to those who want to see their industry and 
others spread itself over waves of emergence, maturity and decline. To me, the pattern of 
innovations being developed during a cycle of collapsed capital and low growth — then 
see consummation in a new Spring with all the disruptions and ferment that the rise of 
automobiles in the 1900s–20s and Silicon Valley saw with transistors in the 1950s–60s is 
compelling. At the very least, it should spur regions to prepare for the next cycle based on 
signals, trends and people who are going out on a limb to imagine new scenarios for a fu-
ture just around the corner. Spending time with K-Waves looking backwards in time and 
forwards into the future seems to offer a more substantial grounding for foresight work, in 
allowing us to look at the big picture instead of only peering around the corner. In trying 
to plan for a world of innovation that has undoubtedly demonstrated patterns of rise and 
decline, knowing where we have come from matters.                                                    
To this somewhat controversial study of historic waves foretelling the future (Kon-
dratieff, after all, was executed in Stalinist Russia for his unpopular insights that predict-
ed long-term American prosperity), we can append the general stages of cluster life cycles 
discussed to allow firms and regions the general good things they should be seeing in the 
emergence of their own cluster, followed by milestones that signify a maturation, and 
finally the signals of agglomeration externalities that may spell doom for the region and 
its firms. These stages and waves have been demonstrated in five case studies that hope-
fully show similarities between the life cycles of industries that once stood as models of 
American proficiency and prosperity, and those that are in their emerging or mature form. 
When taking them in as a whole, one can make sense of these patterns to more completely 
plan for being adaptive in the face of industry-changing possibilities or threats, including 
those that would seem to be out of one’s control. Knowing what a successful architecture 
of clusters might look like also helps, and the GEMS model can influence clusters to have 
sufficient variety in its arsenal throughout the stages of its life cycle to allow for an ex-
tended life in a very complex world of competition and globalization.                                                                    
Finally, having achieved a greater understanding of cluster theory, its workings, a larger 
history and possible future, the people who populate clusters can come together around 
a foresight framework like the Three Horizons to try to plan for a future with a more 
refined consciousness. Ultimately, needs arising from the observed limitations of existing 
ways will prompt a new awareness of how we can make society smarter and more human 
through the use of now-developing technologies in concert with humanity, to the point of 
extending the power of our own minds. In thinking about the long past, workaday pres-
ent and uncertain future, we can use this greater contextual awareness to create a more 
informed future as we head towards a new wave just beyond the horizon.
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